Lord King.—My Lords. I have a Petition to present to your Lordships from the gentleman who was at the Bar of the House yesterday—I mean Mr. Lawson, the Printer of The Times newspaper, who is now in custody under your Lordships' order. I move that the petition he now read.
§
The petition was read by one of the clerks of the House as follows: —
To the Right Honourable the Lords Spiritual and Temporal.
The humble Petition of John Joseph Lawson, the Printer of The Times, now in custody,—
Showeth,—That your petitioner feels the sincerest regret at having given offence to your right honourable House, arid to the Earl of Limerick in particular, and craves pardon for the same; and humbly begs, in consequence of this acknowledgment of his error and regret, he may be set at liberty by your right honourable House.
And your Petitioner will ever pray.
JOHN, JOSEPH LAWSON.
The Earl of Limerick.—My Lords, I know not whether it is necessary for me, after what I have already said on a previous occasion, again to repeat, that in bringing forward this subject, I have been actuated by no personal feeling or motive. I did it merely on the ground of what I considered a gross attack having been made, through an individual Member of it, upon your Lordships' House, by the publication in question. Having so done, and your Lordships having- come to the decision that the paragraph complained of contained a gross libel on the individual who has the honour to address you, I conceive that I have done my duty towards your Lordships and myself. I declared at the time of bringing this sub- 1702 ject under consideration, that which I now repeat—namely, that I sought not then (nor do I look now) for the infliction of any severe punishment whatever upon the individual concerned. I am, however, perfectly aware that for former offences of a nature similar to this, but inferior in point of atrocity, very severe punishments have been inflicted. My Lords, I can show that parties have been sent to Newgate for three months for matters much lighter than the present. There was put in my hands this morning a paper containing two precedents of very serious punishments for Breaches of Privilege. The first case is that of Flower, and the other is the case of Mr. Perry, the Editor of the Morning Chronicle. It occurred on the 21st and 22nd of March, 1798. There was something comical in this Breach of Privilege. I refer, of course, to the terms of the libel, which arose under these circumstances:—Some observations were made in the House of Lords on the late hours observed at the Opera, and on the fact of the amusements being sometimes continued, so as to push them into the Sunday morning; also upon the almost naked dresses of the ladies. In reference to this the Morning Chronicle made the following remarks; — "The House of Lords must now be admitted to be highly important as a political assembly notwithstanding it has of late appeared to be nothing more than a Chamber where the Minister's edicts are registered for form's sake. Some of their Lordships are determined to vindicate their importance. It is there that the dresses of the opera dancers are regulated! One of the Roman emperors recommended to the senate, when they were good for nothing else, to discuss what was the best sauce for a turbot. To regulate the length of a petticoat is a much more genteel employment." This paragraph having been brought under the consideration of the House, was declared to be a gross and scandalous libel, and a Breach of the Privileges of the House; and Mr. Perry, and Lambert, the Printer of the paper, were committed to Newgate for three months. My Lords, I merely mention this, to show your Lordships what were the feelings, and what the conduct of the House of Lords at the period referred to, in reference to facts not nearly so gross as the present; but at the same, time that I refer to the precedent, I have no intention to push this 1703 question to an extremity of punishment, and whatever your Lordships may decide in relation to it will be perfectly acceptable to me, knowing as I do that your determination will be guided by justice, temper, and moderation.
The Earl of Mansfieldsaid, he felt disposed to move, that the petition do lie upon the Table, and that it be taken into further consideration to-morrow.
Lord King.—I am sorry that the noble Earl has made that observation. According to the feeling of the House yesterday, when Mr. Lawson was called to the bar (if he had not declined to answer some questions put to him), the course to be pursued would have been to have had him reprimanded and discharged at that time. Following up the course which the opinion of the House seemed yesterday to dictate, I feel inclined to move, that the petitioner be now called to the bar, reprimanded, and discharged.
§ Earl Bathurstwished the House to be cleared.
