HL Deb 08 August 1834 vol 25 cc1048-54
The Lord Chancellor

wished to call their Lordships' attention to a matter of great importance. He alluded to the dissent of the House of Commons from their Lordships' Amendment to the County Coroners' Bill. That dissent affected a most important branch of the measure. If the matter in dispute involved only a minor point, he should be the first person to give way to the reasons of that House, with which he had been so long connected. His opinion on the best consideration which he could give to the subject was, first of all, that the Commons were wrong; and if it were a matter of little consequence he should say, whether their Lordships were right or the Commons were wrong, that it would become them, as men of sense, to abandon the point. But his next opinion was, that the point in question was of such great importance, that their Lordships ought to adhere to their Amendment, and he should briefly state the principle on which that opinion was founded. He was certainly clear in his own mind, that the Commons had not taken a full and ample view of this question. The Amendment related to that part of the Bill which enacted that publicity should be given to the proceedings in the Coroner's Court, the clause concerning which had been expunged by their Lordships. He admitted that, generally speaking, all Courts should be open, and such was the fact in ninety-nine cases out of 100. But cases might arise where it would be prudent to depart from that rule. He alluded to such cases where it came within the scope of possibility that an open hearing might affect and defeat the end of inquiry—namely, the attainment of justice; or cases in which inquiry was likely to expose third parties, who were not directly connected with them. If in all cases open inquiry were allowed, matters might be exposed which public decency ought not to suffer to be revealed. The Court of Chancery, the Court of King's Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, the Consistorial Court, were all open; yet, nevertheless, if cases came on that outraged public decency, no one grumbled, at least no one could fairly complain, if on such occasions the public were excluded. Let their Lordships then look at the Coroner's Court for a moment. The Coroner's Court was not a final court. Its proceedings were inquiring and preliminary. Nothing was decidedly done in that Court. It was the first step towards ulterior proceedings. It was like a Police Court rather than anything else; or, what was called in France, a procedure d'instruction. For one reason, however, he more particularly compared it to a Police Court. Police Courts were generally open—a course of examination was entered on—but they decided nothing. Police Courts were, however, sometimes closed; because if they remained open, it might defeat the ends of justice. He wished that he had it in his power to put the question to the Commons in that light. No reasonable man wished to keep Courts unnecessarily shut; and, in the case of the Coroner's Court, such a proceeding was rarely resorted to, and, when resorted to, only for the purpose of attaining the ends of justice. Upon a fair examination of the question, must it not strike every one that this precaution might be at times absolutely necessary for the purposes of justice? Would not an individual who, having been present at an examination, found himself likely to be discovered as a guilty party, would he not, on the moment the examination came to that point, get out of the way? Would he not say, "I know that this examination will lead to another, and a person now mentioned, who knows that I am guilty, will certainly be brought forward," and would he not, under this impression, immediately abscond? Whereas, by concealing the proceedings—by keeping out of view the parties likely to give evidence—the guilty person might think himself in perfect security, and thus fall into the hands of justice. In many instances, if they did not thus proceed, they would never get at the culprit at all. Was it not sufficient to show, that this course was frequently essential to the ends of justice, for the purpose of proving that, the Amendment objected to was correct? But the question had long since been decided. It was decided in the case of "Garnett and Ferrand," after having been very fully argued. The judgment of the whole Court of King's Bench (a very strong one at that time) was in favour of the practice. There were then on the Bench Lord Tenterden, Mr. Justice Bayley, his noble and learned friend (Lord Wynford), and Mr. Justice Holroyd—a sound constitutional lawyer—and, he believed, a "pure old Whig." All these learned judges were of opinion, that the Coroner's was not an open Court. If, then, in consequence of keeping the doors shut on particular occasions, the escape of a man who committed murder was prevented, or was likely to be prevented, he thought that he had, by pointing out this fact, said enough to justify himself in advising their Lordships to adhere to their Amendment. He should therefore move their Lordships to adhere to their Amendment which had been rejected by the Commons; and he should follow up that by another Motion, for the appointment of a Committee to draw up their Lordships' reasons for their dissent; and, finally, for a message desiring a conference with the Commons on the subject.

Lord Wynford

said, he was one of the Judges of the Court of King's Beach when the decision to which allusion had been made was come to. However friendly he was to opening the different Courts to the public generally, still he was of opinion, that in many cases strangers should be excluded. The keeping secret what passed was often highly advantageous to the interests of justice; and, on the other hand, the greatest possible inconvenience would not unfrequently be the result, if a premature disclosure of evidence were permitted.

