HL Deb 30 May 1843 vol 69 cc1064-94
The Marquess of Clanricarde

rose to put a question to the noble Duke opposite, of which he had given the noble Duke notice, though he had not given a public notice, because he had not had an opportunity of doing so. The matter, however, was so serious, that he thought it his duty to put the question without the form of a public notice. He referred to a letter which appeared in the public papers, which had been addressed to Lord Ffrench from the Lord Chancellor of Ireland.

The Marquess of Londonderry

rose to order, but after a short conversation,

The Marquess of Clanricarde

proceeded. It was competent to him at once to move for the production of the letter. Nobody could object to such a motion; but he had no wish to make it, as the letter was already before the public, and he himself was well aware that the letter was authentic. Though a motion might hereafter be necessary, he would at present confine himself to the question he wished to put. He was afraid, that in the first place, though for his own purpose two or three extracts would be sufficient, he must trouble their Lordships with the whole of the letter, lest he should he charged with garbling it; and though its terms might be known to their Lordships, he hoped to be allowed to read it at length. The letter was addressed to Lord Ffrench, and was signed by Henry Sugden, secretary to the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, from which functionary it emanated. It was as follows: — Secretary's-office, Four Courts, Dublin, May, 23. My Lord,—I have the honour to acknowledge your Lordship's letter of the 19th inst., stating that it was your intention to attend the Repeal meeting at Caltra, as well as that which is to be held in Athlone, and am directed by the Lord Chancellor to inform your Lordship that he regrets ha has felt it his duty to direct your Lordship to be superseded as a magistrate for the county of Galway. It has been his earnest desire not to interfere with the expression of opinion by any magistrate in favour of Repeal, although from his first arrival here he deemed it inconsistent with the determination of her Majesty's Government to uphold the Union between Great Britain and Ireland, to appoint as a magistrate any person pledged to the Repeal of that Union. Her Majesty's Government. And now came the sentences to which he begged to call the attention of their Lordships,— Her Majesty's Government have recently declared in both Houses of Parliament their fixed determination to maintain the Union, it becomes the duty of the Members of the Government to support that declaration. The allegation that the numerous Repeal meetings are not illegal does not diminish their inevitable tendency to outrage; and, considering the subject in all its bearings, it is the opinion of the Lord Chancellor, that such meetings are not in the spirit of the constitution, and may become dangerous to the safety of the State. It is necessary, therefore, that the Government should be able to place a firm reliance on the watchfulness and determination of the magistracy to preserve the public peace. A magistrate who presides over or forms part of such a meeting can neither be prepared to repress violence, nor could he be expected to act against a body for whose offence he would himself be responsible. To such persons the preservation of the public peace during the present agitation cannot be safely intrusted. Your Lordship's determination to preside over such a meeting, immediately after the declarations in Parliament, proves to the Lord Chancellor, that the time has arrived for evincing the determination of this Government to delegate no power to those who seek, by such measures as are now pursued, to dissolve the legislative union. To allow such persons any longer to remain in the commission of the peace would be to afford the power of the Crown to the carrying of a measure which her Majesty has, like her predecessor, expressed her determination to prevent. This view of the case, which the step taken by your Lordship has forced upon the attention of the Lord Chancellor, wilt compel him at once to supersede any other magistrates who, since the declaration in Parliament, have attended like Repeal meetings. He thinks that such a measure is not at variance with the resolution of the Government, whilst they watch over public tranquility and oppose the Repeal movements, still to act with forbearance and conciliation, and to devote their best energies to improve the institutions, and promote the prosperity of Ireland. I have the honour to be, my Lord, your Lordship's most obedient servant.

"HENRY SUGDEN, Secretary."

With a great part of this letter he had no fault to find there were but three sentences in it upon which he thought it necessary to comment, but those three sentences contained the whole substance of the letter, and conveyed nothing more than that Lord Ffrench had been dismissed from the magistracy, because he had not read, marked, and digested that declaration which the Lord Chancellor of Ireland stated some Minister of the Crown had made in his place in Parliament as to her Majesty's intentions with regard to Ireland. He presumed this act to be the act of the Irish Government, because he knew from official communications which had been made to him, that at the same time Lord Ffrench was removed from the magistracy, he was concurrently and simultaneously dismissed from the deputy-lieutenancy of the county of which he had the honour to be the lord-lieutenant. He therefore wished to know on what ground or right it was, that the Irish Government assumed, that a single declaration in Parliament formed a proper or sufficient ground for such a proceeding, and on what principle Lord Ffrench or any other individual in Ireland could be held to know what passed in Parliament. The question, therefore, he wished to ask was, whether any communication of any message from the Throne, of any Speech from the Throne, or of any speech in Parliament, had been made to the Irish Government, or published in the Gazelles, either of London or Dublin, or in any other official form?

The Duke of Wellington:

Her Majesty's servants in Ireland were instructed, on their appointment, of the desire of her Majesty's Government to maintain the Union with Ireland unimpaired. There have been no other instructions issued to her Majesty's servants in Ireland on that subject.

The Marquess of Clanricarde

was not surprised at the answer he had received, but he must enter his protest against the acts recently done by the Irish government. He thought—

The Earl of Wicklow

rose to order. There was no motion before the House. The question had been put by the noble Marquess and answered by the noble Duke, and, therefore, precisely on the same grounds raised on a former evening the noble Marquess was clearly out of order.

The Marquess of Londonderry

considered the course intended to be now pursued was quite irregular. The noble Mar- quess had read a letter from a public newspaper, instead of moving in proper course for its regular production. He had then put a question upon that letter, which had been answered, and he now wished to enter upon a discussion of the whole subject without notice.

The Marquess of Clanricarde

meant to conclude by moving an humble address to her Majesty that the letter be laid before the House, and then he should be strictly in order.

The Duke of Wellington

did not know that there would be any objection whatever to the production of the letter, but he thought the noble Marquess ought to confine himself to his notice. He had given notice of his intention to ask a question, which had been answered. He repeated that he did not know that there would be any objection to the production of the letter, but he wished to converse with other persons on the subject before he consented to it.

The Marquess of Clanricarde

said, he would not persist in his motion for the production of the letter were it not that the state of Ireland was most alarming. He was not expressing, nor anxious to express, any opinion on the dismissal of the magistrates, and he thought what bad fallen from the noble Duke might have great weight with their Lordships in coming to a decision upon the motion which he was forced to make, in order to offer a few observations on a matter which, in his judgment did not admit of a moment's delay. This letter only came to his knowledge on Saturday last, and as the House did not meet yesterday he was not only deprived of giving notice, but more than an usual time had elapsed. The state of Ireland was such that every moment was of great and grave consequence. In this matter be thought the Irish Government had made an unfortunate, a grave and a serious mistake. He was not about to discuss the policy of the dismissal of the magistrates who had taken part in the repeal agitation; but he certainly thought the steps which had been taken, and that, too, on the mere authority of the public press, as to a Ministerial declaration, were contrary to the constitution, to the principles of the laws of Parliament, and to the principles of common sense.

