HL Deb 06 July 1835 vol 29 cc251-4
The Marquess of Salisbury

brought up the Report of the Islington Market Bill. It stated in substance the doubts that had arisen on the minds of the Committee as to the rights of the City; and they wished to hear counsel at the Bar, and that the Judges do attend to hear the arguments and assist their Lordships.

Lord Brougham

said, that there were cases in which the Judges were summoned, but there must be something peculiar to justify such a proceeding. He did not mean to say that such was not the case in the present instance. He should not oppose the Motion.

The Bishop of Hereford thought that it would he better to have the opinion of two of the learned Judges upon the question of the rights of the city of London.

The Marquess of Salisbury could not consent to the proposition of the right reverend Prelate, which, indeed, he did not think to be quite regular. He should, therefore, now give notice, that it was his intention to move that the Judges be summoned, and that this question be put to them—whether matters relating to the vested rights of the Corporation of London would be affected by this Bill. He should move that this question be argued by one counsel on each side. He was not aware that a Bill of this nature was ever referred to two Judges alone.

The Bishop of Hereford said, that if the Bill was to be referred to the Judges, he suggested whether this question ought not to be argued—whether, under the charter to the city of London, Parliament was not precluded from establishing other markets.

The Marquess of Salisbury could not possibly agree to frame the question in such a manner.

The Duke of Richmond presented a petition from—Rhodes, Esq., a gentleman residing in the county of Essex, praying to be heard by counsel against a certain part of the Islington Market Bill.

The Marquess of Salisbury was very sorry to be compelled to oppose this Petition. The subject had already been discussed before the Committee. If, with reference to any agreement which the petitioner had entered into, he felt himself aggrieved, the matter ought to be investigated in a Court of Law.

The Duke of Richmond said, he wished justice to be done to all parties who were affected by this Bill; but it would not be doing justice to the petitioner to take his land without giving him a proper equivalent. The petitioner stated, that in signing the agreement to which allusion had been made, he had been mistaken, and that the other party had taken an unfair advantage of him. The petition ought to be referred to the Committee; and though it might occasion a delay of a few days, still he would say, let the petition be inquired into, and let the petitioner have justice. As the Committee had reported, it was no longer in existence; but when it was moved that the Bill should be re-committed, he should certainly propose that the petition should be referred to the Committee.

Lord Brougham

complained of the manner in which Select Committees of both Houses of Parliament conducted the business intrusted to them. He recollected, some years ago, when a Bill was referred to a Committee of the other House, and a proposition was made respecting it, which was supported by fourteen Members who had attended to the evidence, down came sixteen Gentlemen who had never heard the evidence, and they decided the other way. The proceeding was, however, complained of in the House, and by acclamation the decision was set aside. In consequence, the Bill was ultimately thrown out. Such was the conduct of those Judges—not Judges of Oyer and Terminer, but Judges of Terminer sans Oycr. This being the mode of carrying on the Private Bill business, he should always, as he had heretofore done, protest against such a course of proceeding. Noble Lords and hon. Gentlemen ought to recollect that on these occasions they were deciding rights as judges. They were making laws which suspended in many cases the course of the Common Law, and of the Statute Law of the land. They, however, concocted laws, and decided on important points, in away in which no judge or juror would dare to decide a case involving property to the amount of 10l.; that was, without hearing the evidence or examining the parties who were interested on both sides.

Lord Wharncliffe

said, their Lordships were acting as judges; and if they read the evidence, they could always make themselves masters of the subject. The evidence in these cases was always printed for the House of Lords, which was not the practice with the House of Commons.—[Lord Brougham: Yes, it is.]—He had applied for evidence given before a Committee of the other House, and could only get it in manuscript. They were not, it should be observed, bound by the Report of the Committee. They might throw out the Bill on the third reading. It was still a matter for their consideration, notwithstanding the Report of the Committee.

Lord Brougham

said, the process of the House was this; they referred a Bill to a Select Committee, and they placed faith in the decision of that Committee. It was just the same as the Court of Chancery sending an issue to be tried for the purpose of getting at the opinions of a jury. Their Lordships would unquestionably proceed on the Report of the Committee to whom a particular inquiry on the merits of a Bill was intrusted. That Committee was the body by whom the question was to be tried, and it was supposed that they would give their opinion upon hearing and seeing evidence. The House adopted their Report, because it was supposed that the Committee had fully and fairly performed its functions.

The Duke of Richmond agreed with the sentiments of his noble and learned Friend much more than with the observations that had been made on the other side. Nothing would make him, for one, vote on a private Bill, unless he had listened to all the evidence, and seen the witnesses.

Lord Wharncliffe

said, he merely objected to the extreme principle as laid down by his noble and learned Friend.

The Marquess of Salisbury said, that in his opinion no noble Lord ought to vote on a Bill of this sort, without, at all events, having previously made himself fully master of all the evidence.

Petition to lie on the Table.

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