The Earl of Malmesbury.—I cannot approve of the noble Lord's suggestion, because, so far from wishing to conceal our proceedings from the public, I hardly conceive it possible to give them sufficient publicity. I am one of those who are disposed to maintain your Lordships' privileges, but I feel confident that our privileges can be better maintained by public than by private discussions. With respect to the proceeding to be adopted in this case, I had a motion in my hand yesterday, that the Printer be called to the bar, reprimanded, and discharged. I propose that, the noble Baron who presented the petition, should make a like motion to-morrow. It might be thought premature to make it to-day, as many Lords who were present yesterday may not be prepared to entertain it at this moment. Under all the circumstances of the case, I think it will be better for the noble Lord to give notice of motion for to-morrow.
§ Earl Grey.—I entirely agree with my noble, friend who spoke last, that when we are called on to consider a case like the present, and to enter into the question of privilege, there is considerable advantage in having our proceedings more especially public. Let it be borne in mind that in making this remark I by no moans say that cases may not arise for proceeding with closed doors, but, generally speak- 1704 ing, I am of opinion, that in order effectually to maintain the character, dignity, and privileges, of the House, it is better for your Lordships to proceed without any secrecy whatever. I am the rather anxious to lay down this principle, as in many cases of privilege the House has been cleared, at the same time that in others a contrary, and as I think a better, course has been taken. In the case of a complaint of Breach of Privilege arising a short time ago out of a message sent by an individual to a noble Lord, which message was interpreted to be in the nature of a challenge, I objected to the House being cleared, as was proposed, stating that I thought it better that the proceedings should take place in public, and accordingly they were so conducted. It was upon the principle of expediency in that (as in the present case) that I recommended that the orders of the House for the exclusion of strangers should not be enforced. With respect to what is to follow, I feel inclined towards the course recommended by the noble Earl opposite. My Lords, I should feel inclined in the present case, taking into consideration all the circumstances of it, and recollecting the noble Earl's disposition not to enforce any extreme penalty (although he quoted examples of severity—for what purpose it is not for me to say), I say I should feel well contented to call Mr. Lawson to the bar immediately, to have him reprimanded by the Lord Chancellor, and then discharged in the usual manner, on payment of his fees. But perhaps with a view to conciliate unanimity of opinion, and for a reason stated by the noble Earl opposite, it may be better to adjourn the consideration of the Petition till to-morrow, on the understanding that the motion be then! agreed to for calling the individual to the bar, and having him reprimanded for an offence which he has acknowledged, with an expression of contrition and regret at its occurrence. I trust that there will be no objection to the individual being then discharged, and that the discussion may terminate here.
The Marquis of Londonderry.—I confess, my Lords, I did understand, from the course yesterday taken, that it would be competent to any noble Lord, to deliver his sentiments on this subject in the event of the presentation of a petition, and to take the opportunity to state whether, in his opinion the punishment now pro- 1705 posed, or a greater punishment, should be inflicted. My Lords, when the resolution of the House is, that this individual, or the editor of the Paper, has been guilty of a scandalous libel, it appears to me that confinement, for a short period and a reprimand are but small punishments for the offence. I am not the individual to urge a strong measure of punishment, but I think it should be stated distinctly, that if we are disposed on the present occasion to allow the individual to escape with a small mark of our displeasure, still if such practices be continued, and if the privileges and the dignity of the House be attacked in future, that we will not be satisfied with the infliction of a light punishment, but will take measures to bring forward the editor, and individuals really guilty; for I cannot believe, that the person who appeared at the bar was the real author of the libel. I say, my Lords, we must then proceed to discover and adequately punish the individual who masks himself under the unfortunate man at the bar. I would here observe, that if there are individuals connected together for the purpose of writing such offensive paragraphs in this or any other Papers, I trust they will, if they have any feelings at all, sustain bitter pangs within their minds, when, on this occasion, they see your Lordships reprimand their publisher and printer, who, perhaps, has been merely obliged to comply with the orders of his employers. My Lords, when I saw the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, who I thought should have been a defender of your privileges, rather than a supporter of their impugners—when I saw him last night placing himself between the House and such an offender, for the purpose of shielding the latter, "I really was almost disposed to believe, that the noble and learned Lord was acting as counsel for a defendant in this proceeding. The Lord Chancellor.—My Lords, I rise to order: at the same lime I must say, that, personally, I have no objection to the noble Lord's course, so little do I dread its consequences. If I were the noble Lord's friend; I should dread the consequences to himself: he is perfectly at liberty, so far as I am concerned, to go on and make what exposition it may please him to make of me or of himself to your Lordships. I care not one rush for what the noble Lord can say—he may go on with his sarcasms, insinuations, or charges, as he pleases; but I would rather have 1706 the noble Lord's charges than his insinuations. I never use insinuations, I always bring direct charges; I would rather have the noble Lord's open hostility than his covert enmity. I am sure he is incapable of persisting in insinuations—the noble Lord has too much honour and high-mindedness for that: therefore, as the noble Lord has hinted something but charged nothing, I put myself on my defence before your Lordships and call upon the noble Lord to charge me with something.
