BRIBERY AT ELECTIONS. (Hansard, 12 July 1847)

LORD BROUGHAM

rose to move the Resolutions of which he had given notice on the subject of Bribery at Elections. He would remind the House that he had called the attention of their Lordships to this grave and important subject at the close of last Parliament. He had a duty much more easy and short to perform on the present occasion; for upon the atrocity of the practice, upon its pernicious consequences to the community, and upon its great—he would not say universal—but very great prevalence, unhappily, there could be but one opinion entertained. A plausible argument might be urged, that the subject rather concerned the other House than their Lordships. He entirely dissented from that opinion. He held an opposite doctrine; and he was supported in holding that doctrine by the authority of their Lordships' House and Proceedings. The Bribery Bill of 1729, the existing law, succeeded the Bribery Bill of 1726, which, after being passed by the other House, was rejected by their Lordships. That was one instance of interference. But a still more remarkable instance occurred in 1729. The Bribery Bill of that year, which, though insufficient, and often broken, was still the 170 only statute law on the subject, was taken into consideration in their Lordships' House, and canvassed in all its provisions; no objection was raised, or attempted to be raised, that it concerned the House of Commons, although the Lords altered it in two essential particulars: one being the amount of penalty; the other the addition of the best clause in the Bill. It went back to the other House, where the objection was taken, that the Lords had overpassed the boundary that separated the jurisdiction of the two Houses of Parliament; but a high authority ^* expressed his opinion that —the Lords were the proper guardians, as well as the Commons, of the purity, as well as freedom of the election; and the Lords were the guardians, not only as a branch of the Legislature co-ordinate to themselves," to wit the House of Commons, "but as the supreme court of judicature of the realm; and no man having a value for liberty, could grudge the Lords the honour of rendering the Bribery Bill more complete and more efficacious. Therefore he (Lord Brougham) thought he need go no further to show that their Lordships had, upon precedent as well as upon principle, an absolute and unqualified right to interfere for the purpose of putting down one of the greatest crimes. Indeed, their high judicial functions made it peculiarly their province to deal with matters appertaining to the-criminal law. When he said that the bribery and corruption of the people was one of the greatest crimes that could be committed, he did not speak the language of exaggeration; on the contrary, he spoke advisedly. But before proceeding further, he begged to remind their Lordships of the extent to which it, had of late proceeded. The Reform Act of 1832, with all its other great merits, had in fact one peculiar advantage if they chose to follow it up; and it was perhaps as important as any other benefit which it had conferred upon the country. It enabled them at once to detect bribery and corruption. Before the Reform Act, the legal expenses of an election contest were so large—it involved the expenditure of so much money—and there were so many bills to be discharged after the election—that it became hardly possible to say, whether a Member or Candidate had expended his money for lawful or illegal purposes. When he recollected that his (Lord Brougham's) contest in 1812 against the late Mr. Canning ^* Mr. Pulteney. See Hansard's Parl. History, Vol. viii. p. 755. 171 for the representation of Liverpool, where there were 10,000 votes to be given, involved expenses amounting to upwards of 50,000l.; when he knew that voters were on that occasion brought from the Land's-end, and others from the north of Scotland; when he recollected that it was considered impossible to economize so much as to prevent a very large expenditure beyond the mere necessary expenses of conveying these voters—and the ordinary expenses of an election in such a place, for instance, as Lancaster (where, of 12,000 freemen, not 500 resided on the spot) were calculated to amount always to 15,000l. for each candidate, or 30,000l. in all—he felt it was impossible to say where the legal expense began and the illegal ended, they were so mixed up together. The Reform Bill, however, had given a test whereby to discriminate the two, because there were no out-voters under it; and treating being unlawful, 300l. or 400l. was the utmost legal expense that could he incurred since that Act. He could not reflect on the extent, degree, and manner in which the last general election of 1841 tarnished the reputation for honesty of the people and Legislature of this country—he could not reflect on that stain upon the national character, without looking to a foreign country. They had heard of charges which were brought of late there against men of the highest rank, of the most eminent public character, and of the proudest official station, all of which charges he was bound in justice to believe groundless—all of which charges he was willingly bound—not compulsorily hound, but cheerfully bound—to believe groundless, until fully proved, and confidently to expect that those eminent individuals would all come free and unscathed out of the trial. He (Lord Brougham) had constantly been receiving from the other side of the Channel letters which it was natural for his friends there to write, but which it was painful for him to read. He was asked why they were to set up as