HL Deb 06 March 1856 vol 140 cc1931-50

Upon Motion as to the first of these Bills. That the Bill be now read 2a,

EARL GREY

My Lords, before these Bills are read a second time, I think it is necessary that the House should consider the grounds upon which we are called upon to make this addition to the national debt. I do not mean to offer any opposition to the passing of the Bill, but I cannot consent to allow a measure of this description to pass without expressing my strong opinion of the impolicy of the measures which have rendered necessary this addition to the national debt. I would remind your Lordships that, within the financial year now about to close £23,000,000 have already been added to the debt—£16,000,000 by means of a direct loan, and about £7,000,000 by an issue of Exchequer bills. We are now called upon to agree to a Bill which sanctions a further loan of £5,000,000 thus making a total addition to the national debt within the financial year of no less than £28,000,000. I must also beg to remind your Lordships that these sums only provide for expenditure which requires to be met immediately. We have been told upon the highest authority that these sums will only provide for those expenses of the war which must be paid before the termination of the present financial year—that is, up to the 1st of April next—so that, even if the war be ended to-morrow, we may be certain there will be further large sums to be provided for in the ensuing year, to meet charges already incurred, and as to the means of raising which we have as yet no information. I cannot but regard this course as a great departure from what was announced to be the policy of the Government at the commencement of the war. At that period we were told, not, indeed, that the whole supplies for the war should be raised within the year for which they would be required—that, as I understood, was never intended—but the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I believe, said, and said wisely and properly, that it was the deliberate opinion of the Government of that day—of which a majority of the Members of the present Government were also Members—it was the deliberate opinion of the Government that a great effort should be made to raise at least a large proportion of the expenses of the war by means of taxation rather than by loans. I have pointed out to your Lordships that within one financial year we have raised and are raising £28,000,000. The Chancellor of the Exchequer is reported to have stated lately that the whole expenses hitherto incurred on account of the war amount to £46,000,000. But besides the£28,000,000 which I have already mentioned as having been raised within the present year, there was also a sum raised in 1854, the exact amount of which I am unable to arrive at, but I believe a sum of £3,000,000 or £4,000,000 was raised in the course of that year. Therefore the total amount of debt already incurred on account of the war is certainly not less than £30,000,000. I believe it somewhat exceeds that amount. In round numbers, then, out of £46,000,000 of expenses you have provided for three-fourths by means not of taxation but of loans. [The Earl of DERBY: Two-thirds.] The precise proportion must depend on the addition made to the debt in 1854—at all events, somewhere between two-thirds and three-fourths of the whole expenses have been met, not by taxation, but by loans. I confess that appears to me to be a most injudicious policy. I think the original intention of the Government at the commencement of the war was far wiser than the course that has been since adopted; because it is admitted by all who are conversant with such matters, that in the end the sacrifices imposed upon a nation by taxation are considerably less than those caused by raising loans. At the end of a certain number of years, if a calculation be made of the total amount raised in the country by the two modes of providing for the expenditure, it is notorious that much less is really required when vigorous efforts are made at first to raise whatever may be needed by means of taxation. It is certain that whatever facility maybe obtained at first by raising loans is in the end more than balanced by aggravated pressure on the people. But the moral effects of large borrowing are far worse. It is quite as true of nations as of individuals, that "borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry," and we know that the practice of raising large sums by loans invariably leads to extravagance in the public expenditure, and to the neglect of all wise precautions in seeing that the money so raised is properly applied. I think there never was a case in which that truth was more clearly proved than the present. It is impossible to look at the estimates which have been laid before the other House of Parliament during this and the last Session without seeing that all idea of economy has been absolutely scouted. I know it is said that in war we should be above all considerations of economy. I entirely differ from that opinion. I quite agree that you ought not to allow yourself to be deterred by considerations of expense, from adopting the most vigorous and effective means of bringing the war to a successful termination. I admit that it would be bad economy to allow yourself to be deterred by their cost from adopting the measures best calculated to bring the war to an early and successful termination. But, on the other hand, I contend that the greater the war, the heavier the pressure on the resources of the country, the more it is necessary that a wise economy should be exercised—I mean that economy which consists in taking care that the money expended should he expended to the best advantage. A very cursory examination of the votes of the present year will, I think, show that this principle has not been acted upon. If it had, this subsidiary loan would, in my opinion, have been unnecessary. I wish to call the attention of your Lordships to the enormous expenditure on account of the militia. Parliament is called upon this year to provide in one way or another for the militia a sum that exceeds rather than falls short of £4,000,000, a similar expense having been incurred last year. Now, when the nature of the present war is considered, it cannot be pretended that there is the slightest danger of attack at home, and it appears to me that this is a most enormous sum which has been wasted or worse than wasted. And