§ The Earl of Aberdeen rose, in pursuance of the notice he had given yesterday, to ask for some information from his Majesty's Ministers, with reference to one or two topics in the Speech of the King of the French on the opening of the French Chambers. That Speech contained matter to excite, at least, the surprise, of not only their Lordships, but of every man who had read it. For his own part, he confessed he had read it with astonishment, and his feelings were by no means mitigated by the manner, the tone, and the terms of this Speech, in which, to say the least, extraordinary matter was couched in most extraordinary language. There were two topics, in particular, touched upon in it of the utmost importance, so far as the interest and the honour of this country were concerned, and to them he was anxious to invite the attention of their 312 Lordships, with a view to obtaining some information from the King's Government; and these were, the present relations of France with Portugal, and the declaration respecting the Belgian fortresses. Their Lordships might recollect, that a short time since, he had taken it upon him to call the attention of the noble Earl opposite (Earl Grey) to the then existing relations between France and Portugal, particularly as they were affected by alleged grievances towards one or two individuals, natives of France, on the part of the Portuguese authorities, and the subsequent demand for redress by the French Government; the refusal to comply with which had led the French Government to make reprisals upon the subjects of Portugal, and capture their property. Without venturing to express an opinion on the merits of this demand, or the character of the alleged grievances, he had earnestly urged the noble Earl particularly to direct his attention to the numerous treaties between this country and Portugal, which bound us, in a manner, to the fortunes of that, our most ancient ally, with a strictness unparalleled in any other treaties between this and other States. On the faith of those binding treaties he had urged upon the noble Earl the paramount necessity of his employing all the influence of the English Government with foreign States, to avert the calamities which menaced our most ancient ally, and which could not fail to involve ourselves in difficulty and embarrassment. And what had been the result of his counsels? The Speech of the King of the French afforded an answer which too truly verified his forebodings; for it declared, that the Portuguese ships of war were in the hands of the French, and added, that "the tricoloured flag now floats under the walls of Lisbon." It might, perhaps, be matter of congratulation to the noble Earl that a French fleet should ride in triumph in the Tagus, but he was sure their Lordships and the country would not join in the exultation at seeing our most ancient ally thus at the mercy of the navy of France. And this brought him to his first question—namely, whether the noble Earl was then prepared to lay on their Lordships' Table such official documents as could explain the negotiations between Portugal and France, concerning the alleged grievances which had led to the result he had just specified; and between this country 313 and both those States, with a view to avert the calamity of war. The other topic of the Speech of the King of the French, on which he wished to obtain information was, if not more important to this country than that he had just alluded to, still more astounding. They were told, that the fortresses on the Belgian frontiers—at least, some of them—were about to be demolished—that is, that the barriers, in the erecting of which we had spent so much of our treasures and our blood, for the purpose of protecting the Belgian territory, were to be overthrown; and that henceforth the only security for the independence of the Netherlands would be, that derivable from their "neutrality being recognized by the great Powers, and above all, from the friendship of France." This fortress-barrier, which had been erected according to solemn treaties, to which all the great Powers were parties, for the defence of the kingdom of Belgium, was then about to be prostrated in the dust. If so, they were abandoning their own solemn acts; and consequently, it was but fair to presume, had entered into new engagements, implying the abrogation of those treaties. He therefore was anxious to learn whether the noble Earl was then disposed to submit to their Lordships some explanation of the particular nature of these arrangements—that is to say, a copy of the Diplomatic Act by which the abolition of these fortresses was formally sanctioned. It was highly important, that the Legislature should be in possession of information on a matter of such importance to the national interests, and as it might be, the national honour—that it should clearly understand the ground on which the English Government had consented to the demolition of fortresses which, at such a tremendous cost, we had mainly contributed, fifteen years ago, to erect as a barrier defence of the Netherlands—fortresses, he repeated, which we at that time wisely considered essential to the safety of the Netherlands; and not, as the Speech of the King of France erroneously asserts, "to menace France," instead of protecting Belgium. On these points he was anxious to obtain information.
