CHURCH OF SCOTLAND.

HL Deb 05 May 1840 vol 53 cc1209-36

The Earl of Aberdeen

rose to present to their Lordships a bill for removing doubts respecting the presentation of ministers of the Church of Scotland; and in doing so, if he appeared less anxious than might seem natural to apologise to their Lordships for submitting to their consideration a subject of so much importance, he could assure them it was not from any newly-acquired confidence on his part, or from any notion that he did not stand in need of their indulgence, but from a conviction that this subject did now indispensably demand the interference of the Legislature, and also from circumstances connected with it, which in some degree compelled him personally to follow the course he now took. After all that had passed on this subject, after the declaration made by the noble Viscount at the head of the Government at the end of last session, again at the opening of the present, and since at repeated intervals, it had been his (the Earl of Aberdeen's) belief and persuasion that the Ministers would have found it incumbent on them to attempt to apply a remedy to those evils, of which they had fully admitted the existence and magnitude. The noble Lords opposite, however, had thought it consistent with their duty, and of that they were probably the best judges, to abstain from making any proposition on the subject. At the same time he must be permitted to say, that this was a case which involved the peace and tranquillity of an important portion of the empire, in which the authority of the law was at stake, and in which was placed in jeopardy the welfare, perhaps the existence, of the best interests and institutions of the country, and therefore it might have been expected that the executive Government would have found it proper and necessary to interfere. The noble Viscount opposite knew that he had never looked at this subject as a matter of party contest; and that any measure which might have been proposed by the Government, and possessed the least probability of attaining the desired object, would have met with his most cordial assent. He did not think he was taxing the noble Viscount's candour too far when he asked him to give a like reception to a measure proposed under similar circumstances by him. He was not unaware of the inconvenience or even danger of attempting to legislate on such a subject. Many difficult and delicate questions might be raised, which had better be left at rest. He felt his own personal position in dealing with the subject sufficiently irksome; for, notwithstanding the vital importance of the subject, and the manner in which it had agitated, and continued to agitate a great portion of the country, affecting the feelings, passions, and prejudices of thousands, yet he almost despaired of bringing the conviction of this truth home to their Lordships' minds, or of penetrating the House thoroughly with a sense of the essential importance of a due settlement of the question. When he recollected that this was the cause of Presbytery—that on the settlement of the question depended the welfare and prosperity of Presbyterian church government, which he was anxious to uphold and confirm, though he could not expect to encounter feelings of hostility, it was impossible for him to look for any warm sympathy, support, or concurrence, from a large portion of their Lordships. However, he thought it right to declare at once, that he approached this subject with feelings of the most profound reverence for the national church as established by law—the church of Scotland. With respect to that church, he adopted the emphatic language of a committee of the House of Commons, who in a report presented to that House not many years ago, declared their conviction that "there never was an institution which at so little cost accomplished so much good as the established church of Scotland." It was a church composed exclusively of active labourers in the service of God, in which pluralities and non-residence were absolutely unknown, and such of their Lordships as had not the means of a personal and local knowledge of the blessed effects of its ministration were little competent to form a judgment of the manner in which it ought to be regarded. It might be true, that the church of Scotland had, at periods of its history, shown indications of a spirit of intolerance and fanaticism. They had heard of the saying that "New Presbyter was Old Priest, writ large," and unquestionably the old spirit had occasionally prevailed; but in saying this, all that was meant was, that such portions of the institutions as were of human origin partook of the failings and imperfections of humanity. It might have been expected that those who had suffered so long from the scourge of persecution would not themselves have manifested a feeling of intolerance; but in the history of the human mind this peculiarity was discovered, that men often felt little reluctance to inflict on their fellow-creatures those very evils from which they had suffered most severely themselves. However this might be, he felt assured that they were not likely to see a revival of this spirit; and although the members of the church of Scotland would continue to act with zeal and activity in the cause of their Great Master, he feared not a repetition of those acts to which he had alluded as disfiguring the church in former times. Having expressed the feeling which he entertained towards the Church of Scotland in bringing forward this subject, he must also add that he approached it with feelings of the most sincere love and respec towards the great mass of the people of Scotland. The people of that country were well worthy of their Lordships' consideration. He remembered many years ago that the late Lord Liverpool, using an expression somewhat colloquial, but very significant, declared his conviction that "Scotland was the best conditioned country on the face of the earth." He was afraid, that since that time they had done nothing to increase, or perhaps retain, their claim to that description; but still there was an intelligence and moral worth among the people of that country which entitled them to their Lordships' consideration. Noble Lords opposite boasted annually, and perhaps properly, of a diminution in the military force of Ireland; and adduced that circumstance as a proof of the tranquillity and good order which prevailed there. They counted their reductions by regiments and thousands of men. Then let him remind their Lordships that they had trusted the peace and tranquillity of Scotland for many years, in the worst of times, to a few hundred men, and had done so with success. This spoke volumes for the love of order which prevailed among the population of Scotland. It also spoke volumes for the efficiency of that moral and religious education which they received at the hands of the ministers of their church. If there was anything on earth to which the people of Scotland were attached with passionate devotion, it was to their national church, and with good reason. The reformation in Scotland was mainly accomplished by the people, and their church was emphatically the Church of the People. Little assisted by the great and powerful, they, after long struggling and great difficulty succeeded in establishing their church. Unlike the Church of England, which, subsequent to the first fiery struggles met with little difficulty in after times, the Church of Scotland was for a century after the period of its first existence, exposed to repeated difficulties and persecutions. It, in fact, never enjoyed the countenance of princes or of courts. From 1660 down to the period of the Revolution, it was perpetually struggling, with more or less success, and during these contentions, the people were never supported by the Government in their endeavours to establish a national church. It was, therefore, but natural that, recollecting the difficulties they had overcome, and how dearly purchased the establishment which they at last obtained was, they should cling to it with a feeling of affection and devotion, of