what return has the country had for their past expenditure on account of the militia? The noble Lord at the head of the Government is reported to have said that the number of trained recruits who have joined the army from the militia during the present year is 24,000. Is not the expense incurred most enormous in comparison with the result? Can any one doubt that if even a part of this £4,000,000 had been judiciously applied to the regular army the Government might have obtained a larger number of recruits, and might have kept up the army to the complete strength voted by Parliament, instead of allowing it to be at one time 40,000, and afterwards 20,000 below the numbers voted by Parliament? The clearest evidence, however, of the want of economy is to be found in the Vote for works and fortifications; and this is the Vote to which I wish to draw special attention. Last year I protested against the outlay under this head, and this year I feel bound to repeat this protest. The Government this year ask Parliament to vote for fortifications and works at home and abroad no less than £1,700,000, being an increase of £600,000 upon the large Vote of £1,100,000 taken for this purpose last year. The majority of these new fortifications and works are admitted to have no reference to the present war. The Vote is chiefly for fortifications on the coast; but during the present war, at least, fortifications upon the coast are not required, and most of those in contemplation are not expected to be completed until after the war is over. On these grounds, therefore, I think there is strong reason for objecting to this Vote. The pressure upon the resources of a nation by a war expenditure is not to be measured merely by the amount of taxes levied on the people. The increased taxes, indeed, and the large sums borrowed form the smallest part of the pressure brought to bear upon the resources of a country. Every addition of expenditure withdraws something from the general means of the population. Whatever is added to the Government expenditure is necessarily taken away in some shape or other from the expenditure of individuals. Take the case of the screw colliers, withdrawn by the Government from the trade in which they are engaged in bringing the supply of coals to the metropolis. The public are deprived of the advantage and economy of the employ of these vessels, and the consumer and the trailer have to pay a higher price in consequence of the demand for these vessels. Every additional artisan employed in the Government dockyards, every additional labourer who is tempted into the army, and every additional pound laid out upon any of the various purposes of war is so much withdrawn from the great work of production which is continually going on to meet the multitudinous wants of a great nation. It is perfectly true that, in consequence of the wide change in our commercial policy ten years ago, and the great improvement in the condition of the country, the burden of the present war has been borne with greater ease than might have been anticipated; but it is idle to say that this burden is not felt. Your Lordships may see the severity of this burden in the war prices of all the great articles of consumption, in the rate of wages, and the interest of money; and you may trace its effect in restricting many valuable enterprises and useful undertakings. Such being the inevitable effect of war, it is the bounden duty of the Government and of Parliament to abstain, as far as possible, from increasing this necessary pressure, from aggravating this disturbance of industrial enterprise by any demands upon the public that can possibly be postponed. Last year I maintained that fortifications and works which were not neces- sary for purposes of defence ought to be postponed. The Secretary of State for the War Department met this argument last year by reasoning which, I confess, surprised me. He said, "It is very true these things may not be wanted now; but Parliament is in the humour to give us the money, and, if we wait, we do not know that the humour will continue." It is a most extraordinary argument to come from a Minister of the Crown, that because the nation is unduly excited, because the war fever is upon the people, the Government will take advantage of the circumstance, and hurry them into injudicious expenditure which they will afterwards regret. The Government ought to know that the greater the extravagance now the greater will be the reaction of the public mind by and by, and the greater the indisposition to afford to future Governments the means of keeping up naval and military establishments equal to the real wants of the country. I say further, that these works ought not to be pressed forward at this moment, because there is a moral certainty that they cannot be executed to advantage during a time of war. War increases the price of labour and material, and the same works will cost much more now than if executed hereafter, during peace. But, moreover, it is quite certain that in time of war the mode of applying these large sums cannot receive proper consideration. The war itself necessarily absorbs the whole energies and thoughts of Her Majesty's Government and of the military departments, and, when their thoughts are taken up and their best energies are tasked to the utmost with the duties of making arrangements for the efficient prosecution of hostilities, they cannot possibly enter, with due deliberation, into the very difficult questions of how fortifications, barracks, and other military works are to be constructed upon a wise and permanent plan. We ought to take warning from the past. The country has already had some experience on the subject. Millions upon millions have been lavished upon fortifications since the peace of 1815, and of all those millions, I will venture to say, three-fourths have been actually wasted, a considerable proportion has been worse than wasted. I will prove to the satisfaction of any man of ordinary judgment that it would be worth while to spend a great deal of money to pull down many of the fortifications which have been erected during that period. We have experience of the manner in which the public money has been wasted, and with that experience will you commence fortifications and military works which are to cost many millions to finish, which, if left unfinished, will be useless, and which are planned upon the same principles, and by men of the same