§ Earl Greydid not rise to follow the noble Earl into the discussion he would fain provoke him into, because such a discussion, at that moment, while important negotiations on matters which it would necessarily involve, were still pending, 314 would be, to say the least, highly inexpedient. Neither the sarcasm, nor the implied sneer, of the noble Earl, should induce him to prematurely anticipate that discussion, or undertake the defence of his Majesty's Government for their conduct with reference to matters, he admitted, of great importance—but which he should be ready to vindicate whenever the noble Earl, or any body else in that House, would venture boldly to impugn it; they, of course, who would provoke the discussion, taking upon themselves the responsibility of the very serious consequences which it might occasion to the important, negotiations then pending. With respect to the relations of Portugal with this country and France, to which the noble Earl had alluded, and on which he had founded—should he call it a question to, or an attack upon, Ministers?—all he could say by way of answer was, to repeat his former often, and explicitly expressed acknowledgments, of the force of the treaties which bind this country to Portugal. He admitted the binding force of these treaties, but would, at the same time, deny that they went so far as to oblige us to undertake the defence of Portugal against every aggression of a third Power, which she might have provoked by her own misconduct, and that, too, when the existing government of that country had not been recognized by the British Court—no, not even by the Administration of which the noble Earl himself had been a member. He repeated, that we were bound by treaty to protect the kingdom of Portugal against foreign aggression, but not, when a third Power was only seeking redress for injuries wantonly inflicted by the Portuguese Government. The present, however, was not the time for discussing how far we were, or were not, bound to interpose between Portugal and the French arms. When the proper time arrived, he should be prepared to lay before their Lordships all the information necessary to elucidate the conduct of Ministers in the whole transaction, and to shew that that conduct had been actuated by an anxious desire to promote the best interests of the country. To produce that information at the present moment, would not only be premature and inconvenient, but most probably, during the pending negotiations between the parties interested, would be detrimental to the public service; and therefore he could not assent to 315 its production. "With respect," continued the noble Earl," to the noble Earl's taunt, that it might be a subject of congratulation to me to hear that the French fleet rode triumphant in the Tagus, I will only say, that I fling back the imputation with disdain; and I tell the noble Earl, that neither he, nor any man in this House, or elsewhere, can be more anxious for the honour and interests of the country than I am. I will tell him more, that the circumstances of the present relations of Portugal with, not only England, but every other European State, have been to me a source of deep regret—not the less so that the present Administration had no share in their formation, and that they are the sole product of the injudicious policy of our predecessors," So much with reference to that part of the noble Earl's animadversions which applied to the relations of France with Portugal. With respect to the other question of the noble Earl—that referring to the declaration of the King of the French, that the fortresses on the Belgian frontier are partly to be demolished—his answer would be very brief. For reasons arising out of the consideration of the impropriety of premature discussions of matters still the subject of anxious negotiations, he would not then enter at length into an explanation of the grounds on which the King of the French had made this declaration to his Chambers; and would merely observe, that there was no man who looked at passing events with the prospective eye of a statesman, who did not feel convinced that it would be impossible—morally and physically impossible—after the separation of Holland and Belgium into two separate and independent kingdoms, that the fortresses of the latter could be kept up on their past footing;—that, in fact, the razing of some of these fortresses must be the necessary and inevitable consequences of the act of separation. But all this was matter for a more fitting occasion. At present the question was, whether he was prepared to lay before their Lordships such documents as would explain the character of the negotiations which led to the new arrangement of the Belgian fortresses? In answer to the question, he would merely say, that though he should, as he had stated, feel indisposed to produce prematurely documents referring to negotiations pending between two States, both our Allies, and should particularly 316 object to granting the particular document called for by the noble Earl; yet, anxious not to permit the noble Earl's question to go wholly unanswered, and to prevent misconceptions of the actual import of the King of France's Speech, he would read to their Lordships two documents, the contents of which must be new, if not interesting, to all of them, and which he had brought down with him in consequence of the noble Lord's notice, and which he thought would be satisfactory, so far, at least, as the