The Marquis of Londonderry.—I beg the noble and learned Lord to believe, that no one has a higher respect than I have for his great and splendid talents; but with all his logic, and talents, and oratory, the noble and learned Lord shall not put me down, nor prevent me from discharging what I conceive to be my duty. The noble and learned Lord's great abilities and acquirements may often enable him
To makeThe worse appear the better reason.He possesses commanding eloquence which carries every thing before it like a torrent, and an individual like myself can have but little chance in an encounter with him; but, pigmy as I am, I tell the noble Lord, that neither he nor any oilier person shall deter me from taking a proper course. I shall now continue the observations I was about to make when interrupted by the noble and learned Lord; and I must say, that I did expect the noble and learned Lord to have taken a different part on the occasion in question. The noble and learned Lord set out last night with telling your Lordships that there was no use in proceeding with the case; but the House came to a. Resolution, nemine contradicente, directly against the noble and learned Lord's recommendation. What was the next step taken by the Lord Chancellor? The noble and learned Lord near me having proposed fine and imprisonment, the Chancellor again started up and opposed a punishment which, for my own part, I. think would have been well applied in the present instance. The Lord Chancellor's opinion did weigh with your Lordships, and the proposition was abandoned. What I submit is, that the noble and learned Lord did not take the part which became him in reference to the gross outrage committed on the feelings of the noble Earl, and against the privileges of the House. These are the sentiments which I was about to give utterance to, when interrupted by the 1707 noble and learned Lord, and which I am not I now ashamed to express. I shall now observe that the unfortunate individual who was yesterday at the bar, is not, in my opinion, the person most worthy of being visited with punishment. If the petition be brought up, I shall move for a copy of the affidavit deposited at the Stamp-office and containing a list of the names of the proprietors of The Times. I give notice of my intention to move for this document to-morrow, and I mean to have it produced, because I think we may thus find individuals to tell us at the bar who the real writers of those paragraphs are. Sure I am that Mr. John Joseph Lawson is not one of the writers; I am convinced that in this respect he is as innocent as myself. My Lords, I have so far stated my sentiments on this subject, and when the petition is brought up, or taken into further consideration, I shall also consider myself at full liberty to express my opinion. I beg the noble and learned Lord to believe that I am the last man in the world to fail in respect for his great talents, but if he thinks to overwhelm me by the torrent of his eloquence, he will find himself mistaken. I shall always stand up firmly for what I conceive to be right.
The Lord Chancellor.—I know not whether I should not better consult your Lordship's feelings and my own by taking no notice of what has been just uttered by the noble Lord, in one of the most extraordinary speeches which I have ever heard; but I am desirous of setting myself right with your Lordships, and with the noble Marquis whose indignation we have witnessed without knowing the grounds of it. As for my reason for calling the noble Lord to order—it being the first, as it may perhaps be the last time in my life that I shall call any noble Lord to order under similar circumstances—I did so because he saw fit to stigmatise the conduct of an individual Peer, by saying that that, individual had acted the part of an advocate or counsel for an offender, at a time when that offender was before him, as one of the Judges of the highest Court in the kingdom.
The Marquis of Londonderry.—One word in explanation. I meant to convey and, indeed, said, that the conduct of the noble and learned Lord was such as almost to make me believe that the noble and learned Lord was the advocate of a defendant.
