§ Lord Lyndhurstrose to present a petition from a Roman Catholic clergyman of Ireland, complaining of great injustice and oppression to which he had been exposed, and requesting the interposition and protection of their Lordships' House. He (Lord Lyndhurst) certainly could not in that instance venture to say, that their Lordships could afford the petitioner the 146 redress for which he prayed; but as the petition was respectfully worded, and as the facts to which the petitioner referred appeared to him (Lord Lyndhurst) to be well authenticated, he felt it his duty to state them to their Lordships. The petitioner, whose name was Dr. Mulholland, had for many years held a Roman Catholic living in the county of Louth, and, according to testimonials which he had seen, Dr. Mulholland, had obtained respect and esteem for his piety and good conduct from all persons in the district in which he resided. It happened, however, that he had the misfortune to bring upon himself the animosity of the Roman Catholic priest in an adjoining parish, and that individual thought himself justified in circulating calumnies greatly to the prejudice and disadvantage of the petitioner. Under these circumstances, in justification of his character, he applied to the titular Roman Catholic Archbishop of the province, at that time Dr. Kelly. Dr. Kelly saw the propriety of the appeal, and directed his vicar-general to investigate the matter. The result of the investigation was, that the vicar-general came to the conclusion that there was no foundation whatever for the charges preferred against the petitioner, and he accordingly directed the person preferring them to make a public apology. This, however, that person refused to do; and under these circumstances, the petitioner had no alternative but to bring an action in one of the civil courts for defamation of character. The action was brought in the Court of Common Pleas in Ireland, and after a full investigation of the whole matter, a verdict was pronounced by the jury in favour of the petitioner. His conduct having thus been twice investigated—first before the domestic tribunal appointed by the titular Archbishop, and afterwards before a jury of his countrymen, he felt that his character was completely vindicated, and of course expected that the matter would there have been allowed to rest. In a very short time afterwards, however, he was removed from his living by the authority of the titular Roman Catholic Primate, without any reason whatever being assigned for his removal, except the circumstance of his having instituted the civil action against a brother priest. It appeared extraordinary to the petitioner, and he thought it must also appear extraordinary to their Lordships, that this course should be adopted; 147 because, adverting to the testimony that was given by the Roman Catholic bishops before the Commissioners of Education, and in particular of an individual of great eminence, Dr. M'Hale, he found it stated over and over again, in the most distinct terms, that, in vindication of a civil right, it was no violation of the rules of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland, notwithstanding the Pope's bull to the contrary, for an ecclesiastic of that Church to institute proceedings before a civil tribunal against a brother divine. If their Lordships referred to the evidence given before the Education Commission, they would see, that questions upon that particular point were put in a great variety of forms, and in a manner the most sifting, and, that over and over again the same answer was returned. Under these circumstances, the petitioner, feeling himself deeply injured, appealed to the superior authority of his Church at the Court of Rome. There again the matter underwent a fresh investigation, which terminated by a rescript being forwarded from Rome to the Roman Catholic Archbishop in Ireland, recommending, in the strongest terms, that the petitioner should be reinstated in his living. In the meantime Dr. Kelly died, and Dr. Crolly was appointed titular Primate in his stead. The rescript was handed to that reverend person; he read it, considered it, said that its recommendation should be obeyed, and that the petitioner should be reinstated in his living. Thus the petitioner supposed that every thing was done according to his wish, and as the justice of