The Marquess of Londonderry

rose to order. Let the noble Marquess confine himself to giving a notice of motion, and every noble Lord would be ready to come down and hear his speech on a future occasion.

The Marquess of Clanricarde

contended that he was perfectly in order, and he promised their Lordships that he would narrow within the smallest possible compass the observations which he felt it necessary to make. He repeated, that the steps which been taken, and the grounds upon which the dismissals had taken place, were contrary to every rule of law and constitutional principle. There was, as he had already said, a great part of this letter with which he found no fault— on the contrary, in which he entirely agreed. He did not want to say anything about the question of the Repeal of the Union, but this he Would say, that whether for the purpose of maintaining the Union or effecting its repeal, there could be no doubt entertained by any reflecting man that the assembling of great bodies of men throughout the country, creating disturbances, and alarming the minds of the peaceable subjects of the Crown, was in itself, on the broad principle, an illegal act. He thought that such assemblages, whatever might be their object, were illegal, and therefore he was of opinion that it might be very right and proper for all magistrates to do everything in their power to discourage and discountenance such meetings; but that was a totally different question from that on which Lord Ffrench had been dismissed. The letter of the Lord Chancellor of Ireland stated, that these assemblies had a tendency to outrage, and were therefore illegal. ["No, no."] He begged pardon, the letter stated

The allegation that the numerous Repeal meetings are not illegal does not diminish their inevitable tendency to outrage; and, considering the subjects in all its bearings, it is the opinion of the Lord Chancellor that such meetings are not in the spirit of the constitution, and may become dangerous to the safety of the State. There was no question that, if one great meeting was held for the purpose of expressing a strong popular opinion, it would, in the common sense acceptation of the term, be legal. But, in Ireland, there were held meetings of men collected by hundreds of thousands from all parts of the country, and he for one, thought that the time had come when the Irish Government were bound to take some step on the subject. And he thought they had a plain and simple course to pursue. He wished, if he could, to keep quite clear of the question of Repeal but he must, in passing, remind their Lordships, that not a month since he made use of warning language to them upon the subject, as far as became so humble an individual as himself. It was no doubt very rash in him to attempt to prescribe before he was regularly called in; but he must say he was of opinion that the Irish Government might very fairly have issued a proclamation stating the simple truth, that those meetings were calculated to disturb, and did disturb and alarm the minds of the quiet and peaceable subjects of the realm—advising such per. sons to discountenance these meetings, and then they might fairly enough, if they had so chosen, hare desired and enjoined all magistrates not only to discountenance, but to keep away from such meetings. If this had been done, if the opinions of the Government had thus been set before the magistracy, and that then after such warning any magistrate had attended a Repeal meeting, he would have had a warning of his peril and must have taken the consequences of his own act upon himself. However, in this instance nothing of this kind had been done; he did not mean to decide whether the desiring the magistrates to keep away from these meetings altogether, would or would not be the wisest possible course. A question might be raised, into Which, however, he would not now enter, as to how far it was desirable while such meetings were held at all, to prevent those persons from attending them, who might naturally be expected to be more moderate and sober-minded, who might keep the assemblage from going too far, and prevent their being delivered over to violent and reckless men. If such a course as that which he pointed out had been pursued, the magistrates would have been fairly treated, and have had due notice given them of what the Government expected they should do and not do; but how stood the case? The Irish Government had not waited for any outrage; there had been nothing of the sort; there had, indeed, been one outrage, but it was not connected with the subject of these meetings, nor could it be fairly considered as connected with the meetings at all. At the meetings there had been no illegal act committed, no breach of the peace whatever, everything had gone on quietly. It was not, therefore, upon the commission of any violent act, not upon the occasion of any particular speech, but merely upon a declaration made by a right hon. Gentle- man in another place, and by the noble Duke in that House, that the Lord Chancellor of Ireland had thought it right at once to call upon all the magistrates of Ireland to avoid these meetings, and not only to call upon them not to attend or preside over these meetings, but to break every magistrate who attended any one of the meetings after this declaration had been made by certain Ministers in their places in Parliament. That such a proceeding was opposed to all constitutional theory and practice must be evident. That assuredly the mere speech of a Minister of the Crown, however exalted his position, the mere speech of a Minister in the House of Commons or the House of Lords, was not the form in which a Message from the Crown, in which the wishes of the Government, should be conveyed to the magistrates of a country. But even were it so, did any one ever hear of such a thing, in a free country, as the Ministers of the Crown, advising the Sovereign to instruct them to convey her opinion upon a subject in Parliament in this fashion, and with a view to such results? As to the question of Repeal itself, he would not hesitate to say that in his opinion, the Repeal of the Union would be the very worst thing that could possibly happen to Ireland; and as to the manner in which, and the men by whom that Union was effected, it appeared to him that the very constitution of the Irish Parliament at the period, which some made an argument against the Union itself, it seemed to him one of the strongest reasons against restoring a separate Legislature to Ireland. What was the effect and the manner in which her Majesty's opinion upon the subject had been made use of by Sir Robert Peel in the other House of Parliament? He had no right, indeed, to comment upon that proceeding, as it took place in another House, anymore than the Lord Chancellor of Ireland was justified in acting upon it. But what was the effect of that proceeding? It was to bring her Majesty's name and authority directly in collision with the opinions and feelings so generally declared by the people throughout a great part of Ireland, and in this he (the Marquess of Clanricarde) conceived there was no small impropriety. Again, it was contrary to all Parliamentary law, for the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, or any person out of the Houses of Parliament, to presume to act at all upon anything that had been stated in Parliament. How should persons out of Parliament know what passed in Parliament, but by a direct breach of Parliamentary law? A very absurd law it was, no doubt—a law daily violated, and very rarely carried into effect at all, even for a half hour, but then it was a law; and, assuredly, no man ever heard before of a debate in Parliament being binding upon the people of the country; of penalties being attachable to persons for the infraction of what was said in either House of Parliament. It was a positive fact well known to those connected with Ireland, that a great many magistrates did not take in the English newspapers, and though the debates were reported with extraordinary precision, they were not always strictly accurate; but, if accurate, he must say, it was very hard to break a set of magistrates because they had not read a certain speech delivered on a certain day. He repeated that this had been a most unfortunate proceeding—a proceeding which had set the people of Ireland more in opposition, because it showed irritation and rashness, and the total absence of that real deliberation, judgment, and dignity, which gave weight. Look to its consequences. Already they had seen some volunteers who had come forward to surrender their commissions. This was not unnatural; but he hoped the example would not be carried out to any further extent. The first effect had, however, been shown; and though he did not wish to take any credit for his own political friends, it was impossible to deny that during the last ten years, the confidence of the people in the impartial administration of the law had greatly increased. Now, if all those magistrates holding certain opinions withdrew from the bench, what would be the feelings of the people with respect to the administration of justice? He was aware he was led into observations he wished to avoid, though he desired to confine himself to the letter of the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, which in his judgment, was a most improper and unfortunate mode of proceeding. He did not think it wise to dismiss any magistrate unless he had been present at a meeting where language of a treasonable and dangerous tendency had been used, and had made himself a party to the use of that language by presiding at the meeting. But upon this point he was not now speaking; he was merely drawing their Lordships' attention to that act of the Irish Executive, which was founded on a speech in Parliament—namely, the dismissal of a magistrate. This he thought an unfortunate thing; and he did hope, that the Government on this side of the water would take immediate steps to remedy, as far as it was in their power, this great and grievous mistake. There had not been any disposition in Ireland or in Parliament to view with hostility or with any other but a good feeling, the distinguished personages who had been sent over to Ireland to fill the highest offices there. There had been no opposition in Parliament or in Ireland to those appointments, and he regretted a step which would set the Irish Government directly in collision with the popular feeling of the country. The noble Marquess concluded by saying that he was quite ready to withdraw his motion after what had fallen from the noble Duke opposite.