which their Lordships were perhaps not aware. There was another class of persons immediately connected with this subject, with respect to whom he wished to say a few words—he meant the body of patrons in Scotland. He was not disposed to deny that perhaps for the latter portion of the last century, the rights of patronage might have been more strictly asserted, and the just claims of the people more neglected than was consistent with the welfare of the church, and the prosperity of religion, and during that period there had prevailed some diminution of the religious sentiment of the country. He believed the same might be observed with regard to England also, but fortunately, the zeal of the people of both countries had revived, and it was impossible to conceive a distribution of patronage more calculated to increase the welfare of the church than that which had taken place of late years in Scotland. In the course of the interviews he had had with patrons connected with the present state of the church in Scotland, and the measure he was about to propose, he had met from all, without a single exception, the expression of the greatest willingness to assent to the imposition of any necessary or reasonable restriction on the exercise of patronage, provided the welfare of the church and the interests of the people were consulted. It was now time for him to state to their lordships what was the actual condition of the church in Scotland, which made him say that legislative interference was absolutely indispensable. He needed not detail at length the proceedings which had led to the present state of things, but he might mention, that a few years ago there was, as there always had been, more or less, a degree of hostility shown to the exercise of patronage, which hostility appeared from the petitions to Parliament, and the propositions made to the General Assembly, to have acquired great strength and consistency. In 1834 an act was passed by the General Assembly, commonly called the Veto Act, by which it was provided, that on a presentation to a benefice, if a majority of the heads of families in the parish being in communion with the church expressed dissent to the nomination of the individual, the Presbytery should be prohibited by that circumstance alone from examining him for holy orders, and should at once be compelled to reject him. There was no reason to suppose that the General Assembly in passing this law had done anything which they believed to be beyond their legitimate authority. That body acted on the best legal advice, and he believed that the law officers of the Crown at the time pronounced an opinion that the passing of the Veto Act was within the legal competency of the Assembly. At all events it was supposed by a learned judge, not more distinguished for his legal attainments than for his high character and love for the church of his fathers, that the General Assembly was at the time warranted by its existing powers in enacting the law he had alluded to. However, shortly afterwards a case occurred in which the authority of the Assembly to pass this act was questioned. A patron having presented a gentleman to a benefice, the Presbytery refused to take him on trial for holy orders. The case was carried to the Court of Session, by whom the Veto Act was found to be contrary to statute and illegal. The Church appealed to the House of Lords, and, the question being heard at great length, the judgment of the Court of Session was affirmed by that House. The Veto Act was consequently pronounced to be a violation of statute and illegal. It was not for him to find fault with the coure which the General Assembly had thought fit to adopt; but if, after the judgment of that House had been pronounced, the Assembly had taken steps for rescinding the act which had been declared to be illegal, and had expressed their intention of effecting the purpose for which it was enacted, namely, that of preventing the intrusion of improper persons, contrary to the will of the congregations, he thought that the question would not have been in a state of such difficulty as it was at present. The General Assembly, however, adopted another course. They retained the law on their journals, but suspended its operation for one year, and appointed a committee to communicate with the Government in order to obtain its sanction of this law or some other, which would effect their purpose in a similar way. Other proceedings took place shortly afterwards which had led to very serious consequences. In a parish of a district not very remote from his own residence, but more immediately connected with the property of his noble Friend and relative on the cross benches (the Duke of Richmond), a gentleman was presented to a benefice, but the Presbytery were prohibited from examining him on trial for holy orders by the commission of the general assembly. This commission was not the committee appointed to communicate with the Government of which he had before spoken, but consisted of members of the general assembly, who chose to meet during the adjournment of that body. This commission prohibited the Presbytery of the district from taking the gentleman presented to the benefice on trial for ordination. The Presbytery being aware of the judgment of the House of Lords, and consequently of the law of the land, were placed in this difficulty—they were prohibited by their ecclesiastical superiors from proceeding with the trial of this gentleman, and on the other hand they exposed themselves to an action for damages, if they did not take him on trial, conformably with the judgment of that House. Under these circumstances, the Presbytery respectfully declined to obey the injunction of the commission of the assembly, and proceeded to take the gentleman on trial for holy orders. The commission thereupon suspended the majority of the Presbytery who had come to this resolution. Seven ministers were so suspended, and they appealed to the Court of Session for protection. The Court of Session issued an interdict prohibiting any person giving notice of the suspension of these ministers in their respective parishes, and also prohibiting any-other persons from performing the ministerial duties in those places. This interdict was in both respects set at nought. Intimation was given of the suspension of the ministers, and it was publicly notified, that the seven ministers were incapable of performing any holy functions, that marriages and baptisms celebrated by them would be invalid, and that other persons were appointed to preach in their parishes. Accordingly, not only on Sunday, but on several days of the week, these parishes had been frequented by other ministers, sent there for the purpose of supplying the places of the suspended incumbents. The feelings of the people were enlisted on one side or the other, and the greatest excitement and alarm had been produced in those parishes, which had hitherto been tranquil and peaceable. He knew nothing of the seven gentlemen suspended by the commission; but he believed them all to be highly respectable men. Many of them had long been the ministers of their respective parishes, and been regarded with universal respect. They were now, however, engaged in controversy with their brethren, and, though they had not been deprived of their churches, religious service was performed in other parts of the parishes, by other men totally unconnected with the places, who intimated to the congregations that the gospel had not been preached before as it ought to have been. He had on a former occasion stated, that the excitement created was so great, that the execution of the law would be attended with danger, and might lead to bloodshed. The extent of the danger might probably have been exaggerated to a certain degree, but there was no doubt that the fanatical zeal of some parties might have induced them to resist the law; and in this opinion he was confirmed by information he had received from a gentleman connected with the district the day before yesterday. This was a state of things which was extending itself, but which