purists in England—why they were to have the pharisaical speech always in their mouths, that they were not as other men were, and that things were done in France which England was incapable of enduring. This when kept in generals was little. But then came the pinch of the argument, and that portion of the letter followed, which it was so painful to read. It was said, "The man 172 who receives a bribe contaminates himself, and injures the Government he is connected with; the man who bribes him commits a great offence against the State; but only see within what narrow limits that is confined; then look to your bribery at elections," said his (Lord Brougham's) correspondent—"that wholesale system of buying and selling men's consciences." His correspondent then told them to ask themselves in England—when they looked down upon the people of France because charges of bribery were made against persons in office there—if there could be the slightest comparison between the effects on the morals of the people from such an offence as that, and the injurious tendency of the wholesale system of buying and selling men's consciences, and corrupting the pure fountains from which their laws proceed, and the representatives of the public character, and the depositaries of the public power are drawn. This English corruption, said his French correspondents, strikes at the root of all morals, and destroys the very character of the people. The injury arising from bribery at elections was great, and the topics were so numberless, and the arguments against the practice were so exuberant, that he might say, "You cannot see the wood for the trees." He would say that honest men could not permit bribery to be practised for their own behoof, or for the behoof of their party. Let every man who was on the Committee of an election—let every man who was a candidate at an election—let every man who was the supporter of a candidate at such election, no longer lay to his soul the flattering unction that he is only encouraging the political offence by bribery, and not encouraging perjury, for he (Lord Brougham) would say that by every act of bribery they ran the risk of perjury. They incurred the moral guilt of perjury, and in many instances the crime was actually committed. Suppose, for instance, 200 people in a town should receive head money, every one of them was exposed, and necessarily exposed, to the hazard of having the bribery oath administered to him. They all came to the hustings and to the poll, knowing that oath might be put to them, and out of the 200 how many did they suppose would refuse the bribery oath? Not 5 per cent, not 10 men out of the whole number. It was frightful and most lamentable to reflect on the case with which election zeal as well as corruption, teaches 173 voters to swear sometimes carelessly, sometimes falsely. In one case, of which he was himself cognizant, the advice was given to keep the poll open till the other voters came up, and to gain time by tendering the votes of some who had already voted, but not to let them take any oath that they had not yet polled. The answer was, they had been doing so all the morning. The expedient had already been resorted to; but without the warning, and the men had been voting a second time and swearing it was the first. The man who took a bribe, and was prepared to swear he had not taken a bribe, was morally as much guilty of perjury, and for the same reason, as the footpad or the burglar was morally guilty of murder, when he goes to rob prepared to kill, and by chance finds he has no occasion to kill; but morally he is a murderer. So is the bribed voter morally perjured. The offence tainted the character of the man for life; that man could no longer hold up his head as incapable of committing perjury. Therefore it was, he begged leave to say, that he entirely agreed with those French friends who held that it not only tainted the purity of the Legislature, but irreparably tarnished the purity of English morals and character, if the offence of bribery and corruption should, by wholesale, be committed. He was asked how he proposed to deal with it? Several modes might be suggested for dealing with this evil of bribery, so as to uproot and extirpate it. Amongst others there was one he would take leave especially to recommend, namely, that there should no longer be any restriction or limitation of the period within which it should be competent for persons who were cognizant that bribery and corruption had been practised, on occasion of elections, to present and prosecute their petitions. As matters now stood, the prosecution of charges of bribery and the punishment of that crime by the loss of the seat so obtained, were made to depend on the operation of a mere Sessional Order of the other House, whereby the period was limited within which petitions charging bribery against a Member could be presented; but it was full time that that regulation should be abrogated. Why should a man's seat in Parliament be at any time secure if he owed it to bribery? Three or four hundred pounds ought, in his opinion, to be the very outside of the fair expenses of an election since the Reform 174 Act. He spoke of borough elections, because there it was that bribery prevailed; but supposing that they were to carry their presumption of legitimate outlay as far as to 800l., or even as far as 1,000l., ought they not to stop there? Suppose they were to make the proof that more than that money had been expended by the candidate or his agents at a given election, conclusive evidence that bribery had been committed, did not their Lordships think that such a proceeding would