the case seemed to require. In a short time, however, Dr. Crolly told him that he had altered his mind —that he should not reinstate him—that the love and veneration which he felt for the memory of his reverend predecessor, Dr. Kelly, was such that he could not by possibility reinstate one whom that excellent ecclesiastic had seen reason to dispossess. The petitioner asked Dr. Crolly if he had any thing to find fault with in his character or conduct? "Quite the contrary," said Dr. Crolly, "I consider you a model of piety and good conduct; but for the reason I have stated I cannot reinstate you." At the same time Dr. Crolly expressed himself so completely satisfied with the petitioner's conduct, that he gave him a paper attesting his merits in the strongest terms, and stating that he was distinguished in the highest degree for zeal, piety, and doctrine. Under these 148 circumstances the petitioner again thought it right to appeal to the tribunal at Rome, where the matter was again investigated with the same results. Meanwhile the petitioner was requested not to leave Ireland, and Dr. Murray, the titular Archbishop of Dublin, requested him, for the sake of maintaining peace and harmony in the Roman Catholic Church In Ireland, to accept of a curacy. The petitioner offered at once to do so. "I will accept a curacy," said he, "if Dr. Crolly will appoint me." Dr. Crolly promised to do so, and the petitioner relied on the fulfilment of that promise. In a few days, however, Dr. Crolly again told him, that he had changed his mind—that he would not give him a curacy in Ireland, but that he might, if he thought proper, go to America, or elsewhere. These were the facts of the case. A clergyman was calcumniated—he appealed for redress to the domestic tribunal appointed under his immediate ecclesiastical superior, an investigation took place—he was acquitted of all blame—his conduct was approved—the party calumniating him was desired to make amends—this the party refused to do—he then appealed to the laws of his country, which he was justified in doing— which a due regard to his character bound him to do—which, according to the authorities to whose testimony he (Lord Lyndhurst) had referred, was no offence against the rules of his Church—a jury of his countrymen, after a full investigation of the matter, completely vindicated his character, and pronounced a verdict against his calumniator—he was described by his ecclesiastical superior as highly distinguished for zeal, piety, and doctrine—and yet, under all these circumstances, he was stripped of his living because he dared to make an appeal to the laws of his country. In the course of his statement he (Lord Lyndhurst) had referred to a document to which he begged to call their Lordships' attention, because it showed how little attention was paid to those prohibitions and restrictions which were imposed at the time that Parliament was granting what was considered a great been to the Roman Catholics. By the 24th Clause of the Act for the Removal of the Disabilities of the Roman Catholics, it was enacted that no person should assume the title of Archbishop of any province, Bishop of any diocese, or Dean of any deanery, who was not entitled thereto by the law of the land, 149 That was a prohibition which was acceded to by the Roman Catholics at the time that the Act passed, and which their Lordships had every reason to suppose, and every right to expect would be obeyed. Yet the document to which he (Lord Lyndhurst)had referred, was signed by Dr. Crolly, describing himself as Archbishop of Armagh, and authenticated by Mr. Mathews M' Cann, describing himself as vicar general of the same province. He would not longer detain the House. He was sure their Lordships would feel the hardship of the petitioner's situation, and the injustice which had been done him, and that they would be anxious, if possible, to afford him some redress. He came before their Lordships, feeling himself aggrieved by his ecclesiastical superior, for no other reason than that he sought to obtain redress for an acknowledged injustice from the laws of his country. Under these circumstances he was sure their Lordships would feel disposed, if possible, to afford redress; at all events, they would justify his bringing these facts to their knowledge, and would allow the petition to he on their table.
