§ Lord Wynfordhad a Petition to present from Thomas Bittleston, who was brought to their Bar yesterday, to answer for a breach of the privileges of that House. It was then understood that, upon a proper application being made to their Lordships by that individual, they would be disposed to extend to him that mercy which it was the custom of their Lordships to evince towards every individual who showed, that he was sensible of the error of his conduct in giving their Lordships offence. He had such a petition to present couched in terms the most respectful, and expressive of his regret for the violation of their privileges of which he had been guilty. The noble and learned Lord read the petition, and moved that Thomas Bittleston be called to the Bar, reprimanded, and discharged.
§ Earl Greydid not wish to act with un- 1007 necessary harshness, but he thought the Motion of the noble and learned Lord was not in exact accordance with the precedent established in the case of a libel upon a noble Lord opposite (Lord Limerick), and it was understood that that precedent was to be followed in this case. Upon that occasion, he believed, the individual was not discharged upon the day upon which his petition was presented, but on the following day. The noble Earl read from the minutes the entry in the case of Mr. Lawson's petition for his discharge from the custody of the Usher of the Black Rod: "It was moved and carried after debate that this petition be taken into consideration to-morrow, and that the Lords be summoned." The proper course, therefore, for the noble and learned Lord would be to move that the petition of Mr. Bittleston be taken into consideration to-morrow.
§ Lord Wynford acquiesced, and moved accordingly.
§ Question carried.
The Duke of Cumberlandbegged to state, that he perfectly agreed with his noble and learned friend in the course he had taken. He admitted unequivocally that the article which had occasioned their Lordships' displeasure was a libel upon the noble and learned Lord upon the Woolsack, but, at the same time, he must say, that it would, in his opinion, be unjust and cruel in their Lordships to punish Mr. Bittleston more severely than they had punished the other person for a libel on a lay Lord. He might be wrong; but he could not consider that the Lord Chancellor was to be considered in a case of this kind as anything more than any other Peer. He maintained, that if the character of any other Member of that House had been similarly attacked, that Member would have an equal right to complain, and to an equal measure of punishment upon the offender, as the noble and learned Lord.
The Lord Chancellorsaid, he should not be discharging his duty to their Lordships if he passed over the remarks of the illustrious Duke without observation. He felt himself called on to place his opinion most decidedly against the opinion of the illustrious Duke. He would not be deterred by any motives of personal delicacy—he would not be prevented by any feeling with reference to himself, from stating his opinion, and he believed that it was also 1008 the opinion of every impartial person in that House and in the country, that the present was an offence tending directly to impede the administration of justice—an offence which, if allowed to be passed over as a matter of course, that House would no longer be a Court of Justice. Very soon, indeed, would their Lordships in that case cease to administer justice in the last resort. Was it to be endured, that those who assisted their Lordships in deciding cases of the greatest difficulty, decisions at which every one of their Lordships had a right to give his opinion, but in arriving at which the law Lords were most able to lend effectual assistance —and God forbid that he should ever see the day when lay Lords should transact all the judicial business of that House without the assistance of law Lords—was it to be endured that the conduct of those who thus assisted their Lordships should be grossly libelled and misrepresented, while little or no notice was to be taken of the offence? In the present instance, it was not a common offence that had been committed—it was not a mere attack upon an individual Peer, but an attack made upon a legal functionary with respect to the discharge of his legal duties. What was the charge? A charge of forgery—a charge of fabricating a fraudulent entry. And who was the individual charged? The first Law Officer under the Crown—the first Officer in their Lordships' House—yes, the Speaker of their Lordships' House—he it was, who was charged with fabricating one of their Lordships' records for a personal and most unworthy purpose. This, assuredly, was very different from a charge brought against an individual Peer in his private capacity. But what he chiefly rose to notice was the allusion made to the extent of punishment by the illustrious Duke. The illustrious Duke said, that there should be no greater degree of punishment awarded in this than in a former case—that it would be cruel and unjust to punish this individual more than another person had been punished. The illustrious Duke seemed to think because Mr. Lawson