ought not to be allowed to exist; and when the noble Viscount gave, before the holydays, as a reason for the Government not interfering in the matter, that great excitement prevailed, that neither party was willing to concede, and that it was better to leave them to themselves, the noble Viscount only showed that he was ignorant of the real nature of the case. This was a case in which the law had been pronounced, and ought to be executed. The law had no passions, violence, nor prejudices. It was the right of the subject to demand from courts of justice protection and redress. The judge was bound by his oath, and by his duty to the Queen, whom he represented on the seat of judgment, to administer justice without delay to every person who demanded it. In this case the court had no option. The court did not mate the law, hut only administered it. Neither did their Lordships make the law; they only interpreted it, declaring, that the Court of Session had put a right construction on the statute. There existed, then, a state of things which manifestly nothing could regulate but the interference of Parliament. When the noble Viscount talked of parties conceding, let him ask what could the Court of Session or the Parliament concede? After pronouncing that the Veto Act was illegal, could the Parliament go back and acknowledge themselves to be mistaken? This was impossible; and they must, by a legislative enactment either legalize the Veto Act, or apply some other suitable remedy to the existing state of things. After all that had been said on the Veto in that House, and in the multitude of publications to which it had given rise, he did not know that he should have called their attention to it, but that he found the non-intrusion committee, which was appointed to confer with her Majesty's Government for the purpose of obtaining the sanction of Parliament to this law or some other equivalent, had, instead of waiting to report their proceedings to the general assembly, by whom they were constituted, published to the world in their own vindication, the Veto Act with some modification which they proposed should be legalized, and to which, having no other suggestions to make, they still adhered. That made it necessary for him to state briefly why he, for one, could never agree to that act, and why he thought Government were perfectly right in refusing their assent to it. What, then, was the Veto?—It was not election; on the contrary, those by whom it was supported declared that it was to prevent the necessity of the popular election of ministers that the veto had been proposed. He could only say, that although he did not mean to support the popular election of ministers, that system had never- theless its advantages; and, if he were compelled to choose, he should without hesitation prefer it to the establishment of the veto. It was decidedly, it was infinitely, better. For what was the veto? It was a dissent without reasons assigned, a capricious dissent—perhaps for unworthy, possibly unscriptural, reasons—but reasons which must prevail even against the deliberate judgment of the church itself, to prevent the ordination of any one whom such persons might think fit to proscribe. When, therefore, the church asked the Parliament to legalise the veto, it appeared to strike a blow at its own independence, nay, at its own existence as an establishment, compatible with the jurisdiction which must be inherent in every church. It parted with all power and jurisdiction when the dissent was pronounced by the third party, who would virtually be entitled to declare who should receive holy orders and who not. This really seemed to be departing from the jurisdiction which must absolutely be inherent in every church. Suppose a lay tyrant had proposed such a provision as to any third party who should be a bar to the ordination of any minister, what an universal outcry would have been raised against such a measure, as something monstrous and wholly incompatible with the very notion of a church possessing any jurisdiction whatever; yet such an act the majority of the Assembly had desired their Lordships to legalize. It was important to consider, when they were called on to legalize this veto, that there could be no qualification or restriction on it. It was an absolute right, for if they imposed any restriction on it, they would alter its nature entirely. The veto which had been passed by the Assembly, and which was still the law of the church, although it had been suspended for one year, concluded with declaring That no person should be held to be entitled to disapprove, as aforesaid, who shall refuse, if required, to declare, in presence of the Presbytery, that he is actuated by no factious or malicious motives, but solely by conscientious regard to the spiritual interests of himself and the congregation. This was a sort of protection against improper motives on the part of those dissenting; but no more was required than the declaration of the parties themselves. He thought that a very insufficient protection, and objectionable in many other respects. It was insufficient, because par ties when excited, either by objecting to one individual or by preference for another, were naturally in such a state of feeling as that they might safely declare they were not actuated by factious or malicious motives; but this provision must also operate as a snare to the conscience, and, by opening the door to a species of perjury, must lead, to many immoral and mischievous consequences. The law proposed for the sanction of the Government, and which, in his opinion, they had very properly rejected, contained this modification:— Provided always, and be it enacted, that it is and shall be competent to and incumbent on the patron, presentee, or heads of families, who may allege that the dissents as aforesaid proceed from factious and malicious motives, and not from conscientious regard to the spiritual interests of the congregation, to establish the same to the satisfaction of the Presbytery, by evidence competent to the law of the church. He would ask, how difficult and objectionable such a course must be? How difficult would it be to prove that motives were factious and malicious in such a case? And then to what a state must the parish be reduced, where it was necessary that such a course of proof should be proceeded with against a majority of the persons dissenting? Nothing he could conceive would be so fruitful of bitterness, hostility, heart burnings, and endless mischief, as any attempt to establish such a case. He therefore thought that the alteration on the part of the committee was rather for the worse than for the better, and the Government had nothing in the altered plan to recommend it compared with the simple and absolute veto. But it was said, the veto was essential to establish and secure what was called the principle of non-intrusion, to prevent the forcible intrusion of improper ministers on the parish and congregation. He had already said, that non-intrusion was a phrase of very wide signification, and, like many nicknames, gave an erroneous impression of the thing it proposed to describe. He was one of those who agreed in the principle of non-intrusion; he was very unwilling that any minister should be forcibly intruded upon a reluctant congregation; but then he did not interpret non-intrusion as those who advocated the veto interpreted it. He understood it as Knox and Melville understood it, and as it had been explained and enforced by Calvin and Beza; not the exercise of an arbitrary, capricious, and groundless will of a congregation without any assigned reason. So explained, it was an absolute innovation. Without troubling their Lordships with any lengthened proof upon this part, he would refer to such authorities as had satisfied his own mind that his interpretation was the authoritative one of the church in its best days. At the very commencement of the Presbyterian church in Scotland, by the first book of discipline, framed by Knox himself and his companions in 1560, it was laid down specifically thus;— Altogether this is