§ Lord Beaumontrose, pursuant to the notice he had given, to present a petition from the East-India Committee of the Colonial Society, the object of which was the production of documents regarding the origin of the war in Affghanistan. In laying this petition before their Lordships, it was his intention to confine himself as closely as possible to the motives which had induced the petitioners to approach their Lordships House, and the grounds on which they founded the prayer of their petition. The petitioners had applied their minds to the study of that portion of our policy in Central Asia, which affected our possessions in India, and they had observed with painful interest the gradual decline of British influence and a corresponding increase of Russian authority in those great Mahomedan nations which intervene and form the main barriers between the territories of the East-India Company and our ambitious rival of the North. Taking a retrospective view of events in those countries, they had witnessed a war between Persia and Russia by which the former country had been so exhausted of treasure and weakened by defeat, that on peace being concluded, she abandoned the defence of her north western frontier, and relied on the forbearance of her late enemy rather than on her alliance with England for the maintenance of her position amongst the nations of Asia. Following up by able diplomacy what they had effected by open violence, the Court of St. Petersburg attained such an ascendancy in the councils of Teheran, that under the direction of Russia the Shah turned his views from the military organization of his western provinces to territorial aggrandizement on his Eastern frontier. Next in the course of events happened the war between Turkey and Russia; which war, after two well-fought campaigns, terminated in the treaty of Adrianople, the date, from which English ascendency ceases, and Russian influence becomes paramount in the Ottoman em- 1144 pire. Thus were two of the three great Mahomedan nations which intervene between India and Russia subdued to the power of the latter, and made subservient to her ambition. A third, the last barrier and defence of our Asiatic possessions remained. Though the Caspian had become like the Black Sea, a Russian lake; though the Persian flag was swept from its waters — though in Constantinople and Teheran the councils of Russia were predominant, a brave and independent people still existed on the site of the ancient Doorannee empire. That people, though nominally divided into distinct principalities, were one in feeling, in religion, and in habits. Herat, Candahar, Cabul and Peshawur might be called separate powers, but the bond of religion was so strong that an attack on the one was considered as an offence against all, and a Seik army could not pass the frontier without exciting the Mahomedan enthusiasm of the entire nation. Russia ever busy in pursuit of its ambitious designs, revived an obselete claim on the part of Persia to a portion of the Affghan country, and in spite of the remonstrances of England induced the Shah to undertake the siege of Herat. Beneath the walls of Herat the nucleus of an invasive army was formed, and Russian officers succeeded to the posts formerly occupied by Englishmen. Herat repulsed the army of Persia, but such was the influence of Russia, that Count Simonich prevailed on the Shah to return to the siege. Our hopes were now in the Affghan tribes, and with a little more energy on the part of the Indian government we might have succeeded in uniting in our favour the remnants of the Doorannee empire. Dost Mahomed was virtually the monarch of Cabul—to his court we sent an accredited agent—and by that act of sending Captain Burnes as our envoy, we acknowledged Dost Mahomed as the rightful sovereign of Cabul. That Prince had showed a disposition in our favour, he offered terms of alliance, and was willing to place his portion of Affghanistan as a barrier between India and Persian aggression; for unfortunately now the words Persian and Russian had become synonimous, and the deeds of the one were subject to the wishes of the other. Then was the moment for the Indian government to act, but, then, unfortunately a Russian envoy Captain Vicovitch, arrived at Cabul, and the Affghans were 1145 surrendered to Russian influence as the Turks and Persians had been surrendered before them. Instead of granting Dost Mahomed his terms, namely, the restoration of that part of Peshawur which had, been violently seized by Runjeet Singh we raked up a treaty which had been formed between the Chief of Lahore and the dethroned monarch of Cabul, Shah Soojah, and became a third party to its execution. Thus was Dost Mahomed, and with him the Affghan people lost to British interests, while Russia, ever ready to embrace every means of pushing on its ambitious views, eagerly sought an alliance with him whose friendly overtures we had disregarded. Deprived of all hope of support from the Mahomedan powers, and having neglected the friendly offer of a passage for our armies to the defence of Herat, we looked, as a last resource, to a new and neighbouring power, which under the genius of Runjeet Singh had risen as an independent nation in the Punjab. A tripartite treaty was signed, the parties being the dethroned monarch of Cabul, the Chief of Lahore, and the Governor-general of India. The object of that treaty was the invasion of Affghanistan and the restoration of Shah Soojah to the throne of Cabul; the means of its execution was an alliance with the Seiks, between whom and the Mahomedans existed the most deadly hatred. Runjeet Singh was to receive as the reward of his accession that portion of Peshawur of which he had unjustly robbed the Affghan princes, and England expected to establish in the person of the restored Sultan an effectual bar to Russian influence. Here he (Lord Beaumont) would pause in the narrative; it was not his intention