school as those former works that have caused so much public disappointment? Such a course would be in the highest degree imprudent and injudicious, if we had no special grounds to warn us against it. But it must be well known to most of your Lordships that men of the highest ability have lately come forward and asserted that the principles of fortification upon which we have been acting are altogether erroneous, that a totally different system ought to be followed, that the money already spent has been absolutely wasted, that many of the new principles for which they contend have been adopted by Russia, that the Russians have recognised the superiority of the new over the old system, that they have adopted it, so far as was practicable, during the emergency of war, and that to their adoption must be mainly attributed the skill and efficiency displayed in Russian works, and the unquestionable superiority of Russian engineers over English engineers, during the memorable siege of Sebastopol. Your Lordships will perceive that I am alluding to the writings of Mr. Fergusson. I am not qualified to pronounce whether Mr. Fergusson's opinions are right or wrong; but this I will say, that Mr. Fergusson has unquestionably had the best of the argument with the old school, and that his views are supported with extraordinary ability, with powers of reasoning I have rarely seen equalled, and have commanded the assent of some of the highest military authorities. [Lord BROUGHAM: The late Sir Charles Napier.] As my noble Friend reminds me, that very great officer, the late Sir Charles Napier, expressed his complete adoption of the views of Mr. Fergusson. Those views have commanded general assent, and, I say, further, that as yet they have received no sufficient answer. I do not say that no answer is possible; but, reading the answers which have hitherto been made, it is impossible not to be struck with the great similarity between them and the answers which in all ages of the world have been given by the disciples of old and antiquated systems to innovators who have made the greatest discoveries in every branch of science. Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, and all the great philosophers, when they broached their valuable discoveries to the world, were met in the same spirit as that in which Mr. Fergusson has been met by the old school of engineers. They were all upstarts when their discoveries were first promulgated. The same gentlemen—Mr. Fergusson and others—have criticised the very latest works constructed by the present school of engineers in a manner which appears to me very difficult to answer. I think those who have read the remarks on the new fortifications in the Isle of Wight and elsewhere will agree with me that those remarks do require some much better answer than they have yet received. Among unprofessional men, who are guided by principles of common sense, the opinion prevails that very great mistakes have been made in these fortifications, and, knowing that blunders have been before discovered, I do say it would be unpardonable if the Government expended another shilling until the whole subject has undergone careful and impartial consideration. I say impartial consideration, because I should not be satisfied with an examination by merely military engineers. I would earnestly urge the Secretary of State for the War Department to appoint a Commission consisting, not only of the highest military engineers, but including civil engineers and naval officers (especially naval officers who have had experience during the present war), carefully to investigate all those questions before he allows another shilling to be spent on the costly works which are now in progress. I have stated the reasons why I think a great want of economy has been shown in the manner in which large sums have been applied, and my reasons for objecting to this continual increase of the national debt. I will only add that I do most earnestly hope and trust the whole expenditure during the present year will be carefully considered, not only by the Government, but by Parliament; because I cannot help saying that the blame of the extravagances which have been committed rests less with the Government than with Parliament, and especially with the other House, which, instead of performing its proper and constitutional functions of closely scrutinising the expenditure of the Government, and taking care that no unnecessary sum should be levied on the people, has hounded on the Government, if I may so express it—has stimulated the Government to the utmost—to expend the largest possible amount of money for warlike purposes. I do hope and trust that in the present Session the House of Commons will be more disposed than in the last Session to look closely and narrowly into these affairs. I do believe that even with a view to the permanent strength and safety of the country this subject cannot he considered unimportant, because, after all, the true defence of the nation consists, not in fortifications, in barracks, or even in ships. It consists, next to the spirit and courage of the people, in the magnitude of our resources. Modern warfare is becoming more and more a contest of the purse as well as of the person; and it is by economising our resources, by not pressing on the means of accumulation, by enabling industry and enterprise to proceed unchecked, that the real power and the real safety of the country can best be increased; and that is more particularly the case at this moment when, with the facilities of communication with different parts of the world, any undue pressure on the means of the people in one country is immediately and inevitably attended with an efflux of population and capital to other countries where they can pursue their various occupations unchecked. These are the reasons for which I condemn the policy of Her Majesty's Government. Though it he too late to recall the past—though I know we must provide for expenditure already incurred, and raise money urgently wanted—and though I am aware this loan cannot be refused, and that the money cannot be otherwise obtained—there is ample time to consider the future. I have, therefore, taken the only opportunity which Independent Members of this and the other House have of impressing their views upon the Legislature, when we are called upon to sanction a proposition of the Government such as this, which I, for one, cannot approve.