The Lord Chancellor—My Lords, able and skilful orators, like the noble Marquis frequently have a cunning way of rendering it difficult to get at their meaning according to the known and ordinary acceptation of the terms which they employ, they wrap up and mystify so successfully; but I, as your Lordships well know, am a plain man, and I say, without any subtlety or refinement, that the noble Lord's mode of expressing himself, even now, is such as would almost make me believe that he meant to insinuate that my conduct on the occasion in question was more worthy of a hired advocate than of an impartial Judge, sitting in the highest Court in the realm. My Lords, the noble Marquis is quite right in not allowing any man to prevent him from doing what he conceives to be his duty; far be it from me to attempt to make the noble Lord refrain from any given proceeding, or to impede or obstruct him in the discharge of his parliamentary duty; but what I beg him to do for bis own sake, seeing he has hinted a complaint, for my sake, and for the sake of the dignity of your Lordships' House (of the privilege of which he is so staunch an upholder), is, that if he has any charge, in connexion with this subject, against me, or any other Member of the House, to state it in an open, manly, and straight-forward way. The charge which the noble Lord has insinuated is, that in respect of the individual who yesterday appeared at the bar, I played almost the part of an advocate, although that person was admitted to have committed a breach of privilege, and that, to the noble Lord's great and unmixed astonishment, instead of taking the part of the House, and siding against the culprit, I went with the offender, and against the House, upon a matter declared, nernine dissentiente, says the noble Lord (and if declared without dissent, then must even I have been a party to the declaration), to be a gross infringement of privilege—a false and scandalous libel. Now just look at the noble Lord's argument: the noble Lord says I sided with the culprit, and unfairly endeavoured to bring him off; yet it appears I agreed to the proposition for declaring the paragraph a gross and scandalous libel; so that, according to the noble Lord's reasoning, I must have been a party to the rejection of my own plan. But the noble Marquis has given a very imperfect account of the transaction, considering that I myself stat- 1709 ed to your Lordships, whatever might be my advice, founded on experience, as to the expediency of your Lordships not getting much deeper in the difficulty created by prosecuting this breach of privilege, that at all events, if you were disposed to go on, it was quite a matter of course that your decision must be against the accused, it being perfectly evident that the article complained of was a breach of privilege. Whether this was an abandonment of the privileges of your Lordships' House (and the noble Lord accuses me of abandoning them) I know not; I leave it to your Lordships to determine. Having, in the outset, expressed my opinion as to the character of the offence, I only offered my advice—advice that might have been dictated through imprudence, as to the result of getting into unnecessary discussions on the privileges of your Lordships' House, discussions which can tend to nothing less than to the support of your privileges and dignity. Nothing has passed this night in the face of the public, any more than last night behind the backs of the public, to alter my opinion as to the inexpediency of these discussions. But I was the first to declare myself a friend to the maintenance of the privileges and dignity of the House, and I was also the first to advise such a course to be adopted as might render every measure to be taken in this proceeding a measure sanctioned by the unanimity of the whole House. As has been stated, when fine and imprisonment were proposed, I entreated the noble and learned Lord who suggested them, not to press the proposition, which, by the way, was never formally made, but only thrown out for consideration. It is only justice to the noble and learned Lord to admit, that he was under the impression that fine and imprisonment were the least punishments that had ever been inflicted under similar circumstances, and upon that account only the noble and learned Lord proposed them. But that I should ever agree with the noble Marquis to fine a man 100l. and commit him to Newgate for six months, for a breach of privilege such as this, is altogether impossible. I must first have this question of your Lordships' privileges debated at length. I must open up the question of the right of the House to imprison for six months and inflict a fine—it may be of 10,000l.—on an individual, tried by no jury, and defended by no counsel, because a noble Lord may complain of 1710 his feelings being injured by a newspaper paragraph. Why, my Lords, if such a principle were to be admitted, one noble Lord would complain of one newspaper, another would direct your attention to a breach of privilege in a second, and the practice might be extended till your Lordships' House would be converted into an Inquisition instead of a Court of Justice. My Lords, before I can admit such a principle, I must have this matter argued; and if the noble Marquis thinks it a mere motion of course, that the King's subjects shall be sentenced to imprisonment and fines, he is very much mistaken, and will find, that every time such a thing shall be proposed, he and I must meet and battle, first, the point of law, secondly, the point of privilege; and if, upon these points, the right of fine and imprisonment be established, then we must dispute the point of justice to the public, of humanity to the individual, and of prudence and discretion in your Lordships. For these reasons, and because I am a friend to the character, privileges, and dignity of this House, and desirous of upholding them, and not that I act the part of counsel to an offender against your Lordships' privileges, I shall give my vote for the measure that will soonest get rid of the difficulty, and it is no fault of mine that it has been created.