to be avoided, that any man be violently intruded or pressed in upon any congregation; the council of the church shall not be forced to admit before just examination. The opinion of Calvin was to the same effect, tolerating no opposition on the part of the congregation, unsupported by the reasons assigned for it. The next authority was that on which the advocates of the veto principally relied, the second book of discipline, dated 1578;— It is to be eschewed that no person be intruded into any of the offices of the kirk, contrary to the will of the congregation to whom they are appointed, or without the voice of the eldership, meaning the Presbytery, which was so called in those days. The interpretation of these words was sufficiently obvious. There were two parties—the congregation and eldership; the minister was not to be intruded into the parish contrary to the will of the congregation, or without the voice of the eldership. There could be no doubt which was to decide. The second book of discipline was principally framed by the celebrated Andrew Melville, the friend of Theodore Beza, the great reformer of Geneva and successor of Calvin. He was sent from Geneva, having been ten or twelve years a member of that church, to Scotland for the purpose, and he brought with him all his notions of that discipline to which the Church of Scotland owed so much. A letter of Beza was still extant in which he described clearly and explicitly the proceedings at the examination and ordination of ministers. He was to preach in the church of the parish to which he was to be presented, "and if, after so doing the people have anything to urge against him, they shall prefer those objections with all modesty and humility, and the Presbytery shall judge accordingly; and Beza made use of this expression, "ut nemo invitœ ecclesiœ obtruderetur."—i. e., without the Presbytery hearing and judging of the objections of the congregation; but rejected in the strongest terms the right of the people any further to interfere in the appointment of the minister. Afterwards one of the rescinded acts in 1649 abolished patronage, and gave the Synod full power to deal with the subject as they thought fit, and settle the whole ordination of ministers. The Assembly accordingly prepared a directory for the purpose, in which, after prescribing various forms, this regulation was added, But if it happens that the major part of the congregation dissent from the person agreed on by the Session, which stood in the room of patrons, in that case the matter shall be brought to the Presbytery, which shall judge of the same, and if they do not find their dissent to be grounded on causeless prejudice they are to appoint a new election in manner above specified. Here, then, the Church being completely master, having the making of the law, reserved in their directory the power to the Presbytery to judge the matter when brought before them. How then could the Presbytery act judicially without knowing the reasons on which it was called on to judge? So that in what had lately been called the golden age of the Church, it had clearly by its own enactment precluded the notion of any thing like the absolute veto which was now sought to be established. The noble Earl read an extract from Sir Henry Moncrief's Life of Erskine to the same effect. The statute of 1609, when patronage was again abolished, provided for the settlement of ministers, and declared that The heritors and elders are to name and propose the person to the whole congregation to be approven or disapproven by them, and if they disapprove, the disapprovers are to give in their reasons, to the effect the affair may be cognosced upon and determined by the Presbytery, &c. i. e., that the merits might be examined judicially, and determined by the Presbytery. For all these reasons he maintained there was no authority in the history of the Church, for the enactment which had lately taken place, and that the veto must be considered an absolute innovation. But his great objection to the veto was, that by it the Church abandoned its chief right and duty. Before any act recognizing the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, the first thing the assembly claimed from the State was, the right of collation, which comprised the act of objection on the part of the people, the trial, examination, ordination, and induction of the presentee to the parish. The Church, having then received the right of collation, had by the act passed by the Assembly abandoned its right, and had abandoned its duty by giving up what the law had conferred upon the Church as it existed at that time. There were various statutes in which the right of collation was recognized as belonging exclusively to the Church, but in one statute in particular the scrupulous cure with which this right was recognized was very remarkable. It was a recent statute—that was to say, one passed since the Union; he meant the 5th of George 1st, which provided that certain oaths should be taken by the ministers of the Church for the security of the Government. So great was the anxiety shown by the Legislature in this statute not to interfere with the right of collation possessed by the Church, that one provision was, that nothing contained in the act should in any manner prejudice or diminish the right of the Church as the same was by law established, to judge the qualifications of any presentee for ordination or trial. This provision, too, was contained in an act which contained no enactments whatever relating to ordination and trial; and it was, therefore, a more conclusive proof of the intention of the Legislature to maintain this right of the Church. He could not but think that the Church, by availing itself of the benefits conferred upon it by law, had undertaken to do its duty by exercising this right, and that it could not preserve any jurisdiction over its own members, if it put into the hands of third parties the right of opposing an absolute bar to the collation of ministers. He thought that to reject a worthy person without any cause assigned, and for a cause perfectly unknown, was almost as great a breach of duty on the part of the Church as it would be to ordain, an improper person. The interests of religion and the welfare of the Church were nearly as much injured by excluding a deserving person from the ministry for an arbitrary and unjustifiable cause as by an improper ordination. He knew that the veto itself had been represented merely as a sort of disqualification, as it was urged, that those who were entitled to judge of a presentee's qualification ought to take into account his acceptability to a certain proportion of the congregation, and that therefore it was the church itself that in truth judged of a presentee's qualifications, when it found him disqualified on account of a certain number of persons dissenting without any reason from the nomination. This was called judging of a minister's qualification. But surely the argument was so sophistical as to be scarcely worth alluding to, since the circumstance of a certain number of persons liking a presentee or not could not be considered as a qualification inherent in the individual. He would take an instance of what was really a qualification. Lately, a certain knowledge of Hebrew was required of a candidate for ordination; that was a qualification inherent in the individual, and also one of which the church reserved to itself the means and power of judging. It did not, as in the case of that which was now set up as a qualification, defer to a third party the right of judging what was the knowledge possessed by the candidate of the Hebrew language, but decided the question in its own courts. So with respect to every other qualification required by the church. But a rejection of a presentee, without any cause being assigned, could not be considered, in any fair meaning of the word, as the want of any qualification inherent in the individual himself. According to this proposition, arbitrary, capricious, and unknown objections to an individual were absolutely to prevail; they were