LORD PANMURE

My Lords, the speech of my noble Friend compels me to trouble your Lordships with a few remarks, which I had not anticipated it would have been necessary for me to make on the present occasion. With reference to those parts of the speech of my noble Friend which alluded to the financial question involved in the Motion before your Lordships, I shall leave others to deal with them, and shall more immediately advert to the charge made by my noble Friend against the Government for an undue expenditure, and an uneconomical management of the finances of the country in the course of the present war. My noble Friend has confined himself to two particular subjects upon which he has thought it right to remark. He first alluded to the large Votes which had been taken on account of the militia; and he, in the second place, remarked upon the Votes which had been taken for the purpose of creating works and fortifications at home and abroad. My noble Friend began by asking, what good the country had derived from the great expenditure for the militia? My simple answer to that is, that the militia has, of its own voluntary efforts, given to this country, very nearly 27,000 troops. I may remind my noble Friend that, in addition to that fact, the militia has garrisoned with twelve of its regiments military posts in the Mediterranean, which has enabled regiments of the line to go on service to the seat of war. I may further remind my noble Friend that, in addition to these circumstances, the training of the militia has imbued a military spirit throughout the country, which has induced our youth to volunteer in great numbers for foreign service. Since the 1st of January, I believe upwards of 13,000 men have joined the standard of the British army. But that is not all which the militia has done. I think the militia has proved to us what the country gentlemen can do when called upon to defend their hearths and their altars. Nothing has afforded me greater gratification than one circumstance—and I am glad to have this opportunity of mentioning it—that with reference to the garrison of Gibraltar—the major part of which consists of militia, although there are also two regiments of the line there—Sir James Fergusson has, in a public order, stated that he was indebted to a colonel of the militia for being the best brigadier in Gibraltar for many years, and that he had afforded him the best support in training the garrison of that important fortress. I feel bound to mention the name of that officer—Colonel Wilson Patten. This would not make it appear that the expenditure on the militia had been thrown away; nor do I think that the sum which has been so expended is too great. A great deal of that expense has been incurred by removing the militia as fast as we could out of billets into barracks. Before the erection of barracks they were put into huts, in order to relieve the community from a tax which has been found to bear very unequally on a portion of them. Though I am ready to admit that improvements may be made in the course of time with reference to the training, the exercising, and the appointments of the militia, yet I cannot admit that the sums which have been expended on this national force have been in any manner thrown away. I now come to the other part of the speech of my noble Friend, in which he referred to works and fortifications. I do not recollect having used the argument which my noble Friend has attributed to me; but if I did use it, I am not disposed to abandon it at the present moment—namely, that I thought at this period, when the public were awake to all the inconveniences which have been occasioned by a former system of economy, it would be proper to ask them to do that which, after a few years of peace, they might be indisposed to do at all. My noble Friend says, that the best preparation for war is to economise our resources in peace, so that when war comes we may be in a fit and proper state to engage in it. Why, my Lords, we had been economising our resources for the last forty years, and yet, when war came, we did not find that the nation was in a fit state to meet it. It is true we had a fine army, but that army was too small: and from the economy of the last forty years that army, which was so beautiful to look at, was utterly unequipped to move in the field. I do trust this will never occur again. I trust that the eyes of the nation are now sufficiently opened to know it is of practical importance that an army should be able to move anywhere in efficient order to meet the consequences that may come upon us, as the present war has done, unexpectedly and with somewhat of suddenness. With regard to fortifications and buildings, I apprehend that a period of war is not at all an inappropriate period to look at the state of our defences, without which are threatened all our otherwise great resources. I should not think any period, whether of peace or war, was an inappropriate time to fortify and protect the great dockyard of Portsmouth, and to secure it against a sudden irruption, come from what quarter it may. Nor can I admit that a time of war is an inappropriate period to defend the great arsenal at Plymouth. We, therefore, find that a great part of the Estimates are for fortifi- cations, for the means of defending the coast, the dockyards, and our commercial harbours at home, so as to be able to meet any sudden irruption upon our coasts. If these were not defended, I would ask what would become of all those great resources which we have been accumulating during a lengthened period of peace? I think the speech of my noble Friend is the precursor of many such speeches, if it please God we should return to a state of peace; but I will venture to warn this House and the country not to listen to those sudden suggestions of a return to a system of stringent economy, which may prove in the end far more expensive than the submission to an annual burden of taxation, which would keep us in a state of defence and enable us to meet any enemy, whether he come from a far or from a neighbouring country. I do not hold that, because this country places itself in such a state of defence as is necessary for the maintenance of its position as a great nation, any Power in Europe has a right to find fault with it. We do it with no intention of invading the territory, or of attacking either the property or the constitution of any neighbouring State. We do it simply because our, resources are large, and because we think it fit to protect them. I cannot conceive how blame can be attached to a nation for protecting its resources any more than to an individual who takes every means in his power to protect his own property, which is not more valuable to him than the resources of the country are to the public.