The Marquis of Londonderry.— My Lords, I wish to say a few words in explanation, and though I may be supposed to be writhing under the eloquence of the noble and learned Lord, I still think I am able to answer one or two points of his speech. As to the charge which he says I brought against him, I certainly did state that the noble and learned Lord's course in the matter, and the arguments which he used, put me in mind of an advocate; and it appeared to me, that if the noble and learned Lord had really been arguing the case in the capacity of counsel for the criminal, he could not have spoken with more zeal or eloquence on his behalf. As to the noble and learned Lord's not tip-holding the privileges of the House, my remark is fully justified by the speech which he has just delivered; for in the latter part of it he appears to doubt the existence of those privileges. If the noble and learned Lord doubts them, I do not; and I must say, I should much rather have heard the sentiments which, he has uttered on the subject expressed by any one rather than by him. I think the privi- 1711 leges of the House go much further than the noble and learned Lord seems to imagine, and I am sorry for the latter part of his argument, because, being of opinion that fine and imprisonment may be justly inflicted by the House, I am sorry to see the fact questioned by such an authority as the noble and learned Lord.
§ Lord Wynford.—I am much obliged to my noble and learned friend for his explanation of what fell from me on this subject last night. What I said upon that occasion has been altogether misunderstood. I never moved, that fine and imprisonment should be inflicted; I did not propose that fine and imprisonment should be inflicted on Mr. Lawson, but I proposed that what the noble Lord on the cross-bench threw out on the subject of fine should be adopted; and, as usual in all such cases, that the party should be imprisoned till the fine was paid, consistently with the practice adopted in all the Courts. But. I never dreamt of uniting the two punishments of fine and imprisonment and I never thought of inflicting a fine till the person at the bar had refused to disclose who was the party concerned in the publication in question. I certainly thought that his refusal, and his putting himself upon his confidential situation, in justification of that refusal, had aggravated the case, and on that account I proposed a fine. The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, although he did not directly dispute the authority of the House to inflict fine and imprisonment, appeared disposed to throw some doubt upon it. For my own part, I should tremble to hazard an opinion contrary to that of the noble and learned Lord upon this or any other subject; were I not fortified by some decided authority. Such an authority does exist in the present instance: I allude to the case of "The King and Flower;" the defendant having been committed by the House, applied to the Court of King's Bench by Habeas Corpus, and no case was ever argued with greater ability than this by the defendant's counsel; yet the Court, without hearing any answer, at once confirmed the authority of Parliament. This decision sets at rest the question of right, and I thought it due to the House to quote it, as the privilege seems to have been questioned by my noble and learned friend. But although I stand up for the power of the House, and insist upon its authority to fine and imprison, 1712 I would disclaim any intention of acting up to the extent of the power, or any thing like it: on the contrary, I shall be quite content with whatever may be done on this occasion, which, in the opinion of those more conversant than so young a Member of the House can possibly be with the practice and privilege of Parliament, shall appear fit.
The Marquis of Lansdown.—I think that this case should be disposed of at the time proposed by the noble Lord, and, if possible, with a complete unanimity of feeling on the part of the House; and I am happy to collect, that there is at present but little difference of opinion as to the course which it may be ultimately expedient to adopt. What I protested against last night was, the principle of bringing an individual to the bar without sufficient notice. I have not expressed any opinion as to the existing authority of the House, but I said that upon a question on which great doubts had been thrown, we ought not to come to a resolution hastily, or act upon the feeling of the moment, when we might afterwards wish that our resolution had been adopted after better and more mature consideration. It is but justice to the noble and learned Lord opposite, to admit that his proposition was not persisted in. The first feeling —namely, that the individual at the bar should be called up and reprimanded—was abandoned, on a comparison of his case with one which had recently occurred, and in which a similar course was taken. It was thought, that what was considered sufficient punishment in the one case might be too light in the other: besides, in the case of the individual who had received the reprimand, the party was brought, at a considerable expense to himself, from Ireland, so that the punishment was greater than it could be in the present instance. Upon that consideration, and also in reference to a doubt whether Mr. Lawson's apology to the House, and to the noble Earl, was sufficiently ample, the idea of reprimanding and discharging him last night was abandoned. But now both objections appear to be got rid of. The individual has been subjected to some further confinement, and may be retained in custody till to-morrow. The petition, which has been read, expressing his deep regret at having failed in respect to the House, and to the noble Earl whose feelings have been hurt on this occasion, seems 1713 to be ample. Thus, both pleas, the inadequacy of the punishment and the want of a proper apology, have been removed, and under these circumstances, I put it to your Lordships, whether the more reasonable and lenient course will not be, to direct Mr. Lawson to attend at the bar to-morrow, in which case he can be reprimanded and discharged. In these proceedings, my Lords, I can most readily concur; but, my Lords, I beg to state now, that if any noble Lord shall to-morrow propose to carry the matter any farther than this, I shall most certainly oppose the proposition of that noble Lord.