not merely to be reviewed and judged of and taken for what they were worth, if objections for unknown causes, and perhaps mere unfriendly feeling, could be considered as worth any attention. The church was to be precluded from all power of judging of the value of such objections, and of counteracting their effect, and this was the system which Parliament was now called upon to legalize. It was a suicidal attempt of the church, which would destroy its own jurisdiction. Therefore he repeated that her Majesty's Government had acted wisely in, refusing to sanction this proposal. But the non-intrusion committee, who had published this proposal, had accompanied it with another, which, he presumed, they also proposed to her Majesty's Government for adoption, and which had been the fruit of long deliberation. He had only recently seen the tract containing this proposition, it having been published about a fortnight ago. It contained a proposed act for giving efficiency to what was termed in Scotland the call; it was proposed by this act, that if a majority of the male communicants assembling in the church on the occasion of the presentation did not agree in signing the call, the presentation should be null and void, and the Presbytery should thereupon reject the presentee. Of the two plans, he considered this rather the worse in many respects. In the first place, this plan was entirely new. Many disputes had taken place upon the question of what was a sufficient call; hut this had never been thought of—that the signatures of a majority were necessary to establish a call. The plan now proposed treated the call as an absolute right on the part of the people; and, although it was not put forth with the avowed intention of giving the people the right of electing the minister, yet what it professed to give did really amount to a power of joint nomination and election. It was, in fact, more objectionable than the veto, since it would practically establish a veto which would in practice be exercised by a very small number of the people. When people had a right to elect, they were eager enough to exert it; but if it were necessary for a majority to sign the call, a very small number of persons who might be disposed to object to an individual, either for good cause or no cause, or for a bad cause, might by exerting themselves obtain from their neighbours a promise to do nothing, but merely to stay away—the easiest of all favours to obtain, and there was little doubt that practically an active few would really be in possession of the veto. But the proposal was still more objectionable on another ground; for when a large body of people came forth and, right or wrong, said they disliked the presentee, and felt that they could never prosper under his ministry, and, therefore, objected to the presentation, such a course might, it was true, seem very unreasonable; but still one might presume, that in such a case there really was something against the man; whereas, according to this plan, No. 2, if on account of business, or for any other reason, some of the parishioners stayed away, so that a majority of the communicants did not sign the call, the Presbytery would be bound to consider the individual as disqualified as if he were found guilty of some grave offence: he was to be presumed to be disqualified for ordination, although no one had uttered a syllable against him; the circumstance of a majority not having come forward to sign the call, was to operate as an absolute exclusion and a bar to any further proceedings towards the ordination of the presentee. Such a proposition was so monstrous and so arbitrary, as to be decidedly worse than the plan at first proposed. He, therefore, entirely approved of the conduct of the Government in rejecting this as well as the former proposal. He was sorry to fatigue their Lordships by detailing all these projected laws, but there was one more plan which, from the station occupied by the individual who proposed it, and his connexion with the Government, was certainly entitled to respect: the plan to which he alluded was that proposed by the Lord-Advocate, who had been occupied many months in preparing it. The subject had been referred to the consideration of the learned Lord nearly a year ago, and he had been very anxious to learn the result of the learned Lord's labours. A little while ago, he had seen a report in a provincial paper containing an extract from the speech of a Gentleman who stood very high in the estimation of her Majesty's Government, and for whom he entertained very great respect—he meant the hon. Member for Aberdeen. That hon. Member had attended the non-intrusion committee, and had detailed the plan of the learned Lord, and the statement of the plan had certainly gratified his curiosity; but last night he had put into his hands an account of the plan published by the learned Lord himself, which therefore superseded the account given by the hon. Gentleman who had acted as its expositor. Now, with the greatest respect to the learned Lord, this plan appeared to him (the Earl of Aberdeen) to be decidedly the worst of all. It adopted in principle the plan No. 2 of the non-intrusion committee, for it provided, that if a majority of the persons whom it described, and to whom he would presently call the attention of their Lordships, did not upon the first presentation to a living sign the call, the presentation should fail, and the patron should have another three months to make a fresh presentation. Upon a second presentation the same thing was to take place, and the patron was to have three months more. The same proceeding was to be repeated upon a third presentation; but after that it was considered to be time to have recourse to further measures; and on a fourth presentation, if the majority did not agree to call the presentee, the principle of non-intrusion was to be given up, and the Presbytery were at last to intrude a minister. So that, after arbitrarily, unjustly, and absurdly disqualifying three men, all of whom might be perfectly unobjectionable, the learned Lord's plan proceeded to violate what was maintained to be an absolute right on the part of the people. Besides, by providing time for successive presentations, it created a device for keeping parishes vacant, it was impossible to say now long. The learned Lord was aware of this defect, for his measure provided, that after the stipend of the vacant living had been paid during a year to the widow's fund, the residue, after paying the assistant, should be applied to pious uses so long as the vacancy continued. This plan, therefore, had nothing to recommend it; it did not recognize the absolute right of the people, nor did it vindicate the rights of the church until they had been abandoned in three cases, not only without any cause being assigned, but without any objection being brought forward. Now, the learned Lord thought himself obliged to introduce something of a popular principle into his measure, and consequently, although the church had by the act of the Assembly limited the veto to the heads of families in communion with the church, the learned Lord could not be satisfied with anything less than an extension of the right to sign the call, or by absence to exclude the presentee to all the seat-holders, that was to say, to all members of the congregation who frequented the church. If he were not very much mistaken, the learned Lord would find that he had here overshot his mark, and that this part of his measure would be reprobated in every part of the country, and by every congregation. The publication of this plan appeared to be an extraordinary proceeding on the part of the learned Lord: if the learned Lord wished to propose a measure upon the subject, why had he not introduced a bill into the other House of Parliament? It had been said that the learned Lord had intended to do so, but had abandoned the design in consequence of his present motion; but that could not be a correct representation of the fact, for he had given no notice of his intention to introduce a bill upon the subject, till the