unanimity of the great Powers of Europe, with respect to the demolition of the Belgian fortresses was concerned. The paper he held in his hand was a copy of the Resolution or Protocol of the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, as well as of this country, respecting the demolition; and he felt, that it was not improper for him to read it—otherwise, nothing would induce him to state its contents—in order to shew the unanimity of these Powers in the consultations on the subject. The Protocol was dated the 17th of April, and was, he repeated, signed by the accredited Representatives of the Courts of Austria, Russia, Prussia, and England. The noble Earl read the Protocol, from which it appeared, that after the most anxious investigation of the subject in all its bearings, and pursuant to the spirit which dictated the Protocol, signed by the same parties in January, 1831, and which determined upon the separation of the kingdom of the Netherlands, into the two separate kingdoms of Holland and Belgium,—"the Plenipotentiaries of the above-named Powers and Allies have come to the unanimous opinion, that the fortresses of the Belgian frontier are too numerous for the resources of the new kingdom; and, moreover, do not afford a security for its independence; and that, therefore, they will, immediately after the independence of the new kingdom of Belgium had been formally recognized by the States of Europe, enter into negotiations respecting the particular fortresses which it may be expedient to raze." This clearly shewed, in the first place, the unanimity of the four great Powers in reference to the demolition of the Belgian fortresses, spoken of in the King of France's Speech; and it also showed—and this was important to bear in mind—that the proposition did not emanate with the French government. And it also showed, that the negotiations 317 respecting the particular fortresses to be razed, had, or rather would have—for they were not yet formally entered into—for their preliminary condition, the fact of the new King of Belgium being duly recognized by the great Powers of Europe, and the general peace being thereby secured. The four Powers having signed the Protocol he had just, quoted, proceeded next to announce their determination to the King of the French, who had no share in the negotiation; and accordingly, a Letter, dated so recently as the 14th of the present month of July, was addressed to Prince Talleyrand on the subject, signed like the Protocol, "Esterhazy, Bulow, Lieven, and Palmerston." The communication was to this effect:—the undersigned plenipotentiaries, being desirous to give further proofs of their earnest desire for the maintenance of peace, feel it their duty to communicate to your Excellency the annexed copy of protocol, and to inform your Excellency that the undersigned see no objection to giving to it the same validity as to the other acts of Congress. That Prince Talleyrand lost no time in forwarding this communication to his own Court, was evident from the circumstance of its being a prominent topic in the King of France's Speech. He would not then permit himself to enter into an examination of the question, as to what fortresses should or should not be dismantled; or of the grounds of the determination of the Plenipotentiaries of the four great Powers with respect to the settlement of Belgium, because such investigation would be mischievously premature during pending negotiations. When the proper time arrived, he persuaded himself he should experience but little difficulty in showing that the policy pursued by Ministers, conjointly with their Allies, with respect to France and Belgium, was that most conducive to the interests of the country, and least derogatory from the honour of the British Throne
§ The Duke of Wellingtondid not rise to embarrass Ministers in their pending negotiations, by a premature discussion of the subject matter of those negotiations, but to set the Government of this country, and himself personally, right in the eyes of the public with respect to that part of the Speech of the King of the French which applied to Belgium. Their Lordships were aware, that by the Treaty of peace of 1814, the kingdom of the 318 Netherlands was erected, and guaranteed in its independence; and they were, he believed, aware, that immediately after that Treaty had been ratified, it was arranged by the Ministers of his late Majesty and the King of the Netherlands, that a barrier defence of fortresses should be erected on the frontier of Belgium towards France at (he expense of the two countries—that is, of England and of Holland. That defence was justly considered essential to the security of the North of Europe. By the subsequent Treaty of Paris, in 1815, the projected fortresses were approved of by the Sovereigns of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, who, moreover, contributed their just share of the expense of their erection; it being felt that all Europe had a common interest in the existence of such a barrier. By this means, these fortresses became the common property of all the States which had assisted in their erection; that is, of England, Holland, Austria, Russia and Prussia—and, therefore, could not be disposed of or dismantled, without the concurrent resolution of all five. France had no right to offer any suggestion with reference to them; for it was as a protection against her possible