to dwell on the brilliant success which attended our arms on their first invasion, nor to allude to the fearful disasters which followed in their subsequent retreat. These, he considered, as the chances of war, and however great our reverses might be, he doubted not the strength and resources of England to counteract and repair them. But it was not in respect of the conduct of the war, but of its origin that he asked for information. If it could be shown, that we had no other course to take but a union with Runjeet Singh—if we had no alternative but that of placing Shah Soojah on the throne—if the abandonment of Dost Mahomed could be proved as unavoidable if the absolute treachery of that prince can 1146 be proved by the documents withheld— then he would admit, that the Indian government was free from all charge of imprudence, and that what had happened in the sequel of our proceedings was only the chances of war, for recovering ourselves from which we had ample resources within our reach. And he might add, that this was a motive for the production of the papers which the petitioners prayed for — for, with the scanty means they now possessed, the petitioners could not ascertain to whom blame, if blame there was, should be attributed, or from what motives, much less on what foreknowledge, the disastrous war had been commenced. The object of the petition was information on which a correct judgment might be formed, and in justice to those concerned in the events, he (Lord Beaumont) thought that information should be given. It might, however, be urged against the petition that it was not usual to notify to Parliament by message a war in India; and that on the present occasion, the custom in that respect had been adhered to. He (Lord Beaumont) was aware, that by an act, Parliament had invested the President of the Board of Control with supreme power, for with him lay the authority to declare war or make peace, to form alliances, or draw up treaties with native princes, but as that authority proceeded from Parliament, Parliament had a right to examine into its use or abuse. It was their duty to watch with a jealous eye the exercise of that power which they had intrusted to the Board, and, if circumstances required, to call for such information as might enable them to form a correct estimation of it. Besides, this war was professedly undertaken against the designs of Russia, and was rather a quarrel between two European powers, than a mere division in the internal affairs of India. But even if these reasons be weak, and not sufficient to justify the petitioners, there still remains another which must have some weight with their Lordships. England has become liable for the debts of India, and whatever amount is drawn by the latter must be indorsed by the former. The Minister of the day has stated in another place, that the expenditure of India must be taken as a portion of the expenditure of this country, and that the financial arrangement of the two Governments are essentially united in one. If this is the case, and we are about to be burdened 1147 with an Income-tax and deluded by the tariff which is intended as a gilding to that bitter pill, the public surely are entitled to know the motives of a war, to defray the expences of which they contribute a considerable amount. On the ground, then, of our being called upon for this large addition to our taxes, he (Lord Beaumont) would rest the right which the public had to demand explanation as to the origin of this war, and though at present it might be inconvenient for the public service to produce the documents prayed for, it would be quite contrary to all Parliamentary usage if information on the subject were permanently withheld. He (Lord Beaumont) requested their Lordships to consider seriously the position which England now held with respect to other powers, and the position of some of those powers with respect to India; and he would then ask their Lordships if there were not sufficient grounds of alarm, as well as motives of national interest to induce the petitioners to ask for the fullest explanations of our past movements in Asia that can be given, without compromising the public service. Let them only contrast our present position with our position a few years ago, let them reflect on the changes which had taken place in Turkey, in Persia, in Affghanistan, on the shores of the Caspian, on the banks of the Black Sea; let them weigh well our loss of influence in all these quarters, and then, he believed, it would be allowed that the petitioners had made good their case for the production of all the documents regarding past proceedings in Affghanistan. He purposely abstained from passing any judgment— or pronouncing any sentence on the conduct of the public authorities in India; he did so, not only out of delicacy towards a noble Lord now on his way from India, but also in consequence of the incompleteness of the information on the subject; and in so doing, he concurred with the petitioners who at present merely asked for the documents which had been withheld, and fairly stated that they did so in order to form a just estimate of the recent policy and acts adopted and done by the authorities at home and in India. Notwithstanding all he (Lord Beaumont) had said, to justify the prayer of the petition, he was free to confess, that should the noble Lord, the President of the Board of Control declare that the production of the said documents would at this moment 1148 injure the public service, he (Lord Beaumont) would not press for them at present by giving notice of a motion on the subject; but would hold himself free and ready to adopt that course whenever the momentary objection had ceased to exist. Reserving, therefore, to himself the liberty of acting in future as circumstances might dictate, he would, on the present occasion, be content with reading the petition, and moving that it do lie on their Lordship's Table.