The Duke of Wellington

was sure their Lordships would recollect the state of anxiety which prevailed in this country, as well as in Ireland, the scene of the present agitation, at the period when questions were put to the Government in both Houses of Parliament, on the subject of the measures adopted by certain persons in Ireland to create agitation with respect to the Repeal of the Union;—a repeal to be brought about not by the deliberations and decisions of that and the other House of Parliament— not by a law to be passed by the Legislature, but by agitation, and eventually, by force and violence. It was impossible to describe the anxiety felt throughout the public by this state of things; and the answer given in both Houses of Parliament to the questions he had referred to, were to the effect, that the Government had paid, and were continuing to pay, the utmost attention to the subject, and that measures had been adopted on both sides of the water to enable the Lord-lieutenant and the Government of Ireland to preserve the peace of the country, and that her Majesty's servants were determined to adopt all measures necessary to preserve inviolate the legislative union of the two countries. The individual who now addressed their Lordships had not then had an opportunity of taking her Majesty's pleasure on the subject, and went no further than he had just stated; but his right hon. Friend who addressed the other House of Parliament on the subject stated that it was her Majesty's intention to act precisely on the declaration of her royal predecessor, and to maintain inviolate the legislative union of the two countries. The declarations made in Parliament were matters of public notoriety, and gave the utmost satisfaction, not only in this country, but also in Ireland; for though there were thousands who attended those meetings in Ireland for the purpose of agitating for the repeal of the Union, it must not be supposed that there were not also thousands— that there was not an equal number, or, as he believed, a majority, who were of a different opinion in that country. Though the measures which the noble Marquess opposite had alluded to, were not adopted in Ireland (and it was not necessary for him to enter upon that subject, as the noble Marquess did not impute any blame to the Government for not having adopted them), yet the anxiety of that part of the population in Ireland, who were opposed to repeal, was greatly relieved by the declarations of her Majesty's Ministers in Ireland, which were matters of notoriety in this country and in Ireland. These meetings still continuing, notwithstanding the declarations he had adverted to, and continuing under the presiding influence of magistrates in her Majesty's commission of the peace, the Lord Chancellor of Ireland had been instructed to adopt every constitutional means in his power in order to maintain inviolate the legislative union between the two countries. When the Lord Chancellor had the satisfaction of learning the declarations of her Majesty's confidential servants in Parliament, he thought it still further necessary to maintain inviolate the legislative union. The Lord Chancellor found, then, notwithstanding these declarations, which were so notorious, and had given such general satisfaction, that magistrates continued to preside at these repeal meetings, and to call them together; and these magistrates were not drivellers, but must have known (what was notorious to the public) that which passed in both Houses of Parliament, They must have known, that her Majesty's confidential advisers had declared it to be the determination of the Government to maintain inviolate the legislative union, and yet they persevered in holding these meetings, which, in addition to other circumstances which proved their illegality, had a tendency to lead to outrage in every case, and had, in fact, led to outrage in one remarkable instance, at Clones. As the people of the country were divided in opinion on this question, these meetings were calculated to lead to outrage in every case; and if lives were lost, those would be liable to the consequences who had called the meetings together which had occasioned such a misfortune. Under these circumstances, it became the duty of the Lord Chancellor to give a check to these meetings, by letting the magistrates know who called together and presided at meetings calculated to lead to outrage and disorder, that they were not fit to be trusted with the preservation of the public peace, the more particularly after the notoriety of the declaration, that it was the determination of the Crown to maintain inviolate the legislative union. It was the Lord Chancellor's duty, then, to take measures to prove to the magistrates, that they could not remain in the commission of the peace if they presided at, or promoted, such meetings. Under these circumstances he conceived, that the Lord Chancellor was entirely justified in the course he had taken, and if the noble Marquess should call for the papers, which he understood were to be produced in another place, he should have no objection to lay them on the Table of the House; but he could not allow the imputation thrown out against the Lord Chancellor of Ireland to remain unanswered.

The Earl of Glengall

merely wished to correct an error which his noble Friend opposite had inadvertently fallen into with respect to the letter of the Lord Chancellor of Ireland. It was evident, from the contents of the document read by his noble Friend, that this was the third letter on the subject. The Lord Chancellor first wrote to Lord Ffrench. To this there was a reply from that noble Lord, and the letter read by his noble Friend was evidently an answer to that. This showed that the proceeding with respect to Lord Ffrench had not taken place without notice.