LORD MONTEAGLE

said, he was bound in consistency as well as from conviction to defend the course taken by the Government in making this loan. He must now, as he had on former occasions, protest against the doctrine that it was the duty of the Government to meet the expenses of a great European war exclusively by annual taxation. He had endeavoured to prove that the question whether it would be consistent with duty to draw the whole expense of the war from present revenue, and without reference to the husbanding of the future resources of a great commercial country, would only be decided in the negative, even if they were rich enough so to raise their supplies annually. The problem Parliament had to solve when required to make any great addition to the resources of the State, in order to provide for national exigencies, was, to seek and to adopt the means least burdensome to the perma- nent interests of the public. If at this time the Government had attempted to raise a larger proportion of the expenses of the war by taxation, the result would have been to dry up the sources of wealth, and to diminish the permanent powers of production of the country. Thus far he differed from his noble Friend (Earl Grey), but in his main argument he thoroughly concurred with him. There was a tendency to undervalue and run down the economy of past years, but the public should remember that it was that economy, and the consequent reduction of taxation, which had led to the development of resources and the accumulation of wealth which enabled the country to carry on the war in which she was engaged, without any permanent sacrifice of our material interests or permanent increase of our burdens. Into these questions, however, he would not now enter at any length, because the time for a most important but necessary financial operation was approaching, he alluded to the exchange of Exchequer bills, and it would be difficult to discuss the subject of our finances without imprudence and the chance of depriving the Chancellor of the Exchequer of those advantages in the money market to which he was justly entitled. He hoped, however, that their Lordships would not be checked hereafter in their discussion of these matters by reason of having passed them over now. In the general scope of the observations of his noble Friend (Earl Grey) he entirely agreed. Depend upon it, that any attempt to keep up anything approaching to a war establishment in time of peace was an experiment which would and ought to fail, and the effect would, perhaps, only be to create an indisposition on the part of the people of England and of their representatives to concede and maintain what was really necessary. In the endeavour to claim too much from the people, the Government would very probably find themselves left with too little. Such was the danger he apprehended. His noble Friend, however, had always studiously guarded himself against the supposition of wishing to stint the war. That was not his argument. But his noble Friend had truly stated that when the Government came to deal with large sums of borrowed money, it was not only extravagance in carrying out the immediate objects of the war which was to be apprehended—that was to be guarded against—but an extravagance pervading all our establishments. For example, it was impossible to hear of the purchases of great buildings, of expensive parcels of land, of the undertaking of great enterprises—certainly not of an urgent kind—without being persuaded of the extravagant expenditure which the command of a certain amount of borrowed money encouraged in Governments as well as in individuals. Whilst thus doing justice to his noble Friend's wise and consistent warnings and counsels, he would add, however, that their Lordships would do wrong if they allowed themselves to be carried away by his noble Friend's argument which endeavoured to prove that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had abandoned the principle of providing by taxation for an adequate portion of the national expenditure, and was relying wholly upon the borrowing principle, because he proposed the loan now before the House. His right hon. Friend had done no such thing—his loan was not for the coming year, but for the discharge of obligations already incurred: and as for the general scope and tendency of our finance—had not Parliament imposed the Succession Duty? Had it not increased the income tax, the malt tax, the tea, sugar, and spirit duties, and, in fact, most of the heaviest burthens upon the great articles of consumption? It would be unjust, therefore, to the Chancellor of the Exchequer to say that he was relying exclusively on borrowed money. His noble Friend had spoken with just pride of the great resources which a prosperous country like ours possessed. That was true; but however great the resources of its industry, its greatest resource was in its public credit, founded on its public faith; and he (Lord Monteagle) had always endeavoured to show that in any attempt at excluding public credit as one of the national resources, Parliament was really flinging away the greatest element of our national strength. His noble Friend had spoken truly as to the pressure of the war upon persons of fixed incomes as well as upon the working classes. But what would have been the condition of these classes if the millions of money required to carry on the war had all been raised by increased taxation? Had the malt tax and the tea and sugar duties been doubled, had the income tax been raised beyond the amount at which it had ever stood before, had Parliament restored the old rates of taxation on salt, leather, tallow, coals, and proceeded upon the same principle with regard to other large articles of consump- tion, what would have been the result as affecting those persons for whom his noble Friend had claimed their Lordships' care and consideration? Why, they would have been utterly crushed. Something