had only undergone one or two days' imprisonment, that, therefore, any breach of their Lordships' privileges ought to be visited with punishment merely to that extent. Was that, then, to be the actual amount of punishment in all cases? [The Duke of Cumberland: No, no.] If the illustri- 1009 ous Duke did not say so, he had misunderstood the illustrious Duke, and sure he was that a large body of their Lordships had misunderstood the illustrious Duke also. He believed the illustrious Duke had said, that it would be unjust to give this man more punishment than had been inflicted on the individual who had been brought before their Lordships some time since. Now, upon that point all he should say was, that every case must be taken on its own individual merits—it must be judged by its own peculiar circumstances. And he did not by any means say, or intend to say, that though he should concur to-morrow in the Motion for liberating this individual (and be it remembered he had made a Motion of the same kind last night, and if he could have had his will that person should not have been taken into custody at all) — but when his noble and learned friend made his Motion, and when that Motion was supported by him, he did not mean thereby to say, that he should not consider it fit and proper to refuse his concurrence to a similar proceeding hereafter, if another case came before their Lordships, because, as he had before said, every case must stand on its own especial grounds.
The Duke of Cumberlandshould not have addressed a single word to their Lordships if he had been aware that the question of adjournment till to-morrow had been carried. He did not mean to recall anything he had stated. He did not deny the power of that House to deal with offenders against its privileges as it pleased. God forbid he should deny their power; and if he had been so understood, he begged distinctly to disclaim any such intention. What he meant to say was this:—That as the Lord Chancellor had so often told them that in that House he was no more than any other Peer, he thought that no distinction should be made between a libel upon the noble and learned Lord and any other Member of the House. All he asked of their Lordships was, that they should adopt the words of the noble and learned Lord himself, and treat him in this case just as they would treat any other Member of the House. If in this he were wrong, he was sorry for it; but he could not retract an opinion conscientiously entertained. He did not mean to defend the libel upon the noble and learned Lord; but he would maintain, that when the individual wrote 1010 the libel in question, he really thought that their Lordships' minutes had been falsified.
The Lord Chancellorwas afraid the illustrious Duke had misunderstood him. He had not intended to say that an attack upon the Chancellor was a greater offence than an attack upon any other Peer; but that an attack upon him in his judicial capacity was an offence of a graver nature than an attack upon the individual character of any Peer. He would suppose his Royal Highness, or any other Member of the House, had been attending a case judicially brought before them, and a newspaper were to impute to his Royal Highness, in the part he had performed, corrupt motives, or that he had falsified the entry on their Lordships' minutes. That would be a parallel case, and in such a case his Royal Highness would have been as grossly libelled as he had been. This was his meaning, and the only distinction he had intended to draw.
§ Earl Greyexpressed his regret at the discussion which had arisen, and that he should prolong it by a single word. He could not, however, allow to pass unnoticed the observation, that this was a case merely of personal libel, and that an attack upon the Lord Chancellor should be regarded in the same light as an attack upon any other Peer. He did not find fault with the noble and illustrious Duke for stating the opinion he entertained; but for himself he must protest against that opinion in the strongest manner. He could not but express his astonishment at such a doctrine. He was willing that the present offence should be visited with the most mitigated punishment; but if be were to refer to former cases of similar offence, he should be able to show how much more severely that House had visited breaches of its privileges of a nature much less grave than the present. In the year 1798 a case was made against the Morning Chronicle for a purely political libel upon that House, one which in the present day would be thought very innocent. What was the sentence of the House upon that occasion? "It was ordered by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, in Parliament assembled, that the said James Perry, for the said offence, do pay a fine to his Majesty of 50l., and that he be sent a prisoner to Newgate for the space of three months, and until he shall have paid the said fine." With this precedent of the punishment inflicted by the House for an 1011 offence of a much less aggravated nature, he thought no one with justice could say, that the punishment of the petitioner was one of undue severity.