Lord Campbell

was more and more convinced, from every reflection he could give to the subject, that the preservation of the legislative union was essential for the happiness of England and Ireland. The very notion that Ireland should have a separate Legislature, independent of the Imperial Legislature was most absurd, and if carried into effect would be productive of the greatest misery to both countries. Under these circumstances all measures necessary for the preservation of the Union would have his hearty support. At the same time he felt bound most deeply to deplore and condemn the dismissal of Lord Ffrench on the grounds stated in the letter of the secretary of the Lord Chancellor. The grounds there alleged showed, that the step taken was most unjust and highly inexpedient. All that was there charged against Lord Ffrench was, that he was about to attend Repeal meetings at Caltra and at Athlone. If these meetings were likely to be attended with the commission of outrage, and, consequently, a breach of the peace, there could be no doubt on the subject; but it did not follow that meetings held for the purpose of petitioning Parliament for a Repeal of the Union were in themselves illegal. For his own part, he denied they were so in themselves. The people had a right to meet peaceably to petition the Throne and the Houses of Parliament on any legislative question. The legislative union was enacted by act of Parliament, and whether right or wrong was not the question? Could it not, he would ask, be repealed by act of Parliament? He deeply regretted the agitation on this subject. He should rejoice to see any measure—any constitutional measure—for its repression; but such a step as had been taken by the Lord Chancellor had only the effect of irritating and provoking, and of rendering the agitation more mischievous and formidable. He apprehended, that there might be meetings lawfully assembled to petition for the Repeal of the Union; and a magistrate, if he attended them, was unconstitutionally dismissed from the commission, unless he had done something which rendered him unworthy to be trusted with the administration of justice. Was it to be said, that merely attending a public meeting, when no violation of the peace was likely to take place, was an illegal proceeding. But he had the high authority of Lord Chancellor Sugden for saying, that meetings might be held to petition for a Repeal of the Union, without their being illegal. That was, that per se the discussion of the Repeal of the Union was not illegal. He referred to this opinion without the slightest description of disrespect to the most learned lawyer who now administered the law in Ireland with great patience and impartiality, to the general satisfaction of the profession and the public in that coun try He had the very high authority of that learned person for declaring that, previous to the declarations that had been made in both Houses of Parliament, and to the expression of opinion that had been attributed to her Majesty, there was nothing illegal in attending these meetings. It must be in the recollection of most noble Lords, that in 1834, a motion was made in the House of Commons for the Repeal of the Legislative Union between England and Ireland, which was rejected by an overwhelming majority. There had also been a motion made in that House in the year 1713, for the Repeal of the Union between Scotland and England, which was only lost by a majority of four in that House. There was nothing illegal, nor had it ever been held, that he had heard of, that there was any thing illegal in either of these motions. There certainly might be a law made to make it sedition, or even high treason, to propose or to meet for the purpose of petitioning for a Repeal of the Union. Such a law would be a most inexpedient measure; but until there was such a law, it could not be considered any violation of the law to meet for the purpose of petitioning for the repeal. If that was illegal, why was it not declared so long ago? Why were not some measures taken to punish those who violated the law. But he took upon himself to say, that to meet for the purpose of petitioning for the repeal of the union, was not a violation of the law. If that were the case, did the declarations of the Ministers in the two Houses of Parliament alter the quality of the act? Without resorting to the technical objection urged by the noble Marquess near him, that the magistrates in Ireland might not know of these declarations, he would ask did these declarations render illegal that which was before legal? Ministers might declare it unlawful to hold meetings to oppose their measures; they might have declared that the relief of the Roman Catholic subjects of the realm from disabilities would be a violation of the constitution; and that Protestant ascendancy was necessary to preserve the integrity of the empire. But if such declarations had been made, would it have been unlawful after that to meet for the purpose of petitioning for Catholic emancipation? The present Minister had declared, in another place, that he would stand by the Reform Bill. Would it now be unlawful to meet to petition that the Reform Bill might be repealed, and all the rotten boroughs restored to the privilege of sending Members to Parliament? He apprehended that, notwithstanding the declarations of Ministers, there would be no illegality in meeting to petition for these objects. He now came to the declaration of the Ministers of the Crown, and he must say, that according to all his notions of the constitution of Great Britain, that declaration was highly irregular — not on the ground that it tended to influence the debate or decision of the House on any pending subject, but on the ground that it was the declaration of the personal opinion of the Sovereign, for which the Minister was not responsible. It was totally different in principle from the answer made by King William to the address of both Houses, which was most constitutional, the Ministers being responsible for it, and liable to be impeached for anything improper in it. But the declaration to which he now referred, though, no doubt, conveying the sentiments of their gracious Sovereign on the subject of repeal (sentiments responded to by all the community in this country, and by a majority, he trusted, in Ireland), was an irregular proceeding in a constitutional point of view, and might form a bad precedent for introducing the personal opinion of the Sovereign with respect to subjects on which the public were divided. It was clearly meant to be the personal opinion of the Sovereign, because Sir R. Peel intimated his own opinion; and the noble Duke opposite had declared the opinion of the Ministers; and then, in addition, they had the opinion and personal determination of the Sovereign expressed. This was highly irregular and unconstitutional, and calculated to lead to the most dangerous consequences, by way of precedent. But was it a reason because such a declaration was made, that magistrates should afterwards he removed from the commission of the peace for attending repeal meetings? Could it be doubted, that before these declarations were made the personal opinion of the Crown, was in favour of the legislative union, and that the right hon. Baronet in the other House, and the noble Duke opposite, were determined to support that union by all constitutional means? He, therefore, submitted that the declarations made in the two Houses of Parliament formed no additional reason for the dismissal of magistrates; and he deeply regretted the grounds on which that step had been taken. He also thought it an inexpedient step in itself. It was neither a system of conciliation nor coercion; but rather one of irritation and provocation. Why should an act be done which would not lessen the influence of the party against whom it was directed? So far from proving a degradation, it would be looked upon by the people in a contrary light, and on these grounds he considered the course which had been pursued unadvisable and improper. If by conciliation order could not be preserved, then let a rigorous and firm course be resorted to, but irritation should be avoided, as it only tended to produce a vindictive feeling, and to add to the power of those against whom it was directed.

The Duke of Wellington,

in explanation, said, that her Majesty's name had been used in connexion with her Majesty's reference to the declaration of her royal predecessor, a circumstance which the noble and learned Lord appeared to overlook, but which made a material distinction. He, in speaking of the dismissals from the magistracy, referred not only to the notoriety of the declarations which had been made in Parliament, but also to the tendency to outrage which was likely to be the result of such immense assemblages.

The Earl of Charleville

said, that when his noble Friend opposite expressed his fears that these dismissals might establish a dangerous precedent, he could assure him that there was no fear of their so doing, for if there was any precedent of the sort it had already been established by the late Ministry. That Ministry had deprived Colonel Verner of the commission of the peace, because that gentleman had at a private party drunk a toast which it was supposed was calculated to produce feeling of irritation amongst those who were opposed to him in politics. They also dismissed Mr, Blacker, because that gentleman's wife, on the 12th of July, thought fit to wear an orange riband. It was clear, then that no precedent could be established by the dismissal of Lord Ffrench or the other magistrates. He would not enter into the question of the legality of these meetings. His noble Friend had spoken of the tranquillity of those meetings, and he would admit that no actual outrage had taken place, except what occurred at Clones, and the unfortunate accident at Cashel. But though there was no actual breach of the peace, was it nothing that the minds of the peaceable and well-disposed of all ranks, of all classes, and of all creeds, were kept in a state of terrified suspense and fear as to the result of the present proceedings in Ireland? When the people of Clonmel were roused from their beds between four and five o'clock in the morning—when they had bands of music playing through the streets—when, on looking out at their windows, they beheld an awful mob parading through the town, at whose mercy they felt themselves placed, he would ask, whether these were not strong grounds for terror and alarm? His noble Friend (Lord Clanricarde) had alluded to those who were likely voluntarily to withdraw themselves from the commission of the peace. It was a course which he should exceedingly regret to see them pursue, and he hoped his noble Friend would exert his influence to prevent its being adopted, as he agreed with his noble Friend that it would be a serious injury. When those on his side of the House thought they had a much stronger cause of complaint, that course was not pursued. No magistrate w it drew from the commission in the indulgence of private feeling, but all continued in the discharge of their duties from patriotic motives.