Lord Hollandthought it most extraordinary that the noble and learned Lord should bring forward a subject so entirely alien to the functions of their Lordships' House as that which was then laid under their consideration. He (Lord Holland) had always been for throwing open the doors of the House to petitioners as much as any one within its walls; but he had always thought it was improper for their Lordships to receive any petition which was either couched in disrespectful language to the House, or called upon the House to do that which the House had not the power to do—which called upon the House, in fact, to exercise a jurisdiction where jurisdiction it had none. It was extraordinary, indeed, that the noble and learned Lord, above all other Lords in that House, should think it a part of the duty of that House to attend to the discipline of the Roman Catholic Church—for what else did the petitioner in this instance pray? The noble and learned Lord had told them a long story—he would not call it a cock-and-a-bull story, though it had something of the bull in it —a good deal was said about a bull of the Court of Rome; but the noble and learned Lord had told them a long story about the grievances of this Catholic clergyman. When that story was commenced, he ex- 150 pected to hear that the person whose petition was presented had not received justice at the hands of the constituted courts of law of the country; but it. appeared that he brought his action, and that a verdict was given in his favour. The noble and learned Lord did not tell them exactly what that verdict was, but he concluded that the benefit of that verdict, as against his libeller, was received from the justice of his country. But because a Church not recognised, not paid, not established by the Government of this country—because that Church chose to interfere with this person, a member of its own body, for having (as the petitioner alleged) sought redress in one of the courts of law—though it did not appear, from anything else than what the noble and learned Lord had stated, that that was the real cause—because his own Church, for some reason or other, thought fit to dispossess him from the living which he had previously held, their Lordships were called upon to interfere and to afford redress. Did their Lordships confer the living upon him? Had they the power either of taking it from him, or of conferring it upon him? The noble and learned Lord described all the Roman Catholics in Ireland as aliens in blood, in religion, and in disposition. Were their Lordships, then, entitled to regulate their spiritual concerns?—because it came to that. Were their Lordships to interfere in the exercise of the Church discipline, or in the spiritual affairs of those who received no temporal or secular advantages from the Government of the country? As fur as he understood the present petition, it appeared to him to be one which their Lordships could not properly receive. But whether they chose to receive it or not, of this he was certain—it was one upon which their Lordships ought not and could not act. For even supposing it were more consistent with the usages of the House, their Lordships would recollect that it complained of a grievance received by one man at the hands of another, and they would also remember that that House had no original jurisdiction, even if it were a question between Protestant and Protestant, and still less when it was a question between a Catholic priest and a Catholic archbishop. He always suffered pain when any person felt himself aggrieved, and came to Parliament for redress, that Parliament should not entertain his complaint. But still he thought their 151 Lordships should pause and consider before they received a complaint of such a nature as that contained in the present petition. If this complaint were entertained, it would be impossible to refuse a like indulgence to others; and were their Lordships really to enter into the question of how far the Church of Rome, in the discipline of its members, was actuated by correct and proper principles?
The Earl of Wicklowsaid, if the noble Baron, who had just sat down, was astonished at his noble and learned Friend for presenting the petition, he was in no degree less surprised at the tone which the noble Baron had adopted. He had understood, or at least had always believed, that it was the duty of every Member of that House not to refuse to present any petition properly and respectfully worded, from any oppressed person in the country, if the constitution of the realm did not afford that individual redress in any other quarter. When it was clearly evident that a person had been grossly injured, and when, under the constitution of the country, there was no court to which he could appeal for redress, he (Lord Wick-low) maintained, not with standing the doctrine of the noble Baron, that it was the duty of a Member of their Lordships' House to bring the subject under their Lordships' consideration. The petitioner, in the present instance, had requested him (Lord Wicklow) to support the prayer of his petition, and he certainly did so with the most unfeigned alacrity. He felt that the petitioner had been most severely and most unjustly treated—that a tyrannical power, unknown to the constitution of the country, had been exercised upon him; and for no other reason upon earth than that he had presumed to exercise the birthright of every British subject. Was it to be endured that any British subject should be deprived of the means of support at the will or dictation of any individual, and that solely because he dared to appeal to the laws of his country in a civil case? The petitioner had shown him testimonials of character from some of the most distinguished members of his own Church, and especially from the Roman Catholic Lord-Lieutenant of his own county, Sir Patrick Bellew, who deeply lamented the injury he had sustained, and strongly condemned the means by which that injury had been inflicted. It was truly surprising that the noble Baron (Holland), professing as he did Whig and liberal principles, should 152 be the first to raise his voice against the reception of a petition coming from an individual claiming redress in the only court in which he could now hope to obtain it. When the prisoner waited upon him to communicate his complaint, and to ask his support, the first question he put to him was, "Why do you not appeal to those persons who profess to be the representatives of your own persuasion? Why do you not appeal to some of those great patriots of your own country, who declare themselves to be friends of the oppressed —who are, in fact, the representatives of the order to which you belong—who owe their seats in Parliament to the support which they receive from those of your persuasion? Surely, the matter would come with greater weight before Parliament if it were introduced by one of those in the other branch of the Legislature." But these individuals knew too well the dangers to which they were exposing themselves; they would not venture to bring upon themselves the censure of those through whose instrumentality they obtained their entrance into Parliament. He had in his possession the answer of the individual who considered himself the representative, not only of the Catholics, but of the whole body of the Irish people, in which he refused indignantly to undertake the case of the petitioner, assigning as a reason that he (the petitioner) ought rather to submit to any injury which the discipline of the Church might bring upon him, than attempt to obtain redress from the ordinary tribunals of the country. In acting otherwise, the petitioner showed that he trusted rather to the fairness of the British public than to the justice of those of his own community. He thought an application of the kind extremely well-timed, now that persons of the Roman Catholic persuasion were endeavouring to impose upon the country, by making them believe that the doctrines they professed in no way interfered with the enjoyment of civil rights and civil privileges. It was well that the country should have an opportunity of seeing what was the real despotism of the Roman Catholic Church. In his opinion it was the bounden duty of his noble and learned Friend to present the petition.