Earl Balhurst.—I rise, my Lords, merely to observe, that even if the proposition for taking this discussion with closed doors can justify the imputation which has been made by the noble Earl opposite, still I think that it would have been far better if such a proposition had been acceded to. I am far from contending that it is always necessary that your doors should be closed upon every discussion respecting the privileges of your Lordships; but I do say, that when you have to debate a complaint of libel, or an imputation of libel, or other matter of the like nature, it would be much better, in my opinion, to deal with such things with closed doors. I am sorry, therefore, that the order of your Lordships was not enforced to-day; and after what we have heard, I believe that I am addressing very few indeed among your Lordships who do not concur with me in that expression of regret, and who are not now, whatever they might have thought at first, of opinion that it would have been much better to have taken this discussion with closed doors.
§ Earl Greysaid, I am sure, my Lords, it will be in the recollection of your Lordships, that I only differed from the noble Lord as to the propriety of excluding strangers. The ground of my opposing the exclusion of strangers is this, namely, that I do not think that it is to the advantage of the privileges of your Lordships, and much less to the dignity and the character of your Lordships, to take such a discussion as this with closed doors. I did not, however, my Lords, throw any imputation, even the most distant, upon noble Lords who took a contrary view of the manner in which, upon such occasions, the privileges, the dignity, and the character of your Lordships would be best consulted.
§ Lord Tenterdensaid (as far as he could be understood, for his Lordship spoke in a very low tone)—My Lords, after what has fallen from the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, I think myself bound to inform your Lordships, that it is the constant practice of all Courts of law, in inflicting a fine, to add to that infliction this farther term—namely, that the party fined shall be imprisoned until that fine be paid. I speak, my Lords, of the superior Courts in Westminster-hall; and I am sure that instances of this practice will be found in all of those Courts. Now, my Lords, I cannot bring myself to think, that while the Courts of Westminster-hall possess this privilege, it can properly be denied to your Lordships. In what cases, under what circumstances, and to what extent, your Lordships should exercise that privilege, is quite another question, and one upon which I do not propose to say one word; but I must declare, that I think the right of your Lordships to the exercise of that privilege is clear, distinct, and indisputable. And why, my Lords, was this power conferred? It was conferred, my Lords, not for the protection of those who possess it—-not for the sake of the House of Lords—not for the sake of the House of Commons— not for the sake of the Courts of law, all of whom are in equal possession of the power—but for the sake of the nation at large, for whose welfare and well-government it was absolutely necessary, that all men should be taught to pay due reverence to the great legislative council of the kingdom, and to those tribunals of justice in which the laws of the land are administered. These, my Lords, are the reasons why the two Houses of Parliament, and why Courts of law, possess this power; these are the reasons why each of them ought to possess it: and I am quite sure that if they, and especially the two Houses of Parliament, did not possess this power of vindicating themselves, it would be impossible that their respective duties could be performed with dignity to themselves, or with advantage to the country.