had been said by his noble Friend as to the danger of driving our population out of the country to other places where they could turn their industry to better account. Now he (Lord Monteagle) had all his life been a friend to emigration; but to those who feared it as an evil, they might depend upon it, there was nothing by which emigration could be more effectually enforced than by the attempt, at such a time as this, to carry on the war altogether by pressing on the springs of industry with increased taxation and by increasing the cost of living to the working classes, instead of borrowing with prudence, good sense, and, he might be allowed to hope, with that success in the future which had attended our past loans. With regard to the cost of militia, he knew from long experience that there was no man in England who had paid such attention to this subject in all its bearings as his noble Friend; and he hoped at some future time that at his invitation the question of the militia would be fully discussed by their Lordships. As to the expenditure in public works, he must say, the reasoning of the Secretary for War appeared singularly inconclusive on this point; he appeared to go upon the principle of "making hay while the sun shines; "but if there was one principle which ought to be more recognised than another, it was that, when Parliament was called upon to defray the charges of a great war, that was precisely the moment when the Government ought, not to open up fresh sources of expenditure for any undertaking (however plausible a case was made out in its favour) which might be postponed to a future time, without prejudice to the public interests. There was one other subject to which he wished to call their Lordships' attention. He did not, and he believed that no one Member of the House did, object to any amount of expenditure really necessary for the vigorous prosecution and the success of the war, but be did object to any increase of expenditure which was not directly for that purpose, and he did object most strongly if any sums of money voted for preserving or increasing the efficiency of the forces should be applied for any other purposes. He feared that such abuses might revive. His noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Derby) would recollect an occasion upon which sums of money voted by the House of Commons for the navy were applied to the construction of public works for which they were never intended. His noble Friend himself had endeavoured to correct that evil. He believed that not less than £1,200,000 was expended on works which were not even contemplated when the money was voted. He alluded to the Rideau Canal. One ludicrous instance was the payment of the salaries of the North American bishops and the Canadian clergy out of the Army Extraordinary Estimates. He had already commented on the dangers that might arise from the transfer of the financial duties of the Government to the War Department. But he foresaw still greater dangers. He begged to caution his noble Friend (Lord Panmure) as to the mode in which army disbursements might hereafter he applied under the Estimates now laid before Parliament. The law, as it at present stood—and he spoke advisedly—laid down the principle, that no Minister of the Crown had the power (without exposing himself to the liability of impeachment for a high crime and misdemeanour) of applying sums voted for the Army to naval purposes, or to matters connected with the Ordnance, or vice versâ, of applying sums voted for the Navy or the Ordnance to Army purposes. The sums of money voted for each of those three branches of the services were allowed to be expended for those purposes alone for which they had been respectively voted by Parliament. The estimates for each of those services consisted of a number of separate Votes, and it might happen that there would be an excess upon Vote 1, and a deficiency upon Vote 2; such excess could not be applied to cover that deficiency, except as an exceptional case. By a wise enactment introduced by Sir James Graham, it was rendered allowable to apply the excess of one Vote to supply the deficiency of another within the same department. But to justify this it was required that a case of absolute necessity should be made out and the consent of the Crown signified through the Treasury. He much feared, however, that there was some intention of departing from that wise principle, judging from the mode in which the Estimates for the current year were, prepared. By the consolidation of the War departments some £34,000,000 would be placed under the control of the Minister for War; the Army, Militia, Commissariat, and Ordnance being consequently united; but it was never intended, nor would it be consistent with Parliamentary or constitutional law, that sums voted for the one service should be hereafter transferrable to the purposes of the other. It would be necessary to alter the Appropriation Act if such a course were proposed to be adopted; but he trusted that the House of Commons would never allow such a principle to be carried into execution, or indeed to be entertained at all, without the fullest inquiry and consideration of its remotest bearings and consequences. From the manner in which the Estimates for the present year were framed it was possible that money voted for the Army in the Crimea might be employed for Ordnance works at Portsmouth, barracks in London, or huts at Aldershot. This was a state of things of which he could not approve, and which he trusted would never obtain the sanction of Parliament. He did not quarrel with his noble Friend (Lord Panmure) for bringing all these departments under the control of the Secretary for War, but he deprecated and denounced any attempt to release any Minister from the strict rule of Parliamentary appropriation, as known, practised, and enforced against Ministers from the time of the Revolution and Lord Somers to the present day.

LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY

said, that his noble Friend (Lord Monteagle) had so completely answered all the points of the noble Earl (Earl Grey) that very little remained for him to add. The noble Earl commenced his observations by reminding the House of the pledge given by the late and present Governments that the war should be conducted with the greatest economy, so far as was consistent with its vigorous prosecution; and, that, secondly, so far as the principle could be carried out, the expenses of the war should be defrayed from the taxation of the year. He (Lord Stanley of Alderley) could assure the noble Earl that those pledges had, by Her Majesty's present Government, and, he believed, by the late Government, been kept with the greatest care and fidelity. He would first state that, in 1854–55, his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer imposed an additional sum of £9,000,000 on the taxation of the country, and in the years 1855–56 an additional sum of £5,000,000; making in the whole £14,000,000 of increased taxation, which had been imposed for the purpose of carrying on the war; and he thought this was ample contribution in this way for the purposes intended. With regard to loans, he would beg to observe that a sum only equal in amount to that obtained by increased taxation had been raised, and the mode of procuring these loans possessed this peculiar feature, that the whole amount would be redeemed in twenty years—a scheme which possessed all the advantages of terminable annuities, but with this superiority over them, that it enabled the country to obtain the money on more economical terms. He would only add that a large portion of this money was required for the most legitimate purposes of providing for the construction of steam vessels, fortifications, and barracks, which, being permanent works, ought to be paid for out of funds provided by means of loans instead of out of the taxation of the country. He would now read to the House a statement of the actual expenditure which had been occasioned by the war during the last two years, and would contrast it with the expenditure during the two preceding years. In the year 1852–53, the whole expenditure for army, militia, commissariat, navy ordnance, and Kafir war was £16,198,415. In 1853–54, the army, militia, and commissariat amounted to £6,415,000; the navy, to £6,942,769; the ordnance, to £2,900,000; and the Kafir war to £230,000—total, £16,487,769. The total expenditure of the two years of peace, therefore, was £32,686,184. In the year 1854–55—the first year of war—the expenditure for the army, militia, and commissariat was £8,380,882; for the navy, £14,490,105; for the ordnance, £5,450,719; and vote of credit, £1,800,000—total, £30,121,706. For the year 1855–56, the expenditure for the army, militia, and commissariat was £17,612,000; for the navy, £19,500,000; for the ordnance, £10,300,000; and vote of credit, £4,200,000—total, £51,612,000. The whole expenditure, therefore, of the two years of war was £81,733,706; deducting from that sum the peace expenditure of two years, £32,686,184, there remained £49,047,522, which was the actual increase in our military expenditure during the two years of war. He would now explain the manner in which the funds had been provided to defray that large expenditure. The revenue of the two years of war had exceeded that of the two years of peace by £17,045,030. That was the result of the increased taxation imposed during the two years. In addition there had been in 1854–55, by Exchequer bills, £1,750,000 and by Exchequer bonds (less £591,000 applied to the redemption of Exchequer bills), £5,409,000; and, in 1855–56, by loan, £16,000,000; by Exchequer bills and bonds, £7,000,000; and by proportion of the new loan of £5,000,000 £3,500,000; making a total debt incurred to the extent of £33,659,000; which, added to the £17,045,000 of additional taxation, gave £50,704,000 as the cost of the war. The proportion, therefore, which the increased taxation bore to the debt, was about one-half. Having made these statements to the House, he would only add that it must be a matter of sincere congratulation to their Lordships, considering the magnitude of the war, the great power of the nation with which this country had had to contend, and the objects which they had had in view on entering upon the conflict, that it had occasioned less suffering to this country than any other great war in which they had ever before engaged. The fact that it was carried on at a great distance from our own shores, although it considerably enhanced the cost, removed all the horrors of war; our trade had not been interfered with—the revenue had not been injured—our commerce had actually increased—and every English ship pursued her course across the sea free from apprehension and alarm. Looking at all these circumstances, he thought that they had great reason to congratulate themselves that, whilst this war had occasioned less inconvenience and suffering to the nations of the earth than any previous one in which we had been engaged, it would result in the most important consequences to civilisation; and if we should be as fortunate as to obtain peace on the terms we sought, the blood and treasure of this country would not have flowed in vain.