The Earl of Wicklow

regretted, that before the letter of the Lord Chancellor of Ireland was written it had not been generally intimated to the magistracy that the Government considered such meetings as the letter referred to dangerous, and that it was not becoming in magistrates to attend them. Though he did not approve the wording of the letter, he still thought his noble Friend opposite had dealt harshly with the Lord Chancellor, His noble Friend had only taken into consideration the case of Lord Ffrench, and that was the only one then before their Lordships. The censure which his noble Friend cast upon the Government and the Lord Chancellor of Ireland was unjust, for it was evident that there must have been some correspondence between Lord Ffrench and the Lord Chancellor before the letter which his noble Friend had read was written; and therefore it would have been but just in his noble Friend before he censured the Lord Chancellor to have moved for the correspondence, which had taken place, If it appeared from that correspondence that in the first instance the Lord Chancellor had written to say, that attendance at such meetings would be unbecoming, his subsequent proceedings would be perfectly justified, and it would appear that he had done so. The course pursued by his noble Friend might, to himself, appear to be just, but he could not consider it so. The noble and learned Lord (Lord Campbell) gave an opinion in favour of the legality of the present meetings in Ireland. He was not a lawyer but when he heard a noble Lord who was once Attorney-general to the Crown, and who had been a Lord Chancellor, express an opinion calculated to prove so mischievous in Ireland — when he heard a person, whose opinion carried such high authority, make a statement which, even if it was right was still mischievous, but which he thought was totally wrong, he could not help feeling surprised. With respect to what the noble and learned Lord had said as to the legality of those meetings, he would refer to what had taken place in 1819, when large and numerous assemblages were called together at Manchester and other places, ostensibly for the purpose of petitioning Parliament for the repeal of the Corn-laws, or for reform, Now he did not consider these meetings nearly so dangerous in their tendency as those that had taken place recently in Ireland; but still the authorities considered themselves justified in dispersing the large meeting which was assembled at Manchester. He did not wish to express any degree of approbation as to the mode that was adopted to disperse that meeting. The question, however, was, whether it should be dispersed or not? That question was brought to trial. Mr. Hunt and other persons were tried for taking part in it, and were convicted. Now, he could not perceive anything dissimilar, as to the character of such a meeting as that which he had just alluded to and those held in Ireland, except that he thought the latter infinitely more dangerous. On the trial of Mr. Hunt the learned judge who presided (Mr. Justice Bailey) was described to have spoken as follows:— The learned judge then proceeded to refer to the evidence, and to enforce upon the minds of the jury that the main question they had to try was, whether the meeting was or was not, according to its manner calculated to produce terror either in the manner in which it was formed, or in the circumstances that ensued before its dispersion. The learned judge told the jury that the only question was, whether the meeting was calculated to create alarm, and they were not to say whether persons were in bodily alarm. It was then stated that the marching of organized bands of men from a distance to a place of meeting, attended with music and banners, was in its nature illegal. The jury found the parties guilty, and Mr. Hunt applied to the Court of King's Bench to set aside the verdict. The Lord Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Bailey, Mr. Justice Holroyd, and Mr. Justice Best, all agreed in opinion as to the illegality of the meeting. When he found this was the case, might he not be permitted to differ from the opinion of the noble and learned Lord as to the illegality of the meetings held in Ireland; for these meetings all had the qualities which Mr. Justice Bailey, described as being characteristic of illegal meetings. He did not blame her Majesty's Government for not having hitherto put down these meetings, for that was a matter which must be influenced by considerations of policy; but there might be a bound beyond which no government could allow matters to pass, and when the danger became great and imminent, the meetings must be put down. He had had no intention to take part in the discussion, but after what had fallen from the noble and learned Lord, he felt bound to make some observations.

Lord Campbell

begged to assure the noble Earl that he wished to speak with the greatest respect of the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, whose learning and conduct he was sure must command the general admiration of the House and the country. With respect to the observation that the noble Lord had made regarding his short residence in Ireland, he would only say that he had derived this benefit from it, namely, to unite in his mind the warmest affections to that country, and to make him feel the greatest interest in its welfare. As to the opinion the noble Earl had attributed to him with regard to the legality or the illegality of the meetings recently held in Ireland, be would only say that he had given no opinion himself on the subject. He had merely confined himself to the question as to whether in meetings called to petition Parliament for a repeal of the Union there was any violation of the law. Now, Lord Ffrench was dismissed not for having attended a meeting, or for any thing illegal that he had done, but for having expressed his intention to attend meetings at Cultra and at Athlone. What he said was that there was nothing illegal in itself to attend a meeting to petition the Crown or the Houses of Parliament for the repeal of any legislative act.