military aggression that they had been erected. The fortresses were maintained on the footing he had specified till the progress of the Revolution last year, led to the dismemberment of the kingdom of the Netherlands, established and guaranteed by the Treaties of 1814 and 1815. The parties to these treaties, were pledged to their maintenance; and as the peace of Europe was involved in that, the great Powers, parties to the treaties, had no alternative save the conferences held in London, in which the assistance of the French government to preserve the general peace was very naturally taken advantage of. So far he saw no matter for blame; and could not deny, that the preservation of the peace of Europe might have required the separation of Holland and Belgium, and the establishment of a new dynasty in the latter kingdom. He would moreover admit, that no single government had a right to guarantee to the King of Belgium the maintenance of the defence erected for the King of the Netherlands, and that any arrangement on this head should emanate from the original guaranteeing parties. But still he would maintain, that the last government which ought to make the Belgian fortresses 319 a matter of complaint, or even the subject of any suggestion not contemplated by the Allied Powers he had mentioned, was the government of France. Nay more, if these fortresses were meant to be what the French King termed them in his Speech, and which he most unqualifiedly denied—namely, fortresses "raised to menace France, and not to protect Belgium,"—he would maintain, that the proposition to raze all or any of them, ought not to emanate from the French government. It was not as a menace to France, but as a defence to the North of Europe against French aggression, that these fortresses had been originally erected; and if the declaration of the Allied Powers to guarantee the independence of Belgium could satisfy that country, a fortiori it ought to satisfy France, which alone had no right to call upon other States to effect the demolition of the barrier. The King of Belgium might, if he so thought fit, declare, that the expense of all the garrisons on his frontiers would press too heavily on the resources of his kingdom, and the other Powers, parties to the erection of the fortresses—that is, he repeated, to prevent mistake, England, Holland, Austria, Russia, and Prussia—might interpose; but the reason that would authorize their interference, entirely shut out France from any participation in it. He was therefore rejoiced to find, that four of the great Powers—the original parties to the Treaty—had alone considered the question of the expediency of dismantling some of the fortresses, and that France had no share whatever in the transaction. Indeed, the only regret he had on this head was, that Holland, the fifth party to the original Treaty, was not also consulted in the Protocol read by the noble Earl. The noble Duke then repeated, that the Belgian fortresses were originally designed as a barrier of defence for the North of Europe, and that, therefore, to remove them would be, to expose Belgium and the Continent of Europe to French aggression. It was absurd to talk of a "guarantee of neutrality," being a valid security for the independence of the new kingdom. Those who had annexed Belgium to Holland in 1814, knew there could be no permanent guarantee, save what the means of warlike resistance afforded, and therefore assisted in erecting the frontier fortresses; and if the Netherlands, the two kingdoms, required this 320 barrier of defence, still more would the new kingdom, the smaller and weaker, require every external and internal security. These were his views, deliberately formed, of the proposed demolition,—views which he was anxious to state somewhat at length, and thus relieve the country and himself, who was a party to the original treaties, from the imputation cast upon them by the French King's Speech, that the fortresses were erected with any other view than as a means of defence against the aggressions of France, and not as a menace of aggression on that country. The next point he wished to call the attention of the House to was, the present relations of Portugal with this country and France. He confessed, that he had listened to the imperfect observations of the noble Earl on this point with concern. He expected something more satisfactory respecting a country so long and closely allied to us as Portugal. When he had read that passage of the Speech of the King of the French, in which he triumphantly boasted, that the Portuguese ships of war were then in his power, and that the tri-coloured flag floated under the walls of Lisbon, he felt his cheek tinge with shame, as an English subject, that our most ancient and intimate ally should be so treated with our permission. He did not say this in his military capacity, from having served as an officer in the army of Portugal. The deeds, the glorious deeds, of the British army in Portugal were now the imperishable subject of history. As an Englishman who had read the history of the country, he felt regret and shame—indeed, he would say something like indignation—that the English Ministry had taken no active steps towards averting the recent calamity from the unfortunate country connected with us by so many ties through a long series of years. He had, on a former occasion, expressed a hope, that Ministers would interfere, as