§ Viscount Melbourneobserved that both the noble Lords had allowed that the House could do nothing in the case in question. The petition was from a Roman Catholic clergyman, who said, that he had 153 been treated with great injustice by his superior, who had dismissed him from his ecclesiastical station, and that he had not been restored by the successor to that superior, notwithstanding the rescript which had proceeded from the highest authority in the Romish Church. It was clear, therefore, that the question was entirely one of ecclesiastical discipline. But the noble Earl said, the petition was an appeal to public opinion through that House; that was, in other words, that the petitioner stated alleged facts in censure of the conduct of another person, under cover of a petition to that House, into the merits of which petition the House could not enter. Now, although he (Lord Melbourne) could not in all respects reprobate such a mode of proceeding, yet he could not put it out of his consideration that it might be carried further in other cases, and indeed to an extent that would prove very inconvenient. Under these circumstances he doubted the prudence and policy of the noble and learned Lord in presenting such a petition. There was one observation made by the noble and learned Lord to which he wished briefly to advert. The noble and learned Lord read from some documents proceeding from the episcopal authorities of the Romish Church, the titles of (Bishops and Archbishops, and then contended, that the use of such titles was a violation of one of the clauses of the Act for removing the disabilities of Roman Catholics. Now he apprehended that the clause in question only prohibited those titles from being taken in ordinary style. To abolish their use in the Roman Catholic Church, would be to abolish that Church itself; for to that Church the existence of episcopal ordination and episcopal authority was indispensable. In the internal discipline of the Romish Church, the use of episcopal titles, and the exercise of episcopal authority, were essential.
§ The Duke of Wellingtonmust say, that the objections which had been made to the character of this petition, appeared to him to be most extraordinary; and above all, it appeared to him to be most extraordinary that the noble Baron opposite, of all persons in the world, should object to a petition from an individual with reference to a subject on which he could have no redress in any other quarter; for, if he were not greatly mistaken, he had heard the noble Lord 154 himself present a petition from certain clergymen of the diocese of Peterborough, complaining of the questions put to them by the Bishop of that diocese preparatory to ordination. But, at all events, he had never heard such an opinion expressed by any one (the noble Viscount had been too prudent and discreet to express it) as that expressed by the noble Baron, that the petition ought not to be received. "Would the noble Baron move as an amendment to his noble and learned Friend's motion, "that the petition be rejected?" For that was the course which the noble Baron ought to take, if he seriously thought that the petition ought not to be received. It was very true that, as the noble Baron had said, that House could not take any steps to redress the grievance of which the petitioner complained; but he had never heard of any instance, and, in his opinion, the noble Baron would be unable to find any instance, of the rejection of a petition to their Lordships, respectfully worded, only because no ulterior steps could be taken respecting it. The noble Baron said, that in some former debate in that House his noble and learned Friend had talked of the Roman Catholic clergy as aliens in religion, aliens in feeling, aliens in principle to the rest of the country. But he (the Duke of Wellington) begged to ask their Lordships whether, if the circumstances which had been stated by his noble and learned Friend respecting the present petitioner were true, his noble and learned Friend was not justified in speaking of the Roman Catholic clergy of Ireland as he had spoken of them? He wanted to know whether an inhabitant of this empire, going to Rome on a subject of this kind, and thereby appealing to a foreign tribunal, was not in the state which had been described by his noble and learned Friend? He would now advert to some of the arguments which had been used by the noble Viscount. The noble Viscount asserted, that the Act of Parliament for relieving Roman Catholics from civil disabilities, could not be supposed to prohibit the use of certain titles used by certain persons in the exercise of their religious authority, because, forsooth, the Roman Catholic Church was an Episcopal Church, and, therefore, that it was absolutely necessary to use Episcopal titles in its administration. But did we never hear of Roman Catholics in any other part of the world but Ireland? 