The Lord Chancellor

said that he felt it to be his duty to address a very few words to their Lordships, after the observations that had fallen from his noble and learned Friend. The letter which had been referred to by the noble Lord who introduced the subject, and which had been animadverted on by other noble Lords, was not on the Table of the House, nor had he seen the letter of the Lord Chancellor of Ireland; but a letter had been reported in the newspapers which purported to be a copy of that letter; but whether it was authentic or not he could not tell. The speeches that had been made had reference to the particular views which the Chancellor of Ireland took with respect to the dismissal of Lord Ffrench. The real question, however, which they ought to consider, was whether the Government of Ireland had done its duty in the dismissal of these magistrates, for it should be recollected that this proceeding was not confined to Lord Ffrench, but extended to Mr. O'Connell and other magistrates; and he was satisfied that if the Government had not acted in the way in which they had, they would have neglected their duty to their country and to their Sovereign. He did not mean to deny what his noble and learned Friend had said, that parties might legally hold meetings to petition for the repeal of any particular act of Parliament, and also that whatever opinions might be expressed in either or both Houses of Parliament, or by members of her Majesty's Government, would not of itself render a meeting illegal, or justify the dismissal of magistrates for attending it. But could they shut their eyes to what had been going on around them for the last two months? Could they have been ignorant of the nature and extent of the meetings that had been held week after week in Ireland? Were they not all fully aware that these meetings had been attended by from two to three hundred thousand persons, at which the most exciting and inflammatory speeches were made, and could any man tell him that such meetings were not ille gal? Every meeting which was dangerous to the public peace was illegal; and no lawyer in the land would give an opinion to the contrary. He would ask noble Lords to look to the situation of Ireland, and to say whether such meetings were not dangerous to the public peace. But he might be told that, although these meetings were dangerous to the public peace, they were attended by these magistrates with the view of exercising their control and influence; but these persons, be it recollected, were appointed to the commission of the peace with the view of preserving the peace. Oh, but his noble and learned Friend exclaimed, would you prevent magistrates attending these meetings to preserve order—but did they do so? On the contrary, was it not notorious that they attended these meetings to promote agitation, and to excite the passions of the people; and when two or three hundred thousands of persons were present, under the circumstances under which these meetings were held, who could tell what might be the effect of any accidental circumstance? He would therefore say, that the persons whose duty it particularly was to preserve the public peace in Ireland, having neglected their duty as magistrates, it became the duty of the Government immediately to dismiss them from the commission of the peace, "Oh but," said his noble and learned Friend, "you gave them no notice of your intention; you did not tell them not to attend such meetings." His answer to this was, that if they were not fully aware that such meetings must be illegal, they were not fit for the situations which they held, and they must be as liable to be punished for attending and taking part in the proceedings in such places as any other description of persons. He had not merely communicated with his noble and learned Friends in that House on the subject, but with other persons standing high in the profession of the law, who all told him that it was hardly possible that there could be a meeting of two hundred thousand persons held which could be legal, Such an assembly must almost necessarily be attended with danger to the public peace, and, above all, when it was a political meeting, and when, in consequence of the inflammatory speeches which were made at it the greatest excitement prevailed. He found, also, that the leader at these meetings said that, by merely holding up his hand, he could get one of these meetings of hundreds of thousands of persons instantly to disperse. He would ask, what might be the effect if this person's hand were held up for another purpose? He would refer to what had taken place within a few years ago in Ireland. He would remind noble Lords that at the period he alluded to a noble Lord of the highest character was Lord Chancellor of Ireland, and that noble person refused to place a gentleman in the commission of the peace for only sanctioning the proposition for the repeal of the Union. He found this proceeding took place with the sanction of persons of the highest authority connected with the late Government. In the present case the Government had to deal, not merely with those who sanctioned the proposition for repeal, but those who were its popular advocates at public meetings, held under the state of excitement which he had described. He maintained that they had the sanction of the noble Lord for the course which they had taken. But they required no sanction—they required the authority of no man—they said, and no man would doubt it, that these persons, acting in the manner in which they had done, had acted inconsistent with the discharge of their duties as magistrates—that it was not necessary to give them any notice of the course to be taken by the Government, and that in this instance the Government had not only acted in the proper execution of their authority, but that if they had neglected to take the course which they had adopted, they would not have discharged their duty to the Queen, or to the country.

Lord Cottenham

was somewhat surprised at the observations of his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack, who said that he was not aware of the authenticity of the letters which had been so frequently alluded to, except from the public papers. His noble and learned Friend had said, that meetings of this sort could not legally take place. He (Lord Cottenham) was not about to discuss the legality or illegality of the meetings. They knew well that meetings ostensibly of a perfectly legal and proper character might become illegal from the manner in which they were conducted, and he should therefore abstain from giving any opinion upon the legality of these meetings, because the facts of the case were not before them They were, however, ostensibly called for a legal purpose, and could only become illegal from something which happened at the time—from something which might excite public terror—or from its being intended to produce some illegal effect. His noble Friend had slated, that the alarm which prevailed through the country, and which had been produced by these meetings, made it the bounden duty of the Government to dismiss all magistrates who might attend those meetings. He would not enter into the discussion of this part of the case now, but he begged to say that if that were so, the Irish government had been guilty of a gross dereliction of duty; because these were meetings, not of yesterday, but of long continuance—which had been attended by magistrates, and which magistrates had not been dismissed. They had the highest authority on this point, because they had that of the Lord Chancellor of Ireland himself. That learned person stated in his letter, that, in his opinion, magistrates ought to have opportunities of slating their opinions on public affairs; he stated, that that was a wholesome practice; consequently the Lord Chancellor of Ireland had been of opinion that they might attend in order to state their opinions. Why, then, did the Lord Chancellor of Ireland alter his course in the case of Lord Ffrench? Not became Lord Ffrench had attended any meeting—that was not the language held by the Lord Chancellor; but because Lord Ffrench had stated, in an answer to a letter from the Lord Chancellor, that he proposed to attend such a meeting. Now, that meeting he insisted was ostensibly for a legal object; he did not say it was a legal meeting ultimately, for his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack had said it was not, but he said it was ostensibly and at first a legal meeting; and yet, because Lord Ffrench stated his intention of attending that meeting, he was dismissed from the magistracy. Their Lordships must observe, that no injustice was done to the Lord Chancellor of Ireland