in all probability have a very salutary effect in putting an end to the abominable practice? Counsel who were deeply versed in electioneering matters were of opinion with him that 800l., or at most 1,000l., ought to cover every conceivable honest and legitimate outlay; and he was strongly inclined to the opinion that a restriction to that standard would be attended with most beneficial results. These were suggestions which he threw out in a cursory manner. He had no doubt but that next Session, if he were spared so long, he should be enabled to lay before their Lordships some other measures yet more efficacious, in addition to the recommendations which he now very diffidently submitted to the consideration of their Lordships. Meantime it occurred to him that the adoption of the resolutions which he had placed upon their Lordships' Books would, in all probability, be attended with a highly beneficial effect. It was time that something should be done to remedy an evil which all must deprecate, and all unaffectedly deplore. Evidence incontestable of the evil working of the present system was to be found in the fact that gentlemen, probably well known in their own private and exceedingly select circles, but wholly unknown to the country at large, were day by day notifying through the public press and otherwise, their intention of presenting themselves as candidates for the representation of various places at the approaching elections. He judged that they were unknown from the very terms in which their addresses were drawn up, for it repeatedly happened that those documents opened with an apology to the constituents that an unknown man, one who was an utter stranger to them, ventured to solicit their suffrages. He had made inquiries on the subject, and found that in some half-dozen cases no human being in the respective places for which those gentlemen came forward as candidates, knew anything whatever respecting those who were soliciting 175 from the constituents that which was beyond all comparison the most important trust that could be confided into mortal hands—the privilege of making laws to bind the community. No man in the place knew anything on earth of the candidate saving only two. The first of these was an attorney. The attorney, to be sure, knew the candidate; but how long he had known him was another question altogether. The intercourse might have been sweet—passing sweet—but it was very short. In all probability it had not extended over more than a week or ten days. But the attorney and the candidate had laid their heads together, and arranged between them the way in which the borough was to be represented. The stranger had brought with him his credentials in the shape of a letter of credit. The large bill of the well-known attorney was to be paid, and the wealthy and unknown stranger was to pay it. The attorney was fully satisfied—the stranger was fully satisfied—and each arrived with marvellous unanimity at the same conclusion, namely, that the said stranger was a fit and proper person (no one more so) to represent Andover, Barn-staple, or whatever the name of the place might be, in the Imperial Parliament. The second person who enjoyed the happy privilege of the stranger's acquaintance was the intermediate agent, and with his cooperation the attorney managed ere long to run up a bill of more than 1,800l. or 2,000l.; and the stranger was brought in as the representative in Parliament of a constituency who had never so much as heard his name before. He had heard of a gentleman who stood pretty much in that relation towards his constituents which he (Lord Brougham) had been describing. The bribery at that place was so notorious, and was so shamelessly practised, that the worthy and independent voters went up to the poll, as if glorying in their disgrace, with bank notes stuck in their hats as cockades. The gentleman at whose expense this was done, after his return, addressed them in these words, "Gentlemen, I have bought you, but, believe me, I will never sell you." The constituents cried out that they hoped he would come again; but his reply was, "No, no, my friends, it is out of the question; I cannot afford it." The noble and learned Lord having observed on the beneficial effects which would probably result from a declaration on the part of their Lordships as to their sense of the duty which devolved upon both Houses with re- 176 spect to the detection and punishment of acts of bribery and corruption, concluded by moving the following resolutions:— 1. That it is the bounden Duty of both Houses of Parliament to adopt, at the Beginning of the next Session, whatever Means may be most effectual for detecting and punishing Acts of Bribery and Corruption which may be committed during the ensuing Recess, at the Election of Members of Parliament, and Peers of Scotland; such Offences being altogether subversive of the Freedom of Election—destructive of the Independence and Purity of the Legislature—leading to the moral Guilt of Perjury in all Cases, and the actual Commission, in many, of that most foul and heinous Crime. 2. That it is also the Duty of both Houses of Parliament to inquire of and visit with Punishment all Acts which may be done during the Recess for interfering with the free choice of Members of Parliament, and Peers of Scotland, by intimidation or otherwise. 3. That it is the Duty of both Houses of Parliament to inquire of all Corrupt bargains, whether by compromise or otherwise, made during the Recess, for the purpose of preventing and frustrating the inquiry into such Corruption or Intimidation at elections of Members of Parliament, or of Scotch Peers.