The Marquess of Westminster

differed in opinion from his noble and learned friend on this occasion. The clause now proposed to be omitted was unquestionably a most important one. He did not mean to say, that the law was not exactly as it had been laid down; but certainly there was a strong feeling throughout the country that the doctrine which they had heard was not really the law of the land, and that there was no good reason for keeping the Coroner's Court closed at all. The other House of Parliament was so convinced of the necessity of this clause, that they had returned the Bill to their Lordships in consequence of their having omitted it. He thought it very desirable that the two Houses should, if possible, come to some satisfactory understanding on this subject. Allusion had been made to the fact that the superior Courts were sometimes closed as well as the Coroner's Court. But the individuals who generally presided in Coroner's Courts were persons of very different acquirements from those who presided in the Superior Courts. No comparison could, in fact, be fairly drawn between them. Very great abuse, he would say, the grossest abuses, had taken place in the Coroner's Court. He himself had known instances of gross abuses, of abuse in particular cases, which it was quite horrible to hear of. Let them look at the conduct of the Coroner in the Oldham case. It had created the greatest disgust throughout the country; and yet the same individual was Coroner to this day. He should say, that the man who was the subject of the inquest on that occasion, who was ——sent to his account, Unhousell'd, unanointed, unanneal'd.' had not, in reality, a fair inquest held on him. The whole case was conducted in darkness. He would suggest as some control that when the Courts were closed, a special report should be made by the Coroner, when the case was over, and communicated to the public through the newspapers. He was not surprised the House of Commons should feel sore on the present occasion, when he recollected that every important Bill which had been sent up by them had been rejected by their Lordships. At all events, several important Bills had been rejected—the Jewish Disabilities Bill, the Warwick Bill, and the Dissenters' Admission Bill.

The Duke of Wellington

said, that the observations of the noble Marquess as to the conduct of their Lordships were quite uncalled for. The House of Lords was an independent House as well as the House of Commons. If their Lordships, after considering a measure, should think proper to reject it, he did not see why the House of Commons should be offended. The three measures to which the noble Marquess had adverted were maturely considered, and on mature consideration rejected. And for one, he most solemnly protested against the doctrines put forth by the noble Marquess.

The Earl of Falmouth

thought the observations of the noble Marquess were not alone uncalled for, but incorrect. The Bills alluded to, involved principles of vital importance, and their Lordships had a right to deal with diem according to their own deliberate judgment.

The Lord Chancellor

said, the most absurd, and false, and ridiculous comments had been propagated respecting his share in throwing out the Warwick Bill, as though it had been done by him alone, and this for the purpose of making mischief between himself and other parties concerned in the measure; but it would not have any such effect. He in the discharge of his duties, from which he would never shrink, either in consequence of the reprobation of any individual or any set of individuals, or of the House of Commons—he, in the discharge of his duties, summed up the evidence, and stated his conviction, that it was not such as would enable their Lordships to proceed with the Bill. This he did with the concurrence of every noble Lord in the House, and especially of the noble Earl on the opposite Bench. Now this was suppressed—probably not intentionally, though it looked very suspicious, for an argument had been founded on the suppression of this most important fact, that the noble Earl (the Earl of Radnor), who had attended every minute when the evidence was given from the beginning to the end, and who certainly had no disinclination to the Bill, but the contrary, taking charge of it as he did in conjunction with another noble Lord, (Lord Durham) he named the noble Lord that there might not be any confusion, who, by the way, had not attended regularly, but only appeared upon occasion, in consequence of ill-health and from other causes—that noble Earl (the Earl of Radnor) came forward—but this was suppressed—came forward in his usual honest and straightforward manner, and not alone seconded his (the Lord Chancellor's) proposition, but moreover declared that he agreed in every word he (the Lord Chancellor) had said upon the subject; but this was suppressed, for the purpose of stating, that he (the Lord Chancellor), forsooth, had thrown out the Bill to spite Lord Durham, who was one of the oldest and most intimate and most valued of his friends, and with whom in political matters, be it observed, he agreed better than he did with many others. He certainly had not been, and would not be, prevented by this from doing his duty. He had done it with all firmness, but at the same time with all possible respect for the House of Commons. He concurred with the noble Marquess in regretting, that in any new instance he should be compelled to differ from the House of Commons, after those recent differences which their Lordships had with the House of Commons, to which he (the Lord Chancellor) had been no willing party. Still, he must do his duty.

The Duke of Cumberland

did not recollect that the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Westminster) ever did attend during the examination of witnesses on the Warwick Bill. The noble Marquess should, therefore, have been cautious in expressing an opinion on its merits. He could undertake to say, that seldom had there been a case more fully discussed, and he was convinced there could be but one opinion in the country on the subject, and that was, that justice had been done.

The Lord Chancellor

would be glad that some regulation was made as to Coroners in distant parts of the country. They were riot always, he admitted, the most respectable of men; they frequently were known to carve out work for themselves at the expense of the country, but this was not a question which could be then entertained.

The Motion for adhering to their Lordships' Amendment was agreed to, and a Committee of Conference appointed to communicate the same to their Lordships.