§ Lord Fitzgeraldsaid, that before he made any observations on the petition which the noble Lord had presented, or called their Lordship's attention to its character, or to the source from whence it proceeded, bearing as it did the signature of one individual only, who called himself the president of a society of which he believed their Lordships knew but little—before he noticed these points, or rather without noticing them, for he passed them by—he might, he thought, presume that neither their Lordships could wish, nor could the noble Lord who presented the petition have well expected, upon the presentation of a petition upon which, with due discretion, the noble Lord himself proposed to found no motion, nor institute any proceeding, that he should follow the noble Lord, or accept the invitation which he had given to pursue him through the various topics which he had introduced. It would be for others, and not for him, when the question arose for the discussion of that policy, to defend the measures of the Indian government, and those proceedings by which the directions of the Home Government had been carried into execution in India. He was not called upon now to do so, and he should think it most unbecoming on his part, and particularly considering the situation which he held, and most unfair to those who were responsible for those measures, if he were to be induced, in the present imperfect state of our information from India, in the yet doubtful position of our army beyond the Indus, and of the manner in which that policy was pursued, and in which Indian affairs were now placed. It would, on his part, of all persons, be most unfair if he were to be induced, by any topic which the noble Lord had adverted to, to enter into a discussion which he considered to be most premature and ill-timed. It would be for those who had recommended that policy to defend it 1149 when it should be arraigned, and he should then not hesitate to express the opinion which he might fairly have formed upon it. It would be for others to defend the past policy, and it would be sufficient for the Government with which he was now connected to defend the policy, which they were prepared to recommend for the future, and to justify the course which, considering the difficulty in which India was placed, they should feel it their duty to recommend. But he must say, without entering into those large and comprehensive questions which the noble Lord had introduced, he thought the noble Lord had not done quite justice to those who had recommended the course that had been pursued, when the noble Lord stated, that Parliament and the people of England had been kept in entire ignorance either of the motives of the Government or of the justification of the views for which those operations were undertaken, or of the policy that dictated the course of the Indian government. Let him not be understood, however, as giving an opinion upon those questions; but he could not look at the papers now before Parliament—(it was not now the question that information was complete, or all that might have been given, or all that Parliament had a right to ask)—but he could not look at that compressed volume now lying on the Table, and believe with the noble Lord, that no information had been given to Parliament—no distinct view of the policy which the Government had pursued; still less could he agree with the noble Lord, after reading the declaration of the Governor-general of India with respect to his proceedings in Scinde, that the Indian government had kept the Government of England in doubt or ignorance as to the circumstances which dictated his policy, or as to the measures which he could bring forward in vindication of his conduct. The noble Lord had by his observations laid rather too broad a foundation for the superstructure which he afterwards raised; for it would hardly be believed, except by those who had listened to the noble Lord's speech, and heard the motion with which he concluded, that upon the presentation of a petition from a body of Gentlemen, directed and influenced, no doubt, by the purest and most patriotic motives, the noble Lord had himself favoured the 1150 House with a review of the whole policy of England as connected with Russia, with Turkey, with Central Asia, and with various other branches of the subject upon which he had dilated, but, concerning which, the noble Lord must himself feel that this was not the most convenient mode for entering into a discussion. But when the noble Lord alluded to the position and relation in which this country stood with Russia, he while declining to enter upon the several topics to which the noble Lord had invited him, must say, that the opinion the noble Lord had expressed with respect to the hostility of feeling on the part of Russia towards this country, and the apprehension he entertained with respect to her spirit of aggression, was an opinion and a fear in which, at least, her Majesty's Government did not share. He was desirous of not going back to occurrences which it would be competent for others to defend whenever Parliament should