§ The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNE

was perfectly aware how frequently this important subject had engaged the attention and labours of his noble and learned Friend who had just sat down, and also the attention and labours both of their Lordships' House and of the other House of Parliament; and whatever his opinion might be as to the expediency of adopting the resolutions proposed by the noble and learned Lord, he could with unfeigned sincerity assert that he was glad that, at this particular time, an opportunity had been afforded him of denouncing, in eloquent terms, the gravity of the offence to which his speech had reference, and the unbounded mischief which its perpetration was sure to entail. This was unaffectedly his feeling; and he hoped that neither the noble and learned Lord nor the House would do him the injustice of supposing him indifferent to the vast importance of the subject, or insensible to the amount of mischief which the practice of bribery at elections occasioned. If he found it impossible to concur with the noble Lord in the expediency, or, to speak more correctly, in the necessity of their Lordships putting just at that moment upon record an opinion which they were not prepared to follow up with an Act, and an opinion, moreover, which it was already notorious that their Lordships at all times, and now more than ever, entertained. To the principle of the resolutions it was impossible for him to take exception; and if he could persuade 177 himself of the necessity of passing them, he should advocate their being introduced, with an amendment, declaring that not only during the ensuing recess, but that at all times it was the bounden duty of that House to give its sanction to measures wisely and judiciously contrived, with a view to the removal of the evil which the noble Lord so bitterly deplored. But the evidences of the feeling of that House in that respect were already numerous, emphatic, and unmistakeable. At no time had an occasion for exhibiting them arisen that they had not been manifested in the most distinct manner. Whatever differences of opinion might have existed in that House with regard to various measures which, from time to time, the ingenuity and contrivance of legislators had suggested to put an end to the abominable practice of bribery, it was at least certain that those differences of opinion did not relate to the expediency of repressing the abuse, but rather to this question—in what judicious and unobjectionable manner that repression might be carried out. The present resolutions appeared to him unnecessary and inexpedient, for it was evidently impossible that at this period of the Session any practical or effectual legislative remedy could result from them. The resolutions were liable to the same objection to which all resolutions of an abstract nature were subject, namely, that while exception could not be taken to them on the score of the principles which they inculcated, or of the truths which they laid down, they were nevertheless in some sense deceptive, as they seemed to indicate an intention to proceed further in the matter, without their Lordships knowing in what that further proceeding was to consist, and without their being in a state of readiness to introduce any legislative provision on the subject. The noble and learned Lord suggested that some provisions might be contrived; but he would be the last man in that House to maintain that the measures to be introduced for the remedy of the evil complained of might not in many respects be liable to objection, or that they should be adopted otherwise than after the most serious deliberation and the most careful consideration. He (the Marquess of Lansdowne) spoke on this matter from experience, for he was well aware, as also were their Lordships, that year after year, Parliament after Parliament, during the last century attempts had been made to repress by statute those abominable practices. 178 Some of those Acts had been adopted, others had been rejected; but all of them had afforded convincing proof in their progress that of all the subjects for legislation this was most difficult to handle, and that the object which was in contemplation could only be carried into effect by the adoption of regulations and the creation of powers which, in their details, were liable to most serious objections: they were often of a most inquisitorial character, involving the necessity of pardoning crime for the sake of repressing crime, and granting impunity were it was least deserved, for the purpose of reaching another offender. It was clear, therefore, that these were questions of great difficulty, and he had an objection to record an implied intention on the part of that House to do that in a future Session of Parliament which they were not prepared at once to say they had the means of doing. The only abstract resolution of this kind that he had ever concurred in passing, or that he remembered to have been attended with good effect, was one which he had the honour of bringing up from the other House, in which at that time he had a seat, a resolution declaring that it would be expedient in the following Session to take measures for the abolition of the slave trade. In that case, however, it should be remembered that there was at first great difference of opinion as to the expediency of abolishing the slave trade; and it was necessary that the fact should be notified to their Lordships of that difficulty having been surmounted; but in the present case there was, and had been, an universal agreement of opinion as to the principle, and the only difficulty was how best to remedy the evil which all deprecated. Until, therefore, they were completely decided as to the manner in which they should act—until they had made up their minds as to the provision to be adopted with a view to the suppression of bribery—he was averse to their needlessly pledging pledging themselves to that which would merely be regarded as a brutum fulmen. It was impossible for any one to doubt for one instant that their Lordships viewed with extreme abhorrence those abominable practices, or that they were not most anxious that they should be done away with. A stronger attestation of their feeling in this respect than any mere declaration of opinion, was to be found in the shape of an Act of Parliament, to which their Lordships gave their assent in the year 1842; an Act which he had no doubt 179 would eventually have the effect, if not of entirely uprooting those corrupt practices, of at least surrounding the commission of them with greater difficulty, and making those who were disposed to them hesitate more than they were in the habit of doing in former times. That Act gave to the other House of Parliament the power of reassembling such Committees as might have been appointed to investigate charges of bribery; but from whose consideration those charges had been, owing to some circumstances or other, withdrawn. Not only did it permit the reassembling of such Committees, but it provided for the appointment of agents to collect evidence and carry on the inquiry in such a manner as seemed most likely to lead to the detection and punishment of offenders. That enactment afforded a striking illustration of their Lordships' feelings on the subject; and he had no doubt that any Bill that might be sent from the other House during the next Session, having for object the punishment of such crimes connected with corruption at elections as the existing law did not reach, would receive the promptest and most attentive consideration from their Lordships. It was most unquestionably their duty to concur with the other House in the enactment of such measures as might be best calculated to promote an end so desirable as the abolition of the odious practices to which the noble and learned Lord had referred; but, confiding in their entire willingness to do so, and entertaining as he did a sanguine hope that the expression of opinion which had gone forth from that House (an expression which their past experience ratified and confirmed) would in itself have a salutary effect, he could not perceive the necessity for the resolution, and would move the previous question.