noble Viscount opposite had declared that the Government had no intention of proposing a measure, and had expressly made that declaration, in order that the subject might be taken up by others. Now, the learned Lord was looked upon as the organ of the Government in Scotch affairs; what, then, were the public to understand by this plan of the learned Lord? It surely could not be considered the plan of the Government, since the Government refused to bring it forward. What was meant by publishing the learned Lord's proposed measure in the newspapers, instead of bringing it forward in the House of Commons? Was it intended to cajole the church and the Assembly with the hope of a measure which the learned Lord did not venture to propose himself, and which he knew would be rejected by her Majesty's Government? If such were the object, he should imagine they were too clear-sighted to be deceived by any such tardy advertisement as this. For his part he cordially concurred with her Majesty's Government in having declined to have anything to do with the Lord-Advocate or his bill, as he decidedly thought it the most objectionable and certainly the most inconsistent of all the plans that had yet been proposed. But it was high time he should state to their Lordships what were the provisions of the bill which he purposed to submit to their Lordships. They were very few, very short, and very simple. He had not followed the example of the Lord-Advocate, who, as was stated in the paper to which he before alluded, had submitted his bill to those Members of the House of Commons who usually supported the Government, though the learned Lord did not say whether they approved of it or not. He had not submitted his bill to any meeting of those members who usually opposed the Government. He had framed it with a sincere desire that it might answer its object and deserve the support of those who both supported and opposed the Government. He had taken such a system as he thought valuable and available for the purpose, but he had had no communication with any one. He believed that the measure he was about to propose was quite consistent with the genius and spirit of the Presbyterian church of Scotland; that it preserved the jurisdiction and independence of that church; that it gave due weight to the just claims of the people, and did not unjustly restrict the rights of the patrons. The preamble recited the various acts by which the right and duty of collation was imposed and granted to the church, and recognized in the church. It then provided, that when a presentee, after being appointed to a parish by the patron, should come to the Presbytery, it should be lawful for the latter to direct him to preach in the church of the parish in such manner as they might require, and when he should have so preached, that they should meet, and after due notice to the said church, to intimate whether any one or more persons, regular communicants of the Church, of full age, had any objection: of any kind to the individual so appointed, or any reason to state against his settlement in the parish. Now this, he would just observe, was very important, for the Church of Scotland had always taken cognizance of not only the qualifications of the individual himself, but also his peculiar qualifications for the parish to which he was presented, because, as their Lordships were aware, ordination always preceded induction to a parish. Well, after intimation had been given for the communicants to state whether they had any objection to the individual or his peculiar gifts and qualifications for the cure of the said parish, the Presbytery should be ready, either then or at their next meeting, to receive the same in writing, or otherwise, as the communicants might desire, which objections or reasons should without delay be considered and disposed of by the Presbytery. The Presbytery might, if they thought fit, then refer the matter to the Superior Court of Synod; but if they thought, regard being had to the whole condition of the parish, that on account of any of the objections or reasons which were stated, the individual ought not to be settled in the said parish, they should state forthwith the supposed grounds on which the objections were founded, and in respect of which they considered the presentee was not qualified for that Church; and it should then be competent to the patron to nominate another person. It should, however, be in the power of both the patron and the nominee to appeal to the superior ecclesiastical courts. But if, on the other hand, the Presbytery, after considering all the objections and reasons against the settlement of the individual who had been nominated in that particular parish, were satisfied in the due discharge of their functions that no good objections existed against the individual, or that no good reason against his settlement had been stated, or that the objections and reasons stated were not fairly founded on any personal objection to the presentee in regard to his ministerial gifts and qualifications, either general, or in respect of that particular parish, the Presbytery should repel the same, and, subject to the appeal aforesaid, should proceed to examine the presentee as to his other gifts and qualifications, and if they were satisfied with them, that they should induct him to the parish accordingly. On a subject respecting which so much excitement prevailed, it was impossible for him to suppose that his plan could meet with anything like universal acceptation; but he did hope for the approbation of all moderate and rational persons. The noble Viscount at the head of her Majesty's Government laughed; but the noble Viscount was aware that in Scotland the greatest stigma a churchman could labour under was being called a "Moderate." But in the English and Scotch sense of the term, he did hope that all moderate men would unite in supporting this bill. He thought it preserved the full jurisdiction of the Church, and placed the power where it ought to reside—namely, in the Church courts. It enabled persons to state every species of objections both against the individual personally, and against his qualifications for any particular parish; and it gave a power to the Church courts to decide those cases which they ought to be the only persons allowed to decide. He knew many would say he had sacrificed the independence of the Church and the rights of the people; but he had already expressed the conviction he felt, that neither was the case, in fact, quite the contrary, and that that independence and those rights could be still preserved. He was not without fear that he might meet with objections of another kind; that he might be told he had conceded too much power to the Church; and he thought it very likely that many of their Lordships were of that opinion; but if such were the case, his short answer was this, that he was quite persuaded that nothing was recommended in this bill which the Church itself could not now by its own legal authority enforce. And he was able to say, that in the opinion of those who were most deeply conversant with the Church of Scotland, and were not disposed to extend its power, such was the case. He had brought forward this measure because he considered that it would be beneficial and useful at this time, and he would in conclusion recommend to the leaders of the Church of Scotland seriously to consider the position in which they now stood. Most willingly would he for one contribute to close, if possible, those grievous rents which went so far to weaken the Church, but he would entreat the Church itself, and the leaders of that body, most respectfully, but, at the same time, most earnestly and affectionately, to consider the imminent peril in which they had involved the existence of the Establishment, and how much that course might tend to its speedy overthrow. He would now commend this measure to the favourable attention of their Lordships, and the people of Scotland, and above all, to those ministers of the Church, and they were numerous, who loved peace, and sought it with their whole heart.

