HL Deb 02 July 1847 vol 93 cc1116-8
LORD BROUGHAM

said, that he wished to ask a question of his noble Friend near him (the Duke of Wellington). He wished to ask him whether he had any information with respect to the order issued by Colonel Hallifax, commanding the 75th regiment, in relation to a man of his regiment who was charged with what was certainly a grave offence, viz., endeavouring to enable another soldier to escape punishment by lending him a bullet to put into his box, this man being charged with having fired at his sergeant? He wished to ask his noble Friend whether he had any information with respect to the extraordinary order written by Colonel Hallifax on this subject? That officer stated that he (the person charged) "should certainly receive the severest punishment that could be inflicted." That in his (Lord Brougham's) opinion was rather jumping at a conclusion. He supposed that the gallant officer meant to say, that the man should be punished if found guilty. The poor man was so much shocked at this that he cut his throat.

The DUKE of WELLINGTON

said, he had had information relative to the transaction, and the facts were these:—A sol- dier of the 7th Hussars, named Smith, had shot at a sergeant-major, also of the 7th Hussars, with his fire-arms. A soldier of the 75th regiment had given to the man who had shot at the sergeant-major a ball, in order that when the murderer was searched, to discover whether he had all his ammunition, he might appear to have all, and so deceive the coroner before whom the murder was about to be inquired into, and enable this soldier of the 7th Hussars—this Smith—who shot at the segeant-major, to defeat the ends of justice, and fasten suspicion on other men of the same regiment of Hussars. He (the Duke of Wellington) was afraid this atrocious act was not a military offence, punishable by court-martial; but in committing that act the soldier did commit one of two offences for which he was liable to be tried by a court-martial. When he gave Smith a ball to enable him to defeat the ends of justice, this man committed a military offence by giving a ball, with the care of which he was entrusted himself, and which he was obliged to produce upon every inspection and parade, unless he could account for it legally, or else he must have purloined the ball from one of his comrades, or from somebody else, in order to give it to this soldier. For one or other of those offences he was liable to be tried; and the officer in command of the regiment, which was at Athlone, was quite in the right in ordering him into confinement immediately, and into irons, and to be brought m irons from Ballinasloe to Athlone, ten miles, in order to take his trial for one of those two military offences. He repeated, the commanding officer was fully justified in censuring, in the strongest manner, and marking with his indignation and abhorrence, this atrocious act of enabling a murderer to escape justice. The commanding officer was quite right under these circumstances in ironing the soldier, and he was quite right afterwards in ordering him to be brought to trial, and in declaring his intention of punishing him, if guilty of the offence. He approved of all that had been done by the commanding officer, with this exception, that the commanding officer, when he gave the order that the man's hair should be cut, and when he marked his indignation and abhorrence at the man's offence, did not state in the order for what offence that order was given; because some persons might suppose that the offence for which he was so treated consisted in his being concerned in the original murder. That he was so concerned, might or might not be the case, but it was not upon that idea that the commanding officer's order was founded; all he felt was that an atrocious act had been committed, m enabling an offender to evade justice; and it was essentially necessary, especially ill Ireland, so to mark such an offence with indignation as to make it not likely that a similar one would be again committed by a soldier of the 75th regiment. All he blamed the commanding officer for was not sufficiently explaining the grounds of his order.

LORD BROUGHAM

acknowledged that the noble Duke was right in expressing indignation at the man's offence; and he (Lord Brougham) had himself observed that it was a grave offence. At the same time, he could not quite agree that a person should have his head shaved, and be sent handcuffed to his trial; because his offence at law (whatever might be his military offence, in taking a bullet out of his own store) was only for being accessary after the fact, in concealing a felony. The noble Duke was mistaken in thinking a murder had been committed, for the man who fired at the sergeant missed him. That circumstance, however, did not make the offence less grave. The defence was that the musket went off accidentally; but that of course had to be tried. He (Lord Brougham) did not deny the gravity of the offence; but his objection was to handcuffing, cropping, and otherwise punishing before trial a man who was charged with being accessary after the fact, but not convicted of anything; and he also objected to the omission in the terms of the order of the cause of punishment, and to the statement that the man was to take his trial, and would most assured receive the severest punishment that could be inflicted. No doubt the commanding officer meant to say that the man would receive the severest punishment, "if convicted;" but he ought to have stated that.

The DUKE of WELLINGTON

did not understand that the man was to have been tried for any other offence than that of either making away with his own ammunition, or taking ammunition from some other soldier. He had not heard that the man was to have been tried for being concerned in the murder.—Subject at an end.

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