Motion agreed to.

Bill read 2a accordingly; and Committee negatived.

Then it was moved, "That the Standing Orders Nos. 37 and 38 be considered in order to their being dispensed with in the Bill."

LORD PANMURE

said, he was afraid that the impression might go abroad, from the speech of his noble Friend (Lord Monteagle), that he (Lord Panmure) had sanctioned the appropriation of funds voted for Ordnance purposes to the army. As far as he could ascertain, however, there had been no breach of the law whatever in that direction; but since he had had the control of the funds of the Ordnance, they had been administered purely for Ordnance purposes. There were various Votes connected with each of those services, and it was not competent for a Minister to apply the sum voted under one head to any other than the purpose for which it was voted, without the express consent of the Treasury. He had instituted very strict inquiries into the subject, and the Secretary of the Treasury had assured him that nothing had been done since his (Lord Panmure's) administration of the financial affairs of the army, with respect to the transfer of money from one Vote to another, without the previous consent of the Treasury. He would only add that, so convinced was he of the expediency of separating from the Commissariat Department the financial expenditure of the Army and Ordnance, that he had already directed arrangements to be made for that purpose.

LORD MONTEAGLE

explained, that his argument was that, in the new form of estimate now prepared, the Army and Ordnance Votes were so mingled that the funds might be interchanged in a manner that they could not have been hitherto. His noble Friend who had just spoken said that he had done nothing without the consent of the Treasury, but the fact was that the Treasury had no power to allow the application of army money to Ordnance purposes, or of Ordnance money to army purposes. He was delighted to hear that his noble Friend adopted the principle of strict appropriation; and that, although he had framed his Estimates in a new form, he did not intend to depart from the old system. [Lord PANMURE: So long as the present law exists.] Just so; so long as the present law existed; but that was the very point. The Appropriation Act was a most important Act, which was passed annually; and he rejoiced that he had gathered from the extreme candour of his noble Friend the fact that there might be meditated a change in the law which would place at his disposal the large sum of £34,000,000 annually, entirely freed from the wholesome rule of Parliamentary restriction. If such a measure should be introduced, he hoped that it would be opposed in both Houses, as it most certainly would be in one.

Motion agreed to; said Standing Orders considered accordingly, and dispensed with; and Bill read 3a, and passed.

House adjourned till To-morrow.