The Duke of Buccleugh

said, that after the able and elaborate statement of the noble Lord who had just sat down, it was not his intention to trouble their Lordships with many observations. The present state of the church of Scotland was most lamentable—he might say, most dangerous. No one who had paid any attention to the affairs of Scotland could deny the truth of the circumstances which had been so ably detailed by the noble Lord. Of late a feeling had grown up in Scotland with regard to the church, hitherto unknown. Pastors were opposed to the people, and the people to their pastors, in many parts of the country; and agitation had been made use of in favour of the principle of what was called non-intrusion, which had produced the most disastrous effect. The measure as explained by the noble Lord was one which while it gave full independence to the church in all spiritual matters, would, he believed, give to the people all those rights which he thought it proper they should have, so as to prevent the intrusion of any minister who might be attempted to be forced upon them. That the people were the best judges of the fitness of those persons who were presented to them, he did not think was the case; they were apt to be occasionally misled by different circumstances; they might have a predilection for some other person than the one presented to be their pastor; or they might, without having any objection to the person who was presented, have a strong dislike to the patron who presented him. In those cases, according to the plan which his noble Friend proposed, it was left, as it should be, for the communicants of the parish to state their objections, and for the decision to be in the proper place, and where it alway used to be, namely, in the hands of the church. Though he was not a member of the church of Scotland himself, yet no person was more anxious than he was for the full integrity of the church, and that it should be established in firmness, and that nothing should be done to lessen its efficiency and independence. But it was impossible that that could be the ease while the veto was left in the hands of what he might say was an irresponsible body, subject to prejudice, and who might be easily excited against a particular individual, or who might make use of those harassing measures which might ultimately drive the patron to appoint a per- son whom he might consider most unfit. He would not detain their Lordships any longer, except to express his extreme satisfaction in finding that the subject had been taken up by the noble Lord below him, who had stated in so distinct a manner the present condition of the church of Scotland. That noble Lord had stated the difficulties in which the establishment was at present placed; but he trusted the plan which the noble Lord had suggested would restore it to that position in which it ought to be placed. He must, however, express his astonishment and great regret that a measure of such great public importance should not have been undertaken by those whose duty it was, in his opinion, to have done so—namely, by the Government, and that they should have thrown the responsibility on others—a responsibility which, from good feeling, the noble Lord had undertaken, and which, whether the plan he had now proposed was acceptable or not to the church, would always reflect the highest credit upon him.

The Duke of Argyll

approved of the plan which had been proposed by the noble Lord below him, and thought it was one which would place the establishment of the Scotch church in the position in which it ought to stand. He also thought it would allay the excitement which now unfortunately existed upon this subject.

The Earl of Galloway

said, no one could be more sensible than he was of how little importance any opinion which he might entertain on the subject must be to their Lordships or the country. Nevertheless, as he had felt it to be his duty on various occasions in the course of the session, in consequence of representations he had received from Scotland, to call on the Government of the country to effect a settlement of this question, he thought that if he were to remain quite silent when it was brought regularly before the House, that the motives of his silence might receive an unjust interpretation, and that it might be said by his countrymen in Scotland that he had been ready enough to call on her Majesty's Ministers to undertake an arduous task, but that when they had virtually confessed their in competency to its performance by abandoning it, and a noble Lord from his own side of the House had patriotically stepped forward in the praiseworthy hope of fulfilling the duty which they had relinquished in despair, it might be said that he (the Earl of Galloway) had shrunk, from the responsibility, perhaps the unpopularity, which might attend the expression of his opinions in regard to it. These were his reasons and apology for troubling their Lordships with a very few observations, while expressing his concurrence in the measure which the noble Earl had laid on the table. It appeared to him, perhaps more strongly than to the noble Earl, that those who still desired to uphold the Veto Act of the General Assembly, which their Lordships in their judicial capacity had pronounced to be illegal, and those who stoutly maintained the propriety of the election of ministers to parishes by the popular voice, founded their argument mainly on two things—namely, that such was the law of the word of God, and that such was the ancient usage of the church Now, if he could persuade himself that patronage, by which he meant the simple right of presentation of a qualified clergyman, the original licensing of the individual, the judgment on his qualifications, and the whole process of the ordination remaining with the church—if he thought that patronage so defined and limited were Inconsistent with the divine law, he would not wish for its continuance. But it appeared to him that the Scriptures had laid down no positive rule which reached such a subject, but that it was left, like many other matters, for the judgment and discretion of men, according to the variations of time and circumstance. Hence he argued that, as in civil matters the laws which obtained in an infant community might be inapplicable when that community had extended itself and had become a great nation, so in ecclesiastical matters, where doctrine was not concerned, the regulations of an infant church might be inapplicable to its future growth and circumstances; and whatever practice might or might not have prevailed in the primitive Christian church—when that church was composed alone of spiritually enlightened men—when that church was beholden to the voluntary contributions of its own members for the support of its ministers, and was an object of persecution, instead of being, as it ought to be, an object of veneration with the civil power, and whatever practice might have prevailed in the early reformed presbyterian congregations in Scotland, he held that their Lordships ought to examine and be guided by the principles which governed the compact and connexion which was subsequently formed between the Church and the State. While thus presuming to differ with great authorities beyond the Tweed, and sheltering himself under a part of the judgment delivered by the noble and learned Lord on the woolsack, he was prepared to contend, that in the Scottish statutes of 1567 and 1592, the great charters of the incorporation, there was not the shadow of an argument in favour of the Veto Law of 1834. In those statutes he marked three essentials—the recognition and establishment of the Presbyterian form of church government in Scotland, the powers of the church defined, and limits set to its jurisdiction, and indisputably the reservation and confirmation of the ancient rights of the lay patrons; and these had been frequently assented to by the General Assembly, however their opinions might have varied at different times. He knew that in troublous times, and by unconstitutional process patronage had been destroyed in 1649, and that, after an interval to which he need not allude, the regular sanction of Parliament had been given to its abolition in 1690; or rather, that the exercise of the presentation had, for the brief period of a few years, been transferred to other parties, until patronage had been restored. But even at that period there had been no interference with the duties of the church, and the presbyteries were held bound to hear the opinions of the people, dispassionately to weigh them, to judge of the qualifications of the presentee, and to receive or reject him accordingly. This was a reasonable procedure. But he could never bring himself to vote for a measure which should go to legalize the Veto Act of the General Assembly, involving, as it did, the virtual abolition of patronage, and believing conscientiously that such abolition would not conduce to the Christian education of the people, nor to their peace and happiness; but he was desirous of every proper check being put upon its exercise by competent parties: and he sincerely hoped Parliament would not, by any measure, give its sanction to the church, divesting itself of any portion or its spiritual jurisdiction in the settlement of ministers, by investing the people with an arbitrary power of rejection of a presentee, without cause assigned, which was unreasonable and unjust. It was by no means safe to trust implicitly to the impression of a majority, regardless of the opinions of a minority in a parish, which had not been of unfrequent occurrence in Scotland, and which, under the practice or the church during the last century. He thought that had not been sufficiently looked to, and that all the evils complained of were not justly chargeable on the patrons; and, with all the unfeigned respect which he felt towards the church, he thought that it had been more faithful in the discharge of its duties; according to the powers which it possessed, many of the abuses complained of might have been avoided. But the measure of the noble Earl would meet such cases, and deal fairly with all parties. The right of the patron to present was preserved, the right of objection on the part of the people was extended to the utmost limit, and the full rights of the church were recognized, who would hear all objections, and judge of the suitableness of such presentee for the particular parish. He thought this measure was consistent with the spirit of the ancient standards of the Church of Scotland, that it was based on right principles, and founded in reason, and calculated to promote the piety and peace of the parishes, and that if those who had hitherto been engaged, some in agitating, and some in enlightening the peoples' minds, on subjects both of doctrine and discipline within the church, would but be at as much pains to recommend the views entertained by this declaratory measure to their good will, he was sanguine to hope, under the blessing of God, it would be productive of the happiest effects.