155 The law had forbidden, and had succeeded in preventing, the use of episcopal titles by the Roman Catholics in England; but although the law had equally forbidden, it had not succeded in preventing, the use of episcopal titles by the Roman Catholics in Ireland. The law, the execution of which at present rested in the hands of the noble Viscount, was, it appeared, not successful in preventing the use of episcopal titles by the Roman Catholics in Ireland? The use of these titles had been abolished in this country, and ought to be abolished in Ireland,
§ The Marquess of Lansdowneobserved, that what had fallen from the noble Duke showed the inconvenience of entertaining such petitions as that which had been presented by the noble and learned Lord; for the noble Duke justified the terms in which the noble and learned Lord had recently spoken of the great bulk of the population of Ireland, by assuming the accuracy of the statement made in the petition—a statement resting on no authority but that of the petitioner himself. Now how was it possible to know whether that statement was accurate or not, except they were prepared to enter into an inquiry on the subject. Did the noble and learned Lord propose or invite such an inquiry? Did the noble Earl opposite propose or invite such an inquiry? And yet their Lordships were told, that this was an appeal to public opinion made through their Lordships, although that assertion was unaccompanied by any proposal to inquire into the veracity of the assertions. But it was on the assumption of that veracity alone that the noble Duke could think the noble and learned Lord justified in the never-to-be-forgotten taunts, which he had, on a late occasion, thrown out against the bulk of the population in Ireland. In his opinion, the noble and learned Lord would have exercised a sound discretion if he had declined presenting this petition. As to the rejection of the petition, the House had the right, if they chose to exercise it, of refusing to receive any petition. If they received this petition, and acted consistently, they must receive all petitions from persons who were, or fancied they were, aggrieved by others; and where would that end? Were all persons in subordinate situations, stewards, clerks, and others, complaining of the conduct of their superiors, to have the privilege of making that House the channel of an appeal to the public on their cases? They had no more 156 right to take such a step, than any of their Lordships' servants, or tenants, would have, although their case might be—as possibly the present case was—one of great hardship and injustice. He was much surprised at the comparison which had been made by the noble Duke, between the present petition and the petition complaining of the questions put by the Bishop of Peterborough to candidates for ordination. Was the Roman Catholic Church an Established Church? Were we to interfere with a Church which we neither recognised nor paid, because we had a right to interfere with the discipline, emoluments, and possessions of a Church which we both recognized and paid? We had no right whatever, to interfere with the discipline of any Church which we neither recognised nor paid unless that Church were guilty of some contravention of public law. The petitioner in the present case had a remedy at law. That remedy he had sought and obtained. Whether the petitioner had been unjustly treated or not, he (Lord Lansdowne), having heard only an ex parte statement, could not say; but this he would say, that if their Lordships received this petition, they could not refuse the petition of any other clergyman of the Roman Catholic religion, who complained of his superior. This might be attended with great inconvenience. At the same time, if the noble and learned Lord pressed the reception of the petition, he (Lord Lansdowne) would not oppose it; for it certainly was his opinion that great latitude ought to be allowed with respect to petitions, however it might be ultimately inconvenient and even mischievous.