by the view of the case which be and his noble Friends near him had taken. They had only remarked on the case, as stated by the Lord Chancellor of Ireland himself in the letter which he wrote to Lord French, as a justification of the course he was pursuing. It was true, that his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack had found out a justification of the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, but only a justification which the Lord Chancellor of Ireland did not find out for himself. The Lord Chancellor of Ireland said, "I had been desirous that magistrates should have opportunities of stating their opinions in favour of repeal." He did not say where; but he (Lord Cottenham) presumed, that it must be at meetings of this kind that they were to find those opportunities. But the Lord Chancellor of Ireland stated, that some change had taken place. What was that change? Why, that her Majesty's Ministers had made certain declarations to the two Houses of Parliament. The Lord Chancellor stated, that Her Majesty's Government having recently declared in both Houses of Parliament their fixed determination to maintain the Union, it becomes the duty of the Members of the Government to support that declaration. Now, from this one might almost suppose that the Lord Chancellor of Ireland had been in doubt what step to take. The Lord Chancellor did not state how he had heard of these declarations, and the inference was, that he knew of them only by those means which were open to those who had not seats in Parliament, He stated, in fact, that he had beard of those declarations, and then said, that it was the duty of the Members of the Government to support the resolution that had been taken by her Majesty's Ministers here. It was true, that this letter was not all that had passed on the occasion. There was a former letter, which was not now before their Lordships—the letter, namely, in answer to which Lord Ffrench had stated his intention of attending the meeting in question—and it ought not to be forgotten that it was not because Lord Ffrench bad attended other meetings of the kind which had gone by, and which might have deserved the reprehension of the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, but because he had expressed an intention of attending such a meeting at a future day, that he was dismissed from the magistracy. Now, he must say, that the learned person who made this defence for himself had been most unfortunate in stating his own defence in his own letter. He did not say, that there was no defence for that learned person's conduct, but he did say, that the trouble which was taken to make the defence stated in the letter was wholly thrown away. But there was another point deserving of their Lordships' attention. This letter stated, that the Be- peal of the Union was a measure, the carrying of which her Majesty, like her predecessor, had expressed her determination to prevent. Now, there were certain constitutional modes by which the Crown communicated with Parliament. The Crown communicated with Parliament by means of a Speech from the Throne, or by a message, or in answer to an address of either House. These were the well-known constitutional means of communicating with Parliament. But a communication made under these circumstances did not convey the personal opinion of the Crown; it was the language of Government expressed in terms which the Crown was known to receive. On this occasion, however, nothing of that kind had taken place; there was no speech from the Throne, no message, no answer to an address. How had the wish of the Crown been communicated? If at all, it must have been by some use of the name of the Crown, which was perfectly unconstitutional. If any Minister in his place in Parliament were to get up and say that the Government had advised the Crown to maintain the Union, that would be perfectly unexceptionable; that would be constitutional; because that was merely stating that they had done what it was the duty of Ministers to do, viz., to advise the Crown; but nothing of the kind was attributed to her Majesty's Ministers in the letter of the Lord Chancellor of Ireland; but what fell from her Majesty's Ministers was stated as if it had come directly from the Crown by way of message. It was true that William 4th had stated his determination to maintain the Union, but in that case there was a constitutional expression of his Majesty's determination; here there was no such constitutional expression of a determination to maintain the Union, though the Government had, as a Government, expressed their determination to the same effect. On the whole he considered that this mode of announcing the determination of the Crown was most unconstitutional and unfortunate. Let it be observed that the Lord Chancellor of Ireland did not state that her Majesty's Government were determined to maintain the Union, but that her Majesty was determined to prevent the repeal of it. As he had intimated, he could not but consider that, whatever grounds there might be to support the course taken with respect to the matter of the present discussion, there had been, he had almost said, a careful abstraction of those grounds from the face of this letter, while other grounds had been put forward which were perfectly untenable. His noble and learned Friend had referred to the refusal of a noble Friend of his, when at the head of the executive in Ireland, to appoint magistrates who were known to entertain opinions in favour of Repeal, but it was quite different not to appoint and to dismiss. But the fact was the late Lord-lieutenant of Ireland did not refuse to appoint to the magistracy on such ground. He believed the only case in which that noble Lord had refused to appoint for those reasons was that of a sheriff. [A noble Lord: " he stated he should refuse in cases of all public officers."] The expression of the noble Lord might have extended further than his recollection went, but at any rate he believed the only case in which a refusal was given was that of a sheriff. All who had held the great seal must have felt that it was usually a matter of delicacy to dismiss a magistrate; it was never resorted to except for strong reasons: but the case of a non-admission to the magistracy was very different, for it was no reflection on any particular individual that he was not made a magistrate. In all he had said, he wished it to be kept in view, that what might be the grounds for dismissing Lord Ffrench he had no means of judging, except from the letter, which stated that the intention expressed by his Lordship of presiding over such a meeting compelled the Lord Chancellor to resort to the measure of his dismissal. The Lord Chancellor said, " You are determined to preside at this meeting, therefore I dismiss you." If there were better reasons they were not to be found within the four corners of the letter; if they really existed why were they not stated? It was most unfortunate that they were not stated; for he would ask their Lordships was this a reason for dismissing a magistrate? He would repeat it was most unfortunate in the present state of Ireland that they should not have had the real reasons for this step put forward at once. The great object of the Government, as of every well wisher of the United Kingdom, was to repress agitation. Was this letter likely to effect that object? If Lord Ffrench had been guilty of any offence which would have rendered his continuance in the commission of the peace disgraceful, why not state it in the letter? But if it was not so, the only question was as to the policy of suffering him to remain. Was such a letter likely to appease agitation? Was it not likely to excite and increase it? He much feared the latter would be the result. But if these meetings were illegal, as his noble and learned Friend intimated, he would say, at least that no man could read the letter and not see that it was an authority, so far as it went, that they were perfectly legal; moreover, no steps had been taken to repress them; and the only reason for the change in the policy of the Irish Government seemed to be, that the noble Duke and the right hon. Baronet in the other House had communicated something which, as a matter of information, the Lord Chancellor of Ireland appeared not to know otherwise than through the ordinary means of intelligence. However, his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack had entirely thrown over that learned person, and put the defence on the general ground of the importance of dismissing magistrates who attended meetings of an illegal character or tendency. With these remarks, he should leave the matter in the hands of their Lordships.