Viscount Melbourne

said, that after the able and copious explanation of the present state of the question given to them by the noble Earl who had brought forward the bill, it would be unnecessary for him to trouble their Lordships at any length, neither should he then enter into a discussion of the observations made by the noble Earl, or those who followed him. His noble Friend, in language certainly of the most moderate character, had expressed his disapprobation of the conduct of her Majesty's Government in not originating some measure upon a subject which had convulsed Scotland. The noble Duke opposite had also censured the advisers of the Crown for not having taken the subject into its hands; yet he still must be permitted to say, that he thought he ought to put off the defence of the Government for some time longer; he felt persuaded that that course would be the most satisfactory in the end, the more especially, as he hoped that in a short time such defence would be altogether unnecessary, as they advanced in the consideration and discussion of the measure, that the prudence of the Government, with re- spect to this subject, would show and demonstrate itself in a manner the most clear, manifest, and undeniable. For another reason he would not go into any defence of the conduct of Government, and it was this, that he felt he could not do so without attacking the measure then before the House, and to that he did not then mean to make any objections. However, he must observe, that the occasion which had arisen was not by any means so grave and serious as the speech of the noble Earl was calculated to lead the House to suppose; the exigency was in no respect so pressing as it had been represented. At the same time, he was most anxious for the settlement of the question, and most earnestly wished that the measure should meet with the fullest and fairest consideration; no one rejoiced more than he in giving up the task to his noble Friend, and he should be sincerely glad if it led to a settlement of the existing differences.

The Earl of Haddinglon

could not consent to give a silent vote on this occasion, though it was not his intention to go at length into the question beyond making one or two observations; for, indeed, he felt that his noble Friend had completely exhausted the whole subject. He concurred in almost every word that his noble Friend had spoken. He had received no provocation from the other side of the House to enter fully into the matter, and it would be inexcusable in him, after the tone and temper of his noble Friend who had just sat down, if he were to say one word more in reference to the conduct of the Government in not having brought this question to a favourable issue. It was not his wish to throw out any thing in the way of irritating matter, which might prejudice the favourable reception of the measure of his noble Friend. He need not refer to the collision which had occurred between the Church in Scotland and the law of the land,—he would say nothing of the agitation in the country, or of the cause of that agitation, or of the conduct of those who had participated in that agitation; because if he spoke honestly, he might be tempted to say something which might create feelings of irritation. He would say nothing on the subject of the Veto Act, except this, that, from the moment that Act was carried into law by the General Assembly, he had expressed the opinion he now did—an opinion which had been expressed by his noble Friend, that this was, perhaps, the most serious and important subject the Church had ever entered upon, when, by investing the people with the right to object, without cause being shown, to the presentation of an individual, they did pro tanto abdicate their own functions, and devolve them upon the people. The people were thus called upon to exercise a right on conscientious motives, and with a sense that the person would not edify them; therefore, they were called upon to judge of the qualifications of the individual, and to estop the competent court of the Church, in taking into consideration the ability of the presentee upon trial, and of judging themselves whether he was or was not competent to have the cure of souls. This was a most formidable objection to the Veto Act. He thought the Veto Act unreasonable, and it was really matter of astonishment to him that parties should be found in the General Assembly to acquiesce in it. At the same time, he would observe, that he thought there could scarcely be a greater curse to the people than a system of popular election of the clergy: yet that was a plain, intelligible principle, for the Church maintained its own position. But the Veto Act put the Church out of its own place, and put the people in a false position,—it put them in the position of exercising an arbitrary power. It appeared to him, that the measure proposed by his noble Friend was of a wise and salutary character, and he joined in earnestly recommending it to the Church of Scotland—nay, he earnestly recommended its adoption to all parties in Scotland. If his noble Friend addressed himself to what was called the dominant party, he would address himself to other parties, and would request them to give this measure a favourable and candid consideration, because it left all parties in their proper places. An eminent lay authority, Sir Henry Moncrieff laid down the principle that it was the right of the people to object, and of the Church to adjudicate. This bill had his best and sincerest wishes. He thought that no man would say, that his noble Friend had conceded too much. He hoped that this measure would bring the Church of Scotland out of her present danger and difficulty.

The Marquess of Bute

felt grateful to the noble Earl for the introduction of this bill, and hoped that it would have the effect of healing all the dissensions which prevailed in Scotland on this subject. He thought that the majority of the committee of the General Assembly ought not to be censured for the course which they had taken; this was acknowledged to be a difficult question, and it was more difficult to them than it could be to her Majesty's Government, or to their Lordships, or to any one else. He trusted that the Church of Scotland would receive this measure in that respectful and affectionate manner which it merited, looking at the tone and temper with which it had been introduced. Bill read a first time.