England was the most ancient and trusted ally of Portugal, in restoring an amicable intercourse between the Portuguese and the French governments; and that they would, on the one hand, urge upon the French Court that the trifling circumstance—for trifling it was as compared with the resentment—of two individuals being treated harshly by the legal authorities in the north of Portugal; for that, after all was the sum and substance of the alleged grievance—was not worth the mere expense of the 321 expedition which they had sent to obtain redress, apart from the consideration that their insisting, by force, to extort that redress was fraught with danger to good order and the social repose of Europe, and could not but be viewed with angry jealousy, in particular by the people of this country. And, on the other hand, he thought that Ministers should have remonstrated with our ancient ally, and urged the expediency of its at once granting the French just compensation for the grievance complained of, and thus saved Portugal from its present disorders. We ought to have acted thus by an ally, not only the most ancient we possessed, but the most ancient possessed by any country in the world. From that alliance Portugal had hitherto derived great advantages—among others, of having been saved three or four times within their own recollection by the prowess of the British arms, which had there fought the battles of Europe, and obtained some honourable triumphs. But now, however, a different result was accruing to that country from her faith in our alliance, as was too manifest in the indifference with which we permitted her enemy, and for so many years the enemy of England, to take forcible possession of her. It was true, that the noble Earl did not pretend to justify our non-interference by the circumstance that Don Miguel's government had not been yet formally recognized by us, for the noble Earl had himself avowed the principle, that that recognition could not affect the treaty which bound us to interfere in certain cases of foreign aggression towards Portugal, by appealing to that treaty as the ground for demanding redress from Don Miguel in a recent case of injustice and oppression against a British subject. Policy, moreover, just now urged the expediency of our taking an anxious interest in the integrity of the Portuguese dominions, for it was, take it altogether, of more importance to us than any other State in Europe. He knew, indeed, or rather he inferred, that such was not the view taken of our intercourse with that country by Ministers; otherwise he could not account for the bill now in progress in the other House of Parliament, for putting an end altogether, and, as it should seem, for ever, to all the benefits which Portugal derived from her commercial intercourse with this country. And what would, he asked, be the inevitable result of such a 322 proceeding? Neither more nor less than dissolving the attachment of the Portuguese people to the British alliance. And, in such a state of things, what was more probable than that when France made her demands for compensation from her prostrate enemy, and made her submission to the French supremacy the price of her forbearing to enforce her demands with her cannon, than that Portugal should say to herself, "We have been abandoned by our ancient ally, on whom we ever placed confidence; she has not only permitted us to be attacked and defeated in our chief harbour, but deprived us of all the commercial advantages which we derived from our alliance with her: therefore, we have no resource but to throw ourselves upon the humane protection of our triumphant enemy." And it was needless to add, what eager friends and protectors they would at this moment meet with in the French. He was sorry to have been obliged to say as much as he had on this painful topic. He assured their Lordships, that the late misfortune which had befallen Portugal had occasioned him more poignant concern than any public event which had happened for some years.
§ Earl Greybegged leave to remind their Lordships of the great disadvantages under which he laboured in addressing them on the topics mooted by the noble Duke, as compared with the noble Duke: for, besides that there was no question substantively before the House, he felt himself fettered by the consideration that a reply to the noble Duke's fallacies would be a prejudicial anticipation of the discussion on matters still the subject of important negotiations. If, therefore, he permitted some of the noble Duke's observations to pass unanswered, he trusted the House would not. conclude that they were unanswerable, but ascribe it to the fact, that to answer them at that particular moment might be injurious to the permanent, and, he trusted, speedy termination of a delicate conference. He lamented as much as the noble Duke could, the circumstances which had led to the hostile relations between France and Portugal, but it did not follow, because the French fleet had triumphantly taken possession of the Tagus, that therefore the honour of England was at all humbled. At the proper time he would show, that Ministers had not been apathetic spectators of these proceedings, as the noble Duke would insinuate; and that 323 every thing had been done to avert the consequences, consistent with a just regard to our own permanent interests. At the present moment he would merely state—what all men connected