§ The Duke of Wellingtonwished to explain what he had said respecting the petition presented against the Bishop of Peterborough. He did not dispute the right of their Lordships to inquire into any subject, the consideration of which might be submitted to them in a petition. But there ought to be something like prudence and propriety on the part of the petitioners; and certainly, the subjects of the question which a Bishop might think fit to put to candidates for ordination, was as improper and imprudent a subject for a petition as could be imagined.
Lord Hollandbegged permission to say a few words in answer to the personal observations which had been made upon him by the noble Duke. There was nothing analogous in the two petitions in question. The noble Duke said that the petition 157 which he (Lord Holland) presented against the Bishop of Peterborough for putting certain questions to candidates for ordination, was improper and imprudent. If the noble Duke would look back to the circumstances of that case, he would find they were these, that the law of the land required certain qualifications and testimonials from the candidates for ordination, and that the Bishop introduced others, which he was not authorised to introduce. But, in the present case, was there any allegation of a departure from the law of the land? Did the law of the land declare that a Roman Catholic Bishop should not dismiss any Roman Catholic clergyman from the exercise of his functions? The noble Duke had said, that of all men in the world, he (Lord Holland) was the last from whom he should have expected an objection to receive this petition. Now, at all times, whether sitting on one side of the House or the other, he had always expressed an opinion, that every petition ought to be received, which was couched in respectful language, and which did not relate to subjects of which the House had no cognizance. For many years that House had enjoyed de facto, though perhaps not de jure, an original jurisdiction between one man and another. But in every case like that which he had just described, where a petition referred to a subject of which the House had no cognizance, he had always refused to present such petition; and he had recommended a similar course to other noble Lords placed in similar circumstances. Suppose any of their Lordships were to dismiss an old servant for having brought an action of which they disapproved, would that servant be entitled to present a petition complaining of his dismissal? How could they enforce rights, the existence of which was not acknowledged by the law? He would not, however, press his opposition to the reception of the petition to a division, but should be satisfied with saying "Not content."
The Marquess of Westmeathdenied that there was any thing in the petition which should disincline their Lordships to receive it. The intolerant, inquisitorial, and tyrannical spirit of the Church of Rome was well known; and the object of the petition, as of many other petitions, was to obtain redress for an unjust act which the law could not reach. The noble Baron might recollect the case of the rev, Charles O'Connor Bog, a Catholic priest, who wrote on the veto, and on several 158 points of the Catholic religion, and who was brought to an untimely end by the oppression and tyranny of a Catholic Prelate. It was endeavoured to raise proceedings in his favour, but the interference came too late. In the present case, there was a tyranny beyond the reach of the law; and as one of the Representative Peers of Ireland, he could not consent to the withdrawing of the petition.
§ Viscount Duncannonobserved, that in the first instance the gentleman who now petitioned their Lordships did apply for and obtain the redress which a court of law could afford him. He had been chaplain to the titular Archbishop, Dr. Kelly, and Dr. Kelly removed him from that situation. Could the House interfere in such a matter as that? The noble and learned Lord spoke of the high character which the petitioner had received from the Catholic Lord-Lieutenant of his county. It was very true, that the petitioner had applied to that gentleman for a character, but he (Lord Duncannon) was authorised to say, that that character was not given with any view of its being brought forward in that House, and that in giving it, there was no intention to countenance the object which the petitioner now had in view.
The Earl of Wicklowremarked, that the Catholic Lord-lieutenant in question knew all the circumstances of the petitioner's case, and, therefore, that his giving the petioner a high character, was a tacit approval of his conduct in those circumstances. He could state, that the Catholic titular Bishop of London, notwithstanding his knowledge of the facts, had given the petitioner leave to exercise his functions in every chapel in his diocese.
§ Viscount Duncannonreplied, that so far was the Catholic Lord-lieutenant in question from approving of the conduct of the petitioner in the circumstances which occasioned his removal, that he approved of the removal.