The Lord Chancellor

never meant to say that refusing to appoint was the same thing as dismissing a magistrate; he had argued from the refusal of the late Lord Lieutenant to appoint to the magistracy persons known to hold repeal opinions, that their Lordships might infer the unfitness of persons who attended repeal meetings, of the character which he had described to retain the commission of the peace. With respect to the question of the illegality of these meetings, he believed that the Lord Chancellor of Ireland thought them illegal, because he said in the letter that they tended to outrage, and all meetings tending to outrage were illegal.

The Marquess of Lansdowne

had concurred in the expression of determination by his noble Friend, the late Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, to use the patronage of the Crown, so as not to encourage the agitation of the question of Repeal, but he did not understand, and he did not believe, that the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack understood at the time, that his noble Friend, in stating that say, that he should appoint no advocated the Repeal of the " it was true the noble Earl had gone, and had refused to appoint a person as sheriff', because that person was irrevocably pledged to Repeal; but did the noble Earl assign any unfit reason for the course which he took? No; he assigned the reason on which he acted. To establish the species of analogy which the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack wished to establish, he ought to have shown, that the noble Earl had referred to the proceedings in Parliament, and to something which had been said there, and taken that as the reason for (-hanging the course which he had formerly held, and which he stated he had been desirous to adopt; but the noble and learned Lord had taken the letter, which he had the singular good fortune not to have seen before, although it was published on Saturday, again on Sunday, again on Monday, and again that morning. [The Lord Chancellor—" I did not say I had not seen the printed letter; l only said I had not seen the letter itself."] That made the case stronger; because, having seen the noble and learned Lord could not defend the letter. Why, he asked, was this particular meeting fixed upon. Had there been no other such meetings within the last two months, attended with all those circumstances which the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack had so eloquently described, and had no magistrates attended, or taken part at those meetings, without drawing down on them the censure of the Government? The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack had stated, that all those meetings were illegal, but that was a different view from the one adopted by the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, for Sir Edward Sugden held, that hitherto they had been legal, but were made illegal from what had passed in Parliament. But, if those meetings had all along been illegal, how came the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack not to have advised the Queen to exercise her authority to put them down, being illegal as he had stated The step might be attended with very serious consequences—consequences, however, on which neither he nor any noble Lord near him was inclined to express an opinion without having all the circumstances of the case brought before them and well weighed; but this he would say, that if the reasons for taking such a step were to be stated, as they had been by a great public functionary, and that statement was to be sent forth' to the people of Ireland as exhibiting the real grounds on which the Government were acting in such cases, he could not agree with the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, that it was immaterial in what terms those grounds were expressed. As to the question of illegality, he was decidedly of opinion, that circumstances might arise at meetings of this kind which might render them illegal; and he was convinced, that a discretion was vested in the Government to determine when they became illegal. They might have a tendency to disturb the public peace, or violent language tending to cause such disturbance might be used at them; and, beyond, this if they were of a peaceable external character, there might be circumstances known to the Government which might connect them with ulterior objects, and so might give them an illegal character, which it might be proper to discountenance and visit with censure. But, whatever the circumstances might be under which such interference took place, the Government ought to give some public intimation of their intention to interfere in order that magistrates and other persons might not be left in the dark as to the line of conduct the Government meant to pursue. In the instances referred to by the noble and learned Lord, that appeared to have been the opinion entertained by the late Government, and especially by his noble Friend who, at that period, occupied the post of Lord-lieutenant of Ireland, who plainly intimated the course which he intended to adopt, so that no shadow of doubt could exist, as to his opinion, and the course he would follow. The Lord Chancellor of Ireland did not, in his letter, call in question the legality of those meetings; but the reason he assigned for the removal of magistrates from the commission, was a declaration which had been made in the other House of Parliament; and which, as his noble and learned Friend had stated, could not be considered as the personal declaration of her Majesty, but only as an intimation of the determination of her Majesty's Ministers to tender certain advice to her Majesty. No one could suppose, that that declaration was intended to convey her Majesty's personal intention to maintain the Union, contrary to the wishes of Parliament, or to refuse her consent, if Parliament should act in so improbable and mischievous a manner as to pass a measure for the Repeal of the Union. What the right hon. Baronet, who made the declaration intended to declare was, undoubtedly, that the Ministers of the Crown would now, and perseveringly upon all occasions, advise her Majesty to maintain the existing Union. [Lord Wharnccliffe—" And have so advised her Majesty."] Such a declaration on the part of her Majesty's Ministers, did not render that illegal which before had been perfectly legal. It did not alter the position of the Lord Chancellor of Ireland with regard to the administration of the power vested in his hands. He complained, that the letter of the Lord Chancellor did not state, as it ought, the grounds upon which the dismissal of Lord Ffrench really took place—that it was in consequence of the illegality of the meetings, or any impropriety connected with them, which might have been of such a character as to justify that peculiar interposition which had been exercised. The only reason assigned by the Lord Chancellor was founded upon information derived from a source which had no authority, and to which he had no right to pay the smallest attention. He concurred with his noble Friend in lamenting the course which had been pursued by the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, and which could not fail to be attended with the mischievous result of directing the attention of the people of Ireland—not. to the law of the land, hut to the debates in Parliament, from which to collect their notions of what was or was not legal. He must say, that he thought a false and unfortunate step had been taken in the case, if not by her Majesty's Government, by an individual connected with them by his official position. In questioning the propriety of these dismissals, he pronounced no opinion on the character of the meetings to which allusion had been made. He could not, of course, be aware of the information in the possession of her Majesty's Government on this subject, and he must repeat, that proceedings which, in the first instance—while confined to fair and free discussion of a great and important question—were perfectly legal, might, as they went on, assume a totally different character and call for the interference of the authorities.

Lord Wharncliffe

thought it would have been better had the noble Marquess (Clanricarde) who introduced the subject moved for the production of the correspondence relative to it before going into a discussion on the question. Allusion had been made to the declaration which, a short time ago, was made in the other House of Parliament by the First Lord of the Treasury, and which had since given rise to considerable comment and observation. Now what did the right hon. Baronet say on that occasion? The right hon. Baronet said, as he understood —for, not having heard the statement himself, he obtained his information from those sources from which all their Lordships derived their knowledge of the proceedings in the other House—the right hon. Baronet then said that he was authorised! by her Majesty to declare that she would adhere to a certain declaration which had been made by her Majesty's royal predecessor. Now the right hon. Baronet could only mean, in making that statement, that he had advised her Majesty to allow him to make that declaration on her Majesty's part. Undoubtedly the Government were responsible for that declaration. It was not the statement of the personal determination of her Majesty, but the declaration of the determination of the Government. With respect to the attendance of magistrates at those meetings, several noble Lords opposite had said that, up to a recent period, the Government considered such meetings to be legal, and took no notice of them. But noble Lords must be aware that many illegal acts were committed, especially during periods of agitation, which it might not be advisable to notice in the first instance; but circumstances might render interference requisite, and if, when the necessity for such interference arose, the Government shrank from exercising the power they possessed, they neglected their duty to the Crown and to the country. It was undoubtedly a fact that, before the dismissal of Lord Ffrench, many meetings were held in Ireland, which, from the number of persons attending them, and from the nature of the proceedings, could not be considered legal and constitutional assemblies; but no interference took place until those meetings assumed a character which, he thought, no one would deny threatened the peace of Ireland. It was very easy to say that those meetings were convened for a legal object. He admitted that to be the case; but an assemblage of 100,000 or 200,000 persons was calculated to alarm her Majesty's peaceable Subjects, and he was surprised that breaches of the peace had hitherto been avoided. A meeting of this nature was recently held at Cork, which it was computed was attended by from 150,000 to 200,000 persons, to the great alarm of the citizens. Surely, it could not be necessary, for any legal purpose to collect persons in such numbers from all parts of Ireland? Such meetings could be assembled only for the purposes of agitation, and they were calculated to excite the utmost alarm and apprehension in the minds of the peaceable portion of the community. He certainly thought that the Government would not discharge their duty if they refrained from dismissing any magistrate who attended meetings of this nature, and he was fully prepared to take his share of the responsibility of such a course. Any magistrate who attended such meetings— even though the purpose for which they were convened might be perfectly legal — could not be aware of his duty as a magistrate, and was unfit to remain in the commission of the peace. That was his opinion—an opinion by which he was prepared to abide. He hoped that what had passed during this discussion would not be without its effect out of doors. It would be seen that the Government had taken upon themselves the responsibility of the dismissal of these magistrates; and that they were determined—a determination in which he believed they were supported by the public feeling—to maintain the union of the two countries.

The Marquess of Clanricarde

in reply, admitted that his motion so far as regarded its form, was open to the observations which had been made by the noble Lord who had last spoken, but he had felt that any delay upon such a subject would be most unwise, and he had, therefore, submitted his motion to the House in a hurried and perhaps insufficient manner. He confessed, however, that he was glad that he had brought the motion before the House, for he believed that the discussion which had taken place would not be without its good effects upon the public mind. He had endeavoured to avoid the discussion of the general question of dismissing magistrates, and to confine his observations on the contents of the letter of the learned Lord Chancellor of Ireland, and he must repeat that both the time of writing that letter and its contents were most unfortunate. As the papers for which he I moved had been granted in the other House, he presumed there would be no opposition to his motion.

Motion agreed to.

Their Lordships adjourned at half past nine o'clock.

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