be called upon to decide upon their merits, but this he must say, that there never was a period—as had been more particularly evinced in the settlement of the questions affecting Turkey and the affairs in the East—when, unfortunately for the noble Lord's argument, the relation between Russia and Great Britain had been more confidential and amicable than at this moment. When the noble Lord stated that we had more reason to fear the machinations of Russia against this country at Teheran than in any other quarter, he was sure the noble Lord would be glad to hear what must remove the fears which now disturbed his repose, that at no period not only were the relations between Russia and Great Britain more intimate and amicable than at present, but that there was no court in the world at which the diplomatic agents of both countries had been acting with more cordiality and unison than at the court of Teheran. Not only had the resumption of our amicable relations with Persia been mainly assisted by the intervention of the Russian government, but, from the commencement of our communications with the court of Teheran, the most uninterrupted harmony had prevailed between the Russian and British Governments; and he trusted that harmony would continue to prevail, thereby giving an assurance of the union of two great empires, whose union and accord 1151 was necessary for the preservation of peace in the East, as a good alliance and a good understanding between them was essential to effect and maintain the peace of the world. He had thought it necessary to mention this, not only in justice to those to whom the noble Lord had alluded, but to allay the apprehensions which must have influenced the noble Lord's mind as to the spirit of aggrandisement on the part of Russia, before he addressed the House. Having stated thus much, he should do wrong if he did not abstain from further observations. He thought, in common with his right hon. Friend in another place, that it was most desirable that all discussions upon the affairs of India should be postponed. It must be prejudicial to the Indian government, as it would necessarily call for the announcement of opinions and of measures which, upon a discussion of that nature, Parliament would have a right to expect and demand from the Minister of the Crown, but which it would be inconvenient and unsafe to give, and which in the present state of our information, he did not think any responsible servant of the public was competent to give. Upon these grounds he should deprecate any discussion of this sort at the present moment. Had the noble Lord asked for papers which he might have conceived had been improperly withheld, then it would have been his (Lord Fitzgerald's) duty to have expressed an opinion as to the expediency of producing them. And, by the way, he could not but observe that it was the duty of one public man towards another, he might almost say of one gentleman towards another, for him to declare, when his official information empowered him to do so, that he thought nothing more unfair than to charge those with anything like interpolation or unfairness who, in their responsible situation, had produced papers in a certain manner. It was due to them that he should say that, having had access to all the papers in question, he could trace no intention improperly to withhold information, and that if any had been withheld it had been done upon their view, and for which they were responsible, of the exigency of the public service. If the noble Lord had made a motion for the production of other papers, he should have been prepared at this time to resist it. It would be inconvenient in the present state of circumstances, and prejudicial to 1152 the public interest to produce them. He had studiously guarded himself against giving any opinion upon the measures which the Government had taken, or might think it right to take, in relation to affairs in India. He trusted the noble Lord would adhere to the course he had last suggested, and not think it necessary to renew a discussion which at this time it was most desirable for the public interest should be avoided.
§ Lord Beaumont,in reply said, that he had not asserted that the papers had been interpolated, but that portions had been suppressed, or more properly speaking, withheld. As to the assurance, the noble Lord had given him of the close alliance between England and Russia, he (Lord Beaumont) assured his noble Friend in return, that so far from that circumstance tending to allay his (Lord Beaumont's) alarm, it tended to increase them, inasmuch as he could not account for the great friendship existing between the two countries in Europe and the great mutual jealousy, if not hostility, evident between them in Asia.
§ Lord Fitzgeralddid not deny that papers had been withheld, and which on a former occasion it might be proper to produce. He had not imputed to the noble Lord the making accusations against the late Government of interpolating the papers. What he said was, that in other quarters he had heard the charge made.
§ Petition laid on the Table.
§ House adjourned.