§ Viscount Melbourneobserved that, as so much had been said upon the subject, it would be but fair to read to their Lordships a letter from Dr. Crolly respecting it. The noble Viscount read the letter. It stated that Dr. Kelly had been informed that Mr. Sergeant Jackson was about to present a petition to the House of Commons from the petitioner, and as it was probable that reference would be made to the circumstances of the case, Dr. Crolly thought it right to declare, first, that the petitioner never had a living, but was chaplain to 159 the Bishop, and was only administrator to a parish; secondly, that he had dragged a worthy clergyman before a court of justice, where he had obtained only a farthing damages, and was adjudged to pay the costs; thirdly, that his conduct on that occasion was universally disapproved of, and that his removal from the office of administrator was confirmed by the proper authority; fourthly, that he (Dr. Crolly) had offered him the choice of three curacies before two Catholic priests, who were prepared to give evidence that he contemptuously refused them all; fifthly, that at the last conference at Dundalk, he (Dr. Crolly) had offered to confirm the petitioner as the associate of any parish priest, but that he refused to be so associated; and the parish priests were as unwilling to be appointed with him, as he was to be associated with them. These statements he hoped would satisfy the minds of their Lordships with respect to the merits of the case.
§ Lord Lyndhursttrusted their Lordships would allow him a few words in explanation. With respect to the allusion of a noble Marquess, to what he (Lord Lyndhurst) had said, or was supposed to have said, on a former occasion, he could assure the noble Marquess and the House, that he was never disposed to shrink from the responsibility attached to any expressions which he had really used, and least of all was he disposed to do so on the present occasion. With respect to the present petition, what other course could he have pursued than that which he had taken? A gentleman came to him, told him that he had been unjustly and oppressively treated by an individual having authority over him. That gentleman produced the highest testimonials to his character, even from the individual from whom he had received the injury. By that individual he was declared to be insignem zelo, pietate et doctrina. Another document from the same individual, after the transaction in which the whole affair originated, also contained the highest eulogiums on the petitioner's character. Under such circumstances was it possible that he could refuse to present the petition? But it had been said, that the statement in the petition was only the statement of the petitioner. Why, what was the statement in any petition, but the statement of the petitioner? But in the present case, he found the statement of the petitioner vouched for by the very person of whom the petitioner complained, He 160 was glad to see the noble Viscount reading the petition, and he would now ask that noble Lord if he had stated the facts or not? Had he attempted to give them a false colour? Had he done more than it was his duty to do, namely, to state to their Lordships as plainly and intelligibly as he could, the substance and the prayer of the petition? The noble Viscount seemed rather to have mistaken the meaning of the clause in the Act for removing the civil disabilities of the Roman Catholics, to which his noble Friend (the Duke of Wellington) had alluded. The clause ran thus—"Be it therefore enacted, that from and after the commencement of this Act, it shall be lawful for any person other than the person thereunto authorised by law, to assume, or use the name, style, or title of—;Archbishop?" No;—"Archbishop of a province;" Bishop? No; "Bishop of a Bishopric." It was not a violation of the law to assume generally the title of Archbishop or Bishop; but it was a violation of the law to assume the title of "Archbishop of any province; or Bishop of any Bishopric in England or Ireland." That was the statement of his noble Friend; and to that statement the observations of the noble Viscount were not an answer. If the noble Lords opposite wished the subject to be investigated, he (Lord Lyndhurst) was quite prepared to enter upon that investigation. All he now asked, however, was, that the petition might he on the table.
Lord Hollandwished to know if their Lordships were to understand, that if any petition were to be presented from Dr. Crolly, that was also to be inquired into? It might be that a petition might be presented from Dr. Crolly directly contradicting the statements of Mr. Mulholland.
§ Lord Lyndhurstsaid, that if Dr. Crolly signed that petition as Bishop of Armagh, he should object to its being received [a laugh]; otherwise he should never object to the reception of a petition complaining of injustice, come from what quarter it might.
§ The Marquess of Lansdowneasked, if a petition was presented from Dr. Crolly, as Dr. Crolly, and not as Archbishop of Armagh complaining of great injustice, would it be received?
§ The Duke of Wellingtonspoke to order. It was irregular to ask noble Lords how they would vote on a hypothetical case.
§ The petition to lie on the table.