The Lord Chancellorsaid—My Lords, I am once more compelled to embark in this unfortunate discussion. I say compelled, because, after what has fallen from my noble friend, the Lord Chief Justice, upon the subject of parliamentary law, I feel myself under the necessity, the absolute necessity, for the sake of the dignity 1715 and the character of Parliament—for the sake of the country and of the subjects of the King-, as well as oat of kindness to my noble friend,—first of all to set my noble friend right upon a point of so much importance; and, next, to give my noble friend an opportunity of reconsidering what he has said, and then of explaining himself to your Lordships. I have said, my Lords—and I repeat it now once more—that I do very much doubt the existence of this power with which your Lordships are said to be invested, and to which some of your Lordships appear to cling with so much and such fond tenacity; and, my Lords, if I do entertain this doubt, I have at least the consolation of knowing that I am countenanced in my scepticism by some of the very highest constitutional authorities, and by some of the greatest lawyers, as well constitutional as general lawyers, that ever the Bar produced, or that ever adorned the Senate, or that ever added weight and dignity to the Bench. But, my Lords, in spite of the support which I receive from such great and learned men, I believe that I am quite wrong, and I believe so, my Lords, because you tell me so. True it is, my Lords, that you are judges in your own cause, and if I do not raise any argument upon that as between your Lordships and myself, with regard to the existence of this power, yet, let me tell your Lordships, that the fact of your being judges in your own cause ought to make you very slow to exercise this power: for though you will always be the judges in your own cause in matters of this description, if you possess this power, yet, let me tell you, that you will not always be what? judges ought to be— calm, temperate, dispassionate, disinterested, and just judges; but yet, without these, essential qualifications of judges, destitute of the only qualifications which can ensure a fair administration of justice, and being, moreover, at once a party to, and the judges of, the cause, your course of proceeding will be, to drag a man to your bar against whom there has been no indictment, to tell him what charges are made against him—to whom you allow no counsel to advise with him, either with regard to matter of fact or matter of law —whose defence, be it what it may, will be deemed good or bad according to your opinions, and not according to any other criterion: and upon this man, so situated, you will, without deliberation, and under 1716 a sense of wounded dignity, proceed to pass what sentence you may please to pass, for the sentence will be regulated by your pleasure and by nothing else; or if by any thing else, by some precedent laid down by men who before your times have appeared in the same character of party, accuser, and judge—whose object may have been punishment, not justice—who may have been influenced, not by respect for your privileges, but by vindictiveness arising from some personal offence, and may perhaps have taken as little time as yourselves to allow their resentment to subside. And this, my Lords, this is the course by which you propose to vindicate your privileges, and to preserve the dignity and the character of your Lordships' House unsullied! I know very well, my Lords, that this is no reason against the possession of this power—I mean no reason for saying that you have it not; but I think it may perhaps be a very good reason why you ought never to have had it: and surely, my Lords, it is a reason as strong as it ought to be convincing—surely, my Lords, it is the very best possible reason why you should abstain from the exercise of that power: surely, my Lords, it is the very best possible reason why you should have taken that advice which I took the liberty to tender to you—to tender to you for the sake of your privileges, and not for the sake of violating your privileges— namely, that you should abstain from the exercise of such a power, except in cases of imminent and absolute necessity. Now my noble friend the Lord Chief Justice may be very right—and I know your Lordships think he is—in saying that you have this power; but he cannot be right in the reasons which he has given for the possession of that power. Let him be quite right in saying that you have the power, but he must be quite wrong in the reasons which he has assigned for saying that you have it. What were those reasons? I heard them, my Lords, with wonder and amazement. He tells you, that because the Courts of law in Westminster-hall have the power to fine and imprison, so also must the Houses of Lords and Commons have that power. Good God! my Lords, who ever heard till this moment—when were you ever told till this day, when you have been told it by a Lord Chief Justice of England—that the House of Commons has the right to inflict fines and imprisonment upon his Majesty's subjects in vindi- 1717 cation of their privileges? No one who knows any thing about the law and the constitution of the country can hesitate for a moment in saying that the Lord Chief Justice is grievously in error here; and until I am told by my noble friend, in terms the most clear and the most explicit, I will not believe that he is prepared to defend and justify in law what he has thus said; for he has thereby conferred upon the House of Commons a power, which none of his least-learned, none of his worst, none of his most corrupt, none of his least calm, his least temperate, or his least respectable, predecessors, ever dreamt of arming the Commons with. But I may