HL Deb 10 August 1840 vol 55 cc1401-2
The Bishop of London

presented a petition from the inhabitants of London, complaining of an alteration which had taken place of late years, by which prisoners charged with felony were allowed to employ counsel for their defence. That was a principle of exceedingly questionable propriety, and from what had occurred on a late most melancholy and remarkable occasion, he hoped the Government would see the propriety of referring the question to the Commisioners of Criminal Law Inquiry, in order to ascertain whether some change should not be made in the present practice. He disclaimed everything like imputation on any member of the learned profession, to whom the country was in many respects greatly indebted. The question really concerned the character of the community at large. He did not venture to give a positive opinion upon it, but this he would say, there were passages of God's word which he could not reconcile with the propriety of any man taking a reward to prove that to be otherwise which the accused himself had distinctly confessed.

Lord Brougham

was at some loss to understand the grounds upon which the petitioners rested their prayer. The privilege of the exercise of which they complained was not that of the counsel, but of the prisoner; it was a privilege upon which the elucidation of truth, the prevention of injustice depended, and the life, liberties, and property of the subject were not worth an hour's purchase if the freest scope, he would say more, the most unrestrained license was not given to the bar. Whether in a case which was right or wrong this was the rule, the sacred rule of the profession, and it was one upon which the safety of the administration of justice depended. With regard to the judgment of counsel, as to the propriety or impropriety of taking any case in hand, how, he would ask, could any man know a case to be a bad one before it was tried? Was he to enter into an investigation of it, sitting in his chambers, upon an exparte statement? Supposing he did so, and should then refuse to enter upon the defence, what would be the consequence? The door would be opened to the possibility of a refusal being given to be counsel in a case, and if a man had a right to refuse to act in one case, the same right might be exercised in others. If once a barrister were to be allowed to refuse a brief, and to say he would not defend a man because he was in the wrong, many would be found who would refuse to defend men, not on account of the case, but because they were weak men, under the pressure of unpopularity, against whom power had set its mark, because they were the victims of oppression, or were about to be made so, or because it would not be convenient for parties at all times to beard power on behalf of individuals, in the situation of prisoners.

The Bishop of London

said, the noble and learned Lord had admirably demolished the phantom of his own creation, for he had said nothing which called for the observations made by the noble Lord. It was not competent for a counsel to refuse a brief, but he lamented the hardship of the law, which, since the recent alteration which had been made in its provisions, might compel a man to do that which was against his own conscience, namely, defend by a speech a man whom he knew to be guilty.

Petition laid on the table.