with public affairs, or acquainted with history, well knew to be the fact, and what the noble Duke, who was so anxious for the honour of his country, would be ready to admit; that points trifling in themselves, if they were closely associated with the national honour, might become of the greatest importance—nay, of an importance greater than any that could be ascribed to what was ordinarily considered to involve the direct interests of the country. It was on this principle that satisfaction had been demanded, and the noble Duke would be ready to concede to other countries that regard for national honour which he was so ready to assert for his own. On a point such as this, satisfaction was demanded, and it was refused up to the very last moment. This was the only information which Ministers had on the subject. The noble Earl opposite (Aberdeen) might shake his head and whisper "No," if he pleased; but he (Earl Grey) must be allowed to claim credit for knowing as much of such subjects, at least, as the noble Earl; he would repeat, that satisfaction was demanded, that it was refused to the last moment, and that it was in consequence of that refusal that the French fleet entered the Tagus. The noble Duke had said, that the French had invaded the country, but he (Earl Grey) was not aware that the fleet had troops on board, or any thing else which would enable them to do that which would constitute an invasion of the country. The French fleet having so entered the Tagus, the satisfaction demanded was, at length, given, and there the matter rested, according to the communication made by the French government to his Majesty's ambassador. In such a state of things, it was obvious, that if he discussed the transaction, he must do so under very great disadvantages. He was restrained from fully discussing the subject, but when the proper moment came, he felt confident that he should be able to relieve his Majesty's Ministers from the reflections that had been cast on their conduct. From the noble Lord, he appealed to that House and to the country, and all he desired was, that the House and the public would suspend their opinions till the whole case was before them, and 324 until they could discuss the question with a view to the general interests, and with the power of coming to a just conclusion upon the premises. He would now come to another point of the attack that had been made upon his Majesty's Ministers. He alluded to the destruction of the fortresses which had been so recently erected on the frontiers of Belgium and of France. He was prepared to acknowledge, that the intention of the noble Duke, in subscribing the treaty by which the fortresses were erected, was to establish an effectual barrier for the defence of the Netherlands, and not to create any injury to France. The neutrality guaranteed to Belgium, which was so advantageous to the interests of the whole world, and so particularly advantageous to England, was likewise as advantageous to France, and would secure the Belgian frontiers more than the fortresses could have done. The House, he thought, would agree with him, that there had been circumstances connected with this system of fortresses—he alluded to the feelings of the Government and people of France—which could not be very favourable to the continuance of such works. This, however, was not a subject into which he could enter at that moment. All he would state was, that considering the circumstances of the country, the question was—whether it were possible to maintain those fortresses with any advantage to this country, and whether some new arrangements respecting them were not the natural consequences, and almost unavoidable result, of the separation of the two countries. For his part, he did not believe, that by the destruction of the fortresses the defence of the Netherlands would be materially diminished. If, unfortunately, a war had broken out between France and Belgium, his firm conviction was, that there was not a single one of those fortresses which would not have been in the hands of the French in the first week of the campaign. The noble Duke well knew that great doubts had existed among persons of the highest authority on such subjects, as to any advantage being derived from the erection of those fortifications. His (Earl Grey's) opinions were purely political, for in a military point of view, he need not say, that he could not place any opinions of his in contradiction to those of the noble Duke. In a political point of view he was, he hoped, competent to express his opinions on the subject; and he had no hesi- 325 tation in saying, that these fortresses did not conduce to the safety of Belgium. All he asked of the public, and all he asked of their Lordships, was, to reserve their opinions till all the circumstances of the case were fully before them. He wished their Lordships only to reflect on what had happened, and put it to themselves, whether, under all the circumstances of the case, particularly the separation of Holland from Belgium, the demolition of the fortresses might not be expected. He wished the public and their Lordships to withhold their judgment upon the point, whether Belgium would not be better off and better defended under the proposed arrangements than under the arrangement of the year 1815, till the whole of the negotiations were concluded, and the whole results fairly before them.
§ Conversation dropped.