be doing the Lord Chief Justice wrong; he may think, in conformity with the reasons he has given, that the House of Commons has this power though it does not exercise it, for upon that, at least— the non-exercise of it—there can be no doubt. And if so, perhaps my noble friend thinks that the Commons have the power of examining upon oath as well as your Lordships, and that your Lordships and the Commons participate equally and reciprocally in all the privileges and powers incident to each. It is quite clear, however, that my noble friend supposes that the Speaker of the House of Commons may summon a man to the bar of the House, fine him 100l., and imprison him till the fine be paid. Yes, this must have been the opinion of my noble friend, which I hereby give him an opportunity of retracting, as I have no doubt he will; for, upon reflection, my noble friend must see that that opinion is utterly untenable, although his whole argument was intended to support and demonstrate it—that argument being, that as the Courts in Westminster-hall had the power, so also must the Houses of Lords and Commons have it. My Lords, I have been dragged into this discussion—I have been compelled to say this; for, as a Member of this House, and filling the situation which I have the honour to hold, I could not, consistently with my duty as a Member of this House, or consistently with the character of the office which I fill, hear the Lord Chief Justice of England—no slight authority on a point of law—make this exposition of parliamentary law without at once contradicting, it. If my noble friend, the Lord Chief Justice, adheres to this opinion, let him make a motion upon the subject, and, bring his store of legal 1718 research to bear upon it, and support it if he can. Let him do this, and if, in doing this, he should succeed in persuading your Lordships that the House of Commons has this power and privilege — and I should not be at all surprised if he did persuade your Lordships of it—your Lordships will have the satisfaction of knowing that you have, by the sanction of your Lordships' high authority, invested the House of Commons with a power which the stoutest friend of parliamentary privileges never before ventured to arrogate to the Commons House of Parliament.
§ Lord Tenterdensaid—My Lords, I never was a Member of the House of Commons, and therefore I must be far inferior in the means of information on this subject to my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack, who was for so long a time one of the most distinguished ornaments of that House. I spoke from recollection—it may be from imperfect recollection—but I was strongly impressed with the notion that there were instances in which the House of Commons had exercised this power. I was mistaken, I dare say: but with regard to this House, I think there can be no doubt that it has the power.
The Lord Chancellor.—I am very glad that I have given my noble and learned friend an opportunity of making this explanation, because these things, though very familiar to Members of the House of Commons, may not be so well known here, where still there can be no inconvenience in having them understood. The fact is, that the House of Commons has the power of commitment, but not for any certain time; they have the power to commit as a means of removing an obstruction; but the confinement of the person so committed can last no longer than the end of the Session. The House of Lords, on the other hand, being a Court of Justice—a Court of record—nay, the highest Court of justice—is said to have the power of committing for a time certain, and of fining; but that power has been disputed by many sound lawyers, and especially by Sir Arthur Pigot, who was one of those who denied that the House of Lords had the power of committing for a time certain. I know very well that the Court of King's Bench has decided otherwise.
Lord Kingsaid—As it appears to be the opinion of your Lordships that this matter 1719 should be postponed till to-morrow, I will not press that Mr. Lavvson should be called to the bar to-day. I should have thought it would have been much better, and much more convenient, to have disposed of the matter at once; but still I will not urge my own opinion in opposition to that of your Lordships.
The Earl of Haddingtonsaid—I thought at first, and I still think, that the noble Earl who introduced this subject, and your Lordships who took it up, have acted quite properly. Still, however, I concur with the noble Lord who has just sat down, in the opinion that it would be much better to finish the matter at once, than to postpone it till another day. I think that the object has now been attained. However, if this proposition of mine is to create any considerable difference among your Lordships, I will not say another word about it. If the question were, whether Mr. Lawson should receive some considerable punishment, or whether he should only be reprimanded, I agree that we ought to take time for consideration; but as I understand it to be settled, that your Lordships do not propose to go farther than a reprimand, and that the only question is, whether that reprimand shall take place to-morrow or to-day, I must say, that I think it would be better if it were to take place to-day.
The Marquis of Londonderryconceived, that the better course would be, to postpone taking the petition into consideration till to-morrow. He congratulated their Lordships that the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack was not at present, so uncertain about their Lordships' privileges as at the beginning of the discussion.
The Lord Chancellorthen put the question, "That the matter